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THE BEING OF ART AND THE ART OF BEING: HERMENEUTIC ONTOLOGY IN 
GADAMER AND WOOLF 
August 3, 2015 
Overall, the point of this project is to plumb the affinities between Gadamer’s notion 
of hermeneutic ontology and Virginia Woolf’s novels—how these affinities illuminate 
and contribute to an improved understanding of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics 
and Woolf’s novels. For their part, Gadamer and Woolf belong to a similar cultural and 
historical milieu, each, in one way or another, a participant in the intellectual and artistic 
movement known as Modernism. This movement arose in response to the encroaching 
impersonality of scientific objectivity: both Woolf and Gadamer recognized the pitfalls of 
this objectivity, as it necessarily discounts the interpretive opportunity and responsibility 
of the individual. In Virginia Woolf’s novels, we witness an intensification and 
enactment of one’s interpretive imperative. In their structure and thematics, we encounter 
narratives that emphasize interpretive experiences and concepts—in them there is a heavy 
accent on those experiences that are binding, those experiences that shape consciousness 
and determine one’s interpretive horizon. Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical outlook 
is especially useful for an analysis of these novels because his philosophy concerns the 
interpretation of day to day existence as it relates to the interpretation of a literary text. 
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For its part, this philosophical framework hinges on the primacy of language—its 
universality and our unconsciousness of it—our belongingness to art—its ability to 
engage the meaningfulness of our perceptions and alter them too—and the dialogical 
situation in which all language use occurs—every utterance belongs to an occasion, its 
meaning only understandable as it relates to its context. Woolf’s novels, for their part, 
highlight and emphasize these hermeneutic and ontological precepts. In these narratives, 
we encounter characters who interpret their existence; this interpretive dynamic—and the 
philosophical precepts that undergird them—are decisive for the significance and impact 
of these novels; interpretation and meaning are, in fact, the primary subject matter. I will 
argue that—as others have noted—a philosophical approach is useful for understanding 
these novels in their full scope, that there is a philosophical undercurrent that runs 
through these narratives, but that the philosophical scholarship on Woolf fails to fully 
appreciate the hermeneutic and ontological underpinnings that are decisive for their 
meaning. Instead of reading these novels through a lens of radical interpretation and 
questionability, the present scholarship relies on static concepts such as world, self, and 
reality. My argument is that these concepts are not static, that they are in movement as 
the individual engages with language, with art, and with others. In many ways, these 
novels are defined by this movement—how one’s understanding and horizon is shaped by 
this engagement—and the consequences and implications therein. In relating Woolf’s 
novels to Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, the reader acquires an improved sense 
for the reference of the words that populate her novels, words that determine the meaning 
of a world and the characters who inhabit it: these narratives include characters who 
strive to understand, who either fail or succeed based on their willingness to privilege and 
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engage with experiences of language, of art, or dialogue with others. Now, in relating 
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics to Woolf’s novels, the reader encounters an 
enactment of Gadamer’s philosophical outlook: interpretation is inescapable—whether 
reading or living an average day, the world and its meaning are forever in motion and it is 
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There are many ways to interpret Virginia Woolf’s novels, but, up until now, no 
one has chosen to organize his or her interpretive effort around Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 
hermeneutic ontology. For its part, hermeneutic ontology concerns how people interpret 
at all: the world is meaningless until it is presented. For Gadamer, the originary 
presentation is language. Language is the means by which people acquire a world (Truth 
and Method 440). Nevertheless, language is occasional: it belongs to an overall meaning 
while never fully able to express that totality. People, then, are tuned to engage with 
presentation, as a part of their/our linguisticality. We make and engage with art to enact 
our interpretive project: artworks are always what they are meant to be, but that meaning 
is inexhaustible. Undoubtedly, artworks do compel: through art we gain knowledge that 
we would have in no other way. As examples of art that take place in language, Woolf’s 
novels provoke the reader: what is language? What is art? What does it mean to be? The 
answers, of course, are contained within the novels and are central to their interpretation; 
some of them will be fleshed out, too, in the following pages.  
In particular, I will be interpreting two of Woolf’s novels: Mrs. Dalloway, and To 
the Lighthouse. For their part, these novels are lyrical texts that explore language, art, and 
the wonder of being human. In all three, there is an interpenetration and codeterminacy: 
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as one’s relationship to language, art, or being changes, the other two morph also. In her 
novels, she tells the stories of characters who are presented as people—but with an 
emphasis on how the stories are told; the narrator takes center stage: the exact meaning or 
nature of these characters is not known; all views and portraits are productive, and 
lacking at the same time, in tension; who and what people are does vary, but each does 
have an identity that depends on assertion—each has to be someone or something, 
whoever or whatever it may be. Here the narrator describes and presents by way of 
language; the identity of these characters depends on that description; the only way that 
the reader knows these characters—the only way that they are anything at all. This 
particular aspect of the narrative reminds the reader: we are by way of language. Of 
course, Woolf’s novels are not just reminders of the indeterminacy of identity and the 
neediness of language, they call attention to the text as text—the concept of text—and to 
art as art—its concept too. That is, Woolf’s novels are about characters who interpret and 
negotiate existence, but they are also about novels and how they can mean. Certainly, 
Woolf plays with form; she makes a kind of argument: the meaning of a story depends 
much more on its narrative posture than its action. These novels jar the reader: part of 
their identity is to demand interpretive awareness; that is, the ubiquity of interpretation 
and its vital importance. 
 Like Woolf, Gadamer recognizes that human being and interpretation are 
inseparable. In his case, though, he is not an artist. He writes about art. As for Woolf, 
because she is a novelist, her commentary on art or the novel is embedded in the text 
itself: hers is not a direct commentary; instead she takes the path of inference. As an 
instantiation of art, her novels create the terms of their identity: what they mean and how 
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they mean are determined by the particulars of each novel; each changes the identity of 
the genre and the identity of art. This particular nature of art and the novel is considered 
by Gadamer. The meaning of art and novels depends on what has come before: each new 
artistic creation is in dialogue with the past; in the moment of creation, though, its aim is 
to engage with the particulars of the present moment; to create something new; to gain 
insight. So it is that change, openness, newness—all are part of the identity of art. But it 
is not only art that Gadamer confronts: he also takes aim at the concept of language and 
the idea of the human being as he or she relates to the world. Gadamer’s starting point is 
the concept of text and its proper interpretation. He argues that a text is contemporaneous 
with all of its readers and that part of its identity is to endure; texts stem from the need for 
posterity, the urge to carve out a stance on the present moment that nevertheless remains 
understandable and open to future application (“Text and Interpretation” 34). 
Furthermore, texts are written because they assert themselves: the words are always the 
same even if the meaning changes with the reader or the cultural moment. In texts, there 
is a self-legitimacy and self-attestation. There is intentionality too: it is what it is meant to 
be. The reader faces this dynamic of the text and wants to do it justice: he or she is 
pushed to think about what the words mean; the reader is caught between two poles—that 
of his or her own world and that of the text. When confronted with a literary text, 
interpretation is inescapable. The meaning of the text, though, does not lie directly with 
the text or with the reader, it lies somewhere in between. It lies in the basic function of 
language, of the recognition of the true world.  
The reader’s task is to recognize the world for what it is. Individuality demands 
that the world be different for each person, but, at the same time, language is the product 
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of a shared context; in all cases, language is so intimately bound with what it means to be 
human that any and all language is potentially understandable, for each manifestation is a 
testimony of the human being’s relationship to the world. It is this relationship that the 
concept of text provokes. A text stakes a claim and makes an assertion: this is what the 
world means. Of course, a text too is an answer to a question and also makes its own 
query to the reader (Gadamer, Truth and Method 367). This process never ends. So when 
a reader faces a text, the reader is reminded of his or her own opinion of the world, for 
the language of a text is always alien and different: the reader’s task is to make sense of 
the world now that his or her horizon has been disrupted—a task of assimilation.  
 Indeed, Gadamer’s starting point for his philosophy is the proper interpretation of 
texts, but his concerns are not straightforward. Like Woolf demonstrates in her novels, 
Gadamer argues that human being, language, and art are part of the same fabric, each 
impinging the one on the other (Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and History 
90). In order to properly interpret a literary text, it is first necessary to understand the role 
of language in human being and the role of art in human being. In other words, the 
literary text is not just an object; its meaning depends on language and history and 
presentation—just like we do; something about how we understand the world and what it 
means to us; we are implicated every time we read. This dynamic will guide my 
dissertation as I move forward.  
 Before further entering into the particulars of this project, it is worth outlining the 
pillars of this interpretive approach. To begin with, Virginia Woolf’s novels are literary 
texts that engage the meaningfulness of the world. This meaning, though, depends on the 
participation of the reader and his or her enactment of the text. The words are forever the 
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same, but their meaning will change with each reader. Each reader belongs to his or her 
own world, and this world is perceived and understood within language. This is the case 
for all people, in fact. This interaction between the individual and the world is primary, 
decisive for all interpretation. Gadamer organizes his entire interpretive structure based 
on this interaction. His interpretive approach might be summarized in the following 
manner: 
1) To be human is to have language.  Before we even realize it, we already use and 
understand language. The world is meaningful and reality is understandable 
because of language. 
2) More can always be said. As we live in language, and language is necessarily 
meaningful and interpretive, we forever strive to reach a correspondence between 
all that the world might be and all that we proclaim it to be. However, as we 
describe the world, this act of description belongs to the occasion of its utterance; 
the identity of the world becomes something else as it is described. The potential 
meanings of the world forever outpace our engagement with these meanings.  
3) All interpretation is perspectival. We always belong to a situation, and this 
situation necessarily demands interpretation. In all, we interpret because each of 
us brings a unique perspective and it is our task to account for this perspective, so 
that we might approach a correspondence between the meaning of the world and 
our understanding of this meaning. This effort, though, is always an 
approximation, never completing itself.  
4) All interpretation is dialogical. Texts provoke the reader: they demand that we 
share in an overall meaning, a meaning which envelops both the reader and the 
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text. It is only within the context of this overall significance that the text has 
meaning and the reader understands. When someone is about to read a text, he or 
she cannot but anticipate its content, its meaning. It is only as an answer to a 
question that the text can mean anything. At the same time, the text will 
necessarily disrupt the presuppositions of the question, the text itself becoming 
the questioner, forcing the reader to answer. This dialogue is made possible 
because both the reader and the text belong to an overall meaning, with neither 
possessing a monopoly on this meaning, each with an equal share. This sense of 
an overall meaning is forever present, but the particulars change with the passage 
of time.  
5) The historicity of meaning. In general, possibility is shaped by the historical 
moment. It is necessary to account for historical difference, to acknowledge one’s 
historical moment and that of the text. In doing so, one might avoid anachronistic 
falsehood. Time comprehends change: there is always difference but, at the same 
time, this difference is shaped by a shared ontology—each of us has a world and it 
is this belongingness that determines historical difference.  
6) A fusion of horizons between text and reader. All interaction between text and 
reader is a matter of mediating identity and difference: the worlds of the text and 
reader are both the same and different. In the end, a new meaning emerges each 





 Overall, the point of this project is to plumb the affinities between Gadamer’s 
notion of hermeneutic ontology and Virginia Woolf’s novels—how these affinities 
illuminate and contribute to an improved understanding of Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics and Woolf’s novels. For their part, Gadamer and Woolf belong to a similar 
cultural and historical milieu, each, in one way or another, a participant in the intellectual 
and artistic movement known as Modernism. This movement arose in response to the 
encroaching impersonality of scientific objectivity: both Woolf and Gadamer recognized 
the pitfalls of this objectivity, as it necessarily discounts the interpretive opportunity and 
responsibility of the individual. In Virginia Woolf’s novels, we witness an intensification 
and enactment of one’s interpretive imperative. In their structure and thematics, we 
encounter narratives that emphasize interpretive experiences and concepts—in them there 
is a heavy accent on those experiences that are binding, those experiences that shape 
consciousness and determine one’s interpretive horizon. Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 
philosophical outlook is especially useful for an analysis of these novels because his 
philosophy concerns the interpretation of day to day existence as it relates to the 
interpretation of a literary text. For its part, this philosophical framework hinges on the 
primacy of language—its universality and our unconsciousness of it—our belongingness 
to art—its ability to engage the meaningfulness of our perceptions and alter them too—
and the dialogical situation in which all language use occurs—every utterance belongs to 
an occasion, its meaning only understandable as it relates to its context. Woolf’s novels, 
for their part, highlight and emphasize these hermeneutic and ontological precepts. In 
these narratives, we encounter characters who interpret their existence; this interpretive 
dynamic—and the philosophical precepts that undergird them—are decisive for the 
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significance and impact of these novels; interpretation and meaning are, in fact, the 
primary subject matter. I will argue that—as others have noted—a philosophical 
approach is useful for understanding these novels in their full scope, that there is a 
philosophical undercurrent that runs through these narratives, but that the philosophical 
scholarship on Woolf fails to fully appreciate the hermeneutic and ontological 
underpinnings that are decisive for their meaning. Instead of reading these novels through 
a lens of radical interpretation and questionability, the present scholarship relies on static 
concepts such as world, self, and reality. My argument is that these concepts are not 
static, that they are in movement as the individual engages with language, with art, and 
with others. In many ways, these novels are defined by this movement—how one’s 
understanding and horizon is shaped by this engagement—and the consequences and 
implications therein. In relating Woolf’s novels to Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics, the reader acquires an improved sense for the reference of the words that 
populate her novels, words that determine the meaning of a world and the characters who 
inhabit it: these narratives include characters who strive to understand, who either fail or 
succeed based on their willingness to privilege and engage with experiences of language, 
of art, or dialogue with others. Now, in relating Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics to 
Woolf’s novels, the reader encounters an enactment of Gadamer’s philosophical outlook: 
interpretation is inescapable—whether reading or living an average day, the world and its 
meaning are forever in motion and it is up to the individual to respond in kind. 
 
Gadamer on Language 
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As has already been mentioned, Gadamer’s starting point is the concept of text. 
For him, the text is the hermeneutic object par excellence. A text demands that the reader 
become aware of his or her relationship to language and to history; the words of a text 
belong to a historical situation and are a result of history, too; these words confront the 
reader, whose own situation is unique also. A text, then, makes a claim that the reader 
cannot discount. Necessarily, the reader grows from this encounter: the texture of his or 
her being has become more intricate, stronger. In this process there is a doubling back: as 
the reader wonders about the meaning of the words in the text, he or she wonders about 
the meaning of words in general, about their role in deciphering what the world means. 
For Gadamer, “the midworld of language has proven itself to be the true dimension of 
that which is given” (“Text and Interpretation” 29). A text transports the reader into this 
mindset: that the world is only understandable when it is presented, when it comes into 
language. The reader is reminded of his or her relationships, of his or her process, of 
those conditions and situations that have yielded the self-presentation of being. The 
reader is reminded to honor and privilege language, for there is no world unless it is 
named: “To come into language does not mean that a second being is acquired. Rather, 
what something presents itself as belongs to its own being” (Truth and Method 470). 
When reading a text, the participant is drawn into this dynamic: the world appears 
different every day, is different, but it is not necessarily alien and strange; it can be 
appropriated, even understood—the world belongs to its presentation.  
Each view, though, each presentation of the world, is always deficient, never 
complete. For Gadamer, part of the identity of language is that it is occasional; it belongs 
to the occasion, never able to fully name the whole, the unity; each particular instance is 
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new and different, contextualized by the whole, even changing it, but never complete and 
entire:  
But there is another dialectic of the word, which accords to 
every word an inner dimension of multiplication: every 
word breaks forth as if from a center and is related to a 
whole, through which alone it is a word. Every word causes 
the whole of language to which it belongs to resonate and 
the whole world-view that underlies it to appear. Thus 
every word, as the event of a moment, carries with it the 
unsaid, to which it is related by responding and 
summoning. The occasionality of human speech is not a 
casual imperfection of its expressive power; it is, rather, the 
logical expression of the living virtuality of speech that 
brings a totality of meaning into play, without being able to 
express it totally. All human speaking is finite in such a 
way that there is laid up within it an infinity of meaning to 
be explicated and laid out. That is why the hermeneutical 
phenomenon also can be illuminated only in light of the 
fundamental finitude of being, which is wholly verbal in 
character (Truth and Method 454).  
 
That is, we all have a vague sense of the world and its truth, and we are always moving 
towards some sort of confirmation or complete understanding, but language is discursive 
and situational: it unfolds through time and it changes with each new moment; because of 
this, we only acquire an aspect or view of the way things are. This nature of language is 
both productive and frustrating: it leads us to continuously search and try; it also means 
that we will never reach our goal. Nevertheless, we engage with texts and language for 
this very reason: as a reminder of our humanity and its potential.  
Gadamer on Art and Literature 
 If language is the means by which we have a world, one wonders how art fits into 
this estimation. Language is the original self-presentation of being; art takes notice of this 
situation and reminds us that all meaning must first be presented; there is no 
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interpretation if there is no appearance. Gadamer states this dynamic directly: “The world 
that appears in the play of presentation does not stand like a copy next to the real world, 
but is that world in the heightened truth of its being” (Truth and Method 132). Language 
is the originary presentation, but art mines this dynamic, playing with our natural 
receptiveness to engage with presentation. So, when we encounter an artwork we are 
reminded of ourselves; we are reminded that the world depends on its presentation. Each 
presentation, though, is new and different and always intentional. An artwork is always 
more than what we make of it—its interpretive possibilities are inexhaustible: yet all 
artistic production “intend[s] what it produces to be what it is” (The Relevance of the 
Beautiful 25). Because art is a self-enclosed, internally coherent world that hinges on its 
self-fulfillment, the artistic product creates the terms of its own interpretation: the task of 
the interpreter is to do justice to those terms. 
 Gadamer makes the argument that art is arresting: part of the nature of art is to 
captivate; so much so that the participant forgets about him or herself, for a moment at 
least. In that captivation, the participant notices nothing else but the appearance itself: “In 
the apparent particularity of sensuous appearance, which we always attempt to relate to 
the universal, there is something in our experience of the beautiful that arrests us and 
compels us to dwell upon the individual appearance itself” (The Relevance of the 
Beautiful 16). This concept of the beautiful is important to Gadamer’s hermeneutics. He 
argues that beauty closes the gap between the appearance of something and its true 
identity. Therefore, when we encounter beauty in art we encounter the thing for what it is 
and nothing else. For this reason, because it allows us to encounter the world for what it 
is, the experience of art signifies “an increase in being” (The Relevance of the Beautiful 
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15).  Of course, like being, a work of art comprehends the fundamental tension between 
revealment and concealedness. (“The Truth of the Work of Art” 107).  We never fully 
know the meaning of existence or of art, but we are always aware that there is this 
tension. Part of the accomplishment of art is to face this tension and seek some sort of 
resolution: “The only relevant thing is whether we encounter a spiritual and ordering 
energy in the work […] a new order of unity in tension” (“Art and Imitation” 103). Art 
encourages us to embrace the ambiguities, doubts and insights that we all experience, 
giving us a sense for their complementary position in our lives.  
 For its part, literature and the poetic word are examples of art that depend on 
language. In literature there is “a counterplay between the intended meaning and the self-
presentation of the language (Gadamer in Conversation 74). Unconsciousness of 
language is our natural state: when we speak and converse it does not occur to us that we 
are using language and that language is, or can be, undependable. When we speak, our 
concern is to reach an agreement about matters of fact, to recognize the way things are. 
And of course, when we read literature, there is a meaning that is conveyed through the 
language; we want to understand this meaning and that is our main focus; but, in 
literature, we become aware of the variability of language, of its indeterminacy and 
fecundity—we notice that the language itself is in the foreground: the language is new 
and different, creative too; this language describes a world heretofore unknown.   
 With this dynamic in mind, we can say that poetic language fulfills itself (“On the 
Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth” 111-2). It does not seek any verification 
outside of itself. Poetic language does not depend on anything else besides its 
presentation. The poetic word is always about something but it is always about itself too: 
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it is about the accomplishment of language and its role in our life. Gadamer describes the 
principal accomplishment of language in the following manner: “what the word evokes is 
there” (“On the Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth” 113). Because of 
language we have a world: the poetic word proves insightful because it challenges us to 
recognize our own creative mandate—the world can be rich or bland, full or empty, 
depending on its description.  
 Language provides the fundamental articulations that guide our understanding of 
the world. Language is co-existent with our growth; our familiarity with the world too. It 
is a process of ‘making ourselves at home’: “The word of the poet does not simply 
continue this process […] Instead it stands over against this process like a mirror held up 
to it. But what appears in the mirror is not the world, nor this or that thing in the world, 
rather this nearness or familiarity itself in which we stand for a while” (“On the 
Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth” 114-15).  We enter into the poetic text 
and we encounter language that, up to a point, describes the world as we know it, while at 
the same time it illuminates the world in new and different ways; the words take on a 
complete naturalness, as if they were always meant to be there, as if each word belonged 
precisely to its place: there is nothing contrived about these words, just like our first 
experience with language—everything belongs.  
Gadamer on Dialogue 
 Dialogue is a useful concept for a variety of reasons. Overall, it will enable me to 
bring together my cogitations on language and art: both concepts will now dwell in this 
chapter, illuminated from several different angles. Also, of course, dialogue is central to 
my interpretive project: I will be in dialogue with Virginia Woolf’s novels and dialogue 
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is a principal thematic concern in Woolf’s novels. According to Gadamer, interpretation 
itself is defined by dialogue. In its entirety, dialogue is the source of language and art and 
meaning. There is no such thing as an individual language: “Language is a we, in that we 
are assigned our place in relation to each other, and in which the individual has no fixed 
borders […] we all must overstep our own personal boundaries/limits of understanding to 
understand” (Gadamer in Conversation 56). We are social creatures and all meaning 
depends on that socialization: our relationships happen to be our greatest source of 
fulfillment. Looking ahead to Woolf’s novels, we can certainly notice a heavy emphasis 
placed on the limits and borders between people; people need each other and depend on 
each other, each a source of conflict and resolution. As Gadamer says, in dialogue “world 
is disclosed” (Truth and Method 443). In all cases, for every person, the mandate is to 
recognize the world for what it is. Dialogue has its own energy; it sweeps the participants 
along: each individual perspective is limited and temporary; in dialogue, though, we test 
our understanding and our one-sidedness, now pushed to see the thing from another 
angle. Dialogue yields insight. In dialogue, different aspects of the world appear.  
 Overall, language and meaning depend on dialogue: “Are we not always 
answering when we venture a word, by which I mean are we not trying to respond to the 
other, to the occasion, to the issue, to the causa” (“Culture and the Word” 5). Language 
and meaning are defined by movement, change: the answers and questions always alter 
because the hermeneutical situation consistently shifts. Virginia Woolf engages with this 
dynamic in her fiction and it dominates the interpretation of texts, too. The hermeneutical 
imagination hinges on the following point: “a sense of the questionableness of something 
and what this requires of us” (Gadamer in Conversation 42). We ask questions of 
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something to open it up: it can either be this way or that way. Then we answer the 
question and a new question appears: the answer, of course, has its own indeterminacy—
it too can go one way or another. This series of questions and answers leads to a path: 
interpretation “implies pointing in a particular direction” (“Composition and 
Interpretation” 68). What that direction is, or what it should be, is hard to say, but the 
goal is to recognize the thing for what it is: of course, that thing is going to change 
because we change. Nevertheless, sincere engagement with the object is the most 
productive path towards truth:  
The hermeneutical experience also has its own rigor: that of 
uninterrupted listening. A thing does not present itself to 
the hermeneutical experience without an effort special to it, 
namely that of ‘being negative toward itself.’ A person who 
is trying to understand a text has to keep something at a 
distance—namely everything that suggests itself, on the 
basis of his own prejudices, as the meaning expected—as 
soon as it is rejected by the sense of the text itself (Truth 
and Method 461).  
 
This approach described here applies to the interpretation of texts and the interpretation 
of existence as we experience the world. It is a kind of dialogue: here there is an 
assertion, then there is a response; each assertion disrupts the horizon of the interpreter—
here he or she realizes that his or her expectations were not entirely accurate; here, then, 
he or she adjusts expectations; his or her view is now in harmony with the presentation of 
the world.  
Literature Review 
At this point, I would like to begin by looking at those studies that most closely 
resemble my own. In this manner I might show how my own approach is part of a more 
general discussion and prove that it provides insight to that discussion. That is, Mark 
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Hussey’s book The Singing of the Real World, and A.O. Frank’s book The Philosophy of 
Virginia Woolf’s Fiction clearly indicate that Virginia Woolf’s novels and philosophy 
belong together. The question, though, is what kind of philosophy and what kind of 
analysis. Before going into a more detailed presentation of my own approach, I would 
like to discuss these two works and by doing so, by way of contrast, my own approach.  
Hussey’s study states his intent directly: “The primary focus of this study is 
Woolf’s record of a ‘reality’ that she apprehended in the actual world, but that transcends 
it” (xix). The key terms in this statement are reality, actual world, and transcendence. 
Here, Hussey’s mistake is that he relies on terms that he allows to be static. He places 
reality and the actual world on one side and transcendence on the other. Whereas, I 
contend, reality and transcendence belong together—a statement supported by Woolf’s 
novels, I would argue. In other words, one might say that reality includes its very 
transcendence as part of its identity. How is this so? How can reality go beyond itself and 
still be real? The answer has to do with language and art. That is, reality depends on its 
being named and pictured—so, reality is provisional and in process. Reality, in and of 
itself, is defined by change, a moving further and beyond, by transcendence of itself. 
There is no way to avoid language and art, but the yield can be less or more, depending 
on the degree of participation and adaptation to circumstance.  
 Hussey’s approach to Woolf’s writing also chooses to focus on such concepts as 
knowledge, the self and being: “Virginia Woolf’s novels are concerned with knowledge 
of others, and knowledge of the world. The question of the nature of the self is at the 
heart of her thinking, and, I believe, is the dynamic of her fiction. Her novels uncover 
what Georges Poulet has called ‘the essentially religious nature of human centrality’ […] 
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Her point of departure is always a simple, but radical wonder in the face of being at all 
(what Heidegger called Thaumazein)” (xv). His analysis is appropriate, but, once again, it 
depends on static concepts that do not reflect the depth and searing insight of Woolf’s 
thought. Her writing points to a need for a radical openness, an impulse to question 
everything. To talk about knowledge or the self is useful, but derivative of being in and of 
itself—the disclosure and withdrawal that point us toward ways of knowing and identity 
construction. In my mind, Woolf challenges the usefulness and dependability of using 
such concepts. To Hussey’s credit—and in support of my own argument—he does 
recognize that Woolf’s thought does point to an ontological concern (the mystery and 
wonder of being at all), but his own argument, up to a point, undermines this recognition.  
 In contrast with Hussey’s analysis, the goal of A.O. Frank’s study of Virginia 
Woolf’s fiction is to provide the philosophical associations which Woolf’s fiction 
provokes. Frank focuses on central ideas in Woolf’s novels and then elaborates on those 
ideas as they manifest themselves in philosophy. Unlike mine, Frank’s project is not 
defined by interpretation or hermeneutics as the central philosophical concept. She, of 
course, does interpret the novels, but only inasmuch as her interpretations support the 
philosophical concepts and vice versa. She mines the continental philosophical tradition 
and even cites Gadamer as an inspiration, but ignores him when it comes time to actually 
apply her interpretive framework. Overall, though, Frank’s effort does suggest that my 
own ideas are not in isolation; rather, they belong to an extensive field which 
acknowledges that philosophy and literature ask and answer similar questions; even 
more, more specifically, that Gadamer and Woolf ask and answer similar questions: “The 
aesthetic turn in modern philosophy as it is described by Gadamer in Truth and Method, 
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whereby art offers an appropriate medium of understanding for problems that discursive, 
methodical philosophy of the Socratic-Cartesian paradigm has failed to answer, offers a 
position which comes much closer to a description of Woolf’s own intellectual stance” 
(21-2). I agree with this statement, and my own project would be unnecessary if Frank 
had chosen to analyze Woolf’s novels by way of Gadamer’s ideas, but she did not.  
 Up until now, it has not been very popular to link Gadamer and Woolf. Frank’s 
study is an exception and so is Linda O’Neill’s article, “Gadamer meets Woolf in a Room 
of One’s Own”. O’Neill wrote her article in the context of education, but it is still useful 
to mention because it affirms the relevancy of my own study and also the importance of 
language and art in human development. She says: “Woolf brings to life through 
literature what Gadamer affirms through philosophical hermeneutics: that the primordial 
lived experiences, in and outside of schools, cannot be understood without careful 
attention to accessible traditions, embodied language, and potential transcendence in 
pursuit of intellectual freedom and practical wisdom” (337). Here O’Neill suggests that 
Woolf and Gadamer point in the same direction—that analysis and knowledge should 
have “primordial lived experiences” as a starting point. Instead of relying on one-size-
fits-all methods and constructions, one should recognize that these sort of approaches 
stem from the same material that we all possess: in our relationships to each other, to 
language, to art, and to the world. To interpret is to recognize the questionableness of 
something and it is to share in the general ontological relationship of human being to the 
world. By way of participation, different aspects of the thing itself appears. O’Neill 
recognizes this emphasis that Gadamer and Woolf place on participation in tradition. In 
participation, she would note, one can develop a greater sense of meaning: the truth of 
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being in the world. And, of course, it is a meaning that is individualized, unique to one’s 
particular history and place in the world.  
 Yes, a handful of critics have connected Virginia Woolf and Hans-Georg 
Gadamer. Others, also, have noted a connection between Woolf and Gadamer’s teacher, 
Martin Heidegger. Heidegger’s life work was defined by a need to go beyond or to 
destroy metaphysics. He did not believe that there was a static world—out there—which 
was the real and true world and that all attempts at knowing or understanding were just 
attempts at approximating or approaching this true reality. Rather, he argued that being 
and understanding are co-existent; the world and the perception of it are co-existent; to 
belong in the world is already to understand it. Humans understand something and are on 
the way towards understanding more; furthermore, this understanding includes a 
fundamental tension between disclosure and withdrawal: the world is on a swivel and its 
meaning too. If this is the case, if reality itself is in flux, then interpretation takes on an 
even greater role: that which is to be understood is to be questioned; to find the right 
question is to participate in meaning. In her essay, “Heidegger in Woolf’s Clothing”, 
Heidi Storl recognizes Heidegger’s impulse as seen in Woolf’s writing: “Virginia 
Woolf’s work reveals a deep understanding of, as well as an appreciation for, sustained 
meditation on that-which-is” (1). I agree with Storl’s estimation and would say that 
literature is the ideal medium for just such a consideration. Literature takes place in 
language and places language as the medium of its existence; the appearance of language 
is its very truth—here there is no gap between what the language says and what it is. 
However, the meaning of such language is indeterminate: interpretation is included in its 
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identity. Woolf’s novels play with this dynamic and present characters and storylines that 
wrestle with it too: what is the world and how are we to understand it? 
 There are some other studies of Virginia Woolf and her fiction I would like to 
examine. I have chosen to mention these studies because they recognize the philosophical 
undertones of her work. In general, these studies focus on what is held in common 
between people and what is constitutive of how people find that common ground—that 
which shapes knowledge and understanding at all. Jane Duran’s article “Virginia Woolf, 
Time, and the Real” is just one such example. She says: “Woolf’s writing forces us to 
look closely at what is constitutive of the real in our lives. In this sense, Woolf’s novels 
are philosophical. They pose questions driven by wonder, and they answer those 
questions by depicting those very moments, few though they may be, when a striking 
sense of the urgently real breaks through our ruminations, and makes itself felt in an 
unmistakable way” (6). This article is useful for this proposal because it reinforces the 
direction which I have chosen to take: she too says that Woolf’s novels are philosophical 
and also that they examine reality. The real, of course, is hard to pin down but the merit 
of this article lies in its suggestion that the real is something that happens to us. The real 
and the true appear when people engage with the world; the world and its nature makes 
itself felt precisely because we belong to it.  
 In Howard Harper’s book-length study, Between Language and Silence: The 
Novels of Virginia Woolf, we see a similar focus, but with a greater emphasis on effort 
and the role of the subject: here it is the subject’s task to find meaning, one that requires 
tremendous effort and work. In this scene, the world is separate, waiting to be interpreted: 
“Meaning is not something inherent, or at least self-evident, in the given world; rather, it 
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is something to be discovered, achieved, wrested from the struggle with the protean, 
phenomenal world. The discovery of transcendent meaning becomes the great mythic 
theme of this drama of intentionality” (3). In this passage we get the flip-side of the coin: 
instead of meaning as something that happens to us, it is something that we make happen. 
This assertion is a half-truth. It is necessary to engage with the world and, at times, to be 
stubborn in that engagement (to not give up), but we are only able to find new ways of 
being and more coherent meaning because the world already means something to us; it is 
not always a struggle, sometimes, instead, we glide, propelled by our own momentum, 
the truth of the world and its self-disclosure deeply resonant. 
 Virginia Woolf and her novels promote the idea that there is no one fixed, 
immovable world; the world to be understood is up for debate; to say that things are one 
way or another is to accept the unquestioned assumptions that have led to subjugation and 
inequality. Instead, Woolf aimed to present a world that varies, depending on perspective, 
a world that is never truly, really known. Even Woolf’s narrators are unsure about the 
world—all is conjecture, possibility, as James Hafley notes in his essay, “Virginia 
Woolf’s Narrators and the ‘Art of Life’”: “Woolf’s narrators are creators and not 
reporters real or supposed; they do not tell the stories as much as the stories tell them; it is 
they who are the central drama, the central fiction. The abstract and general, the objective 
and true, are in this art to be located only in the concrete, specific, subjective and 
invented. Reality is invention […]” (31). That is, Woolf’s novels focus on the manner in 
which the story is told—the attitude of the narrator towards the story; the content of any 
story depends on the way it is told. By extension, one might say that reality depends on 
how it is narrated.  
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 Now, at this point, I would like to take my summary of Woolf studies in a new 
direction. This direction is united by a thread that goes through them: what all people 
share, what is held in common. Gillian Beer’s study, Virginia Woolf: The Common 
Ground, is one such attempt. Although the following passage is specifically about 
Woolf’s novel, The Waves, its tenor is accurate in its description of her novels as a whole:  
Like the waves, the person and people come together, then 
sink ‘into one of those silences which are now and again 
broken by a few words, as if a fin rose in the wastes of 
silence’. The pressure of ‘I’ and ‘we’ have here formed a 
work at standing water, without tides. The Waves is dense 
on the page, intensely verbal and articulate, but it searches 
endlessly, through its rhythms of recounting, for a way of 
giving utterance to all that is unpossessed by writing. 
Virginia Woolf is not here creating simply an exploration 
of individualism; she seeks what is held in common—and 
as commonly lost (71-2).  
 
To understand Beer’s point, it is worth mentioning this tension between I and We that 
Beer discusses. This tension might be related to Gadamer’s concept of dialogue. In all 
cases there is no completely autonomous I or self. The I is unique and individual but it is 
also dependent on others. Growth depends on other people and so does language. It is this 
tension that we hold in common and it is also our need for language, a need that is never 
entirely satisfied. That is, Virginia Woolf gives voice to the feeling that our voice is 
deficient; that the I is always searching for something that is never found.  
 So it is that Virginia Woolf presents characters who do not know, but still have an 
idea. These characters recognize the mystery and accept it; they build on this mystery and 
incorporate it into their sense of meaning. Eric Auerbach’s famous essay, “The Brown 
Stocking”, recognizes as much: “And here, furthermore, one comes upon the order and 
the interpretation of life which arises from life itself” (31). Life from life, a circular and 
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solipsistic way of thinking, but still true: here the aim is to avoid false thinking or to be 
diligent in analysis; there is never a completely right way of thinking, but it can be 
buoyed by uninterrupted listening and a willingness to ask questions. Through 
participation, one might come closer to a sense of how things are. And, of course, all 
people have this in common: the interpretation of life from life. Auerbach suggests that 
Woolf contributes to understanding because her fiction spotlights random moments and 
random thoughts—this is how people experience life: as a series of moments that 
provoke thoughts that are not sequential or tied into a neat narrative; instead, the thoughts 
appear and disappear, without our willing or doing. This is what it means to be human: 
“The more numerous, varied, and simple the people are who appear as subjects of such 
random moments, the more effectively must what they have in common shine forth” (33). 
Instead of focusing on what is commonly thought to be big, Woolf privileges what is 
commonly thought to be small. We all have perceptions of  the world and these 
perceptions are forever valid—they seize us before we even opt to honor them.   
 Central to my thesis is the idea that art is a part of life and life is a part of art; art 
is always present, part of how we perceive and understand. This is a dynamic felt by 
Woolf and one that she weaved into her novels. Critics, too, have noticed this situation. 
Penelope Ingram’s article, “‘One Drifts Apart’: To the Lighthouse as Art of Response,” is 
a strong example : “I see the relationship between art and life in To the Lighthouse as an 
organic unity, in a relation of part to whole. Art is realized through life as life is realized 
through art” (“‘One Drifts Apart’: To the Lighthouse as art of response” 4). Art demands 
interpretation and it stakes a claim: despite all attempts to dismiss its validity, it remains 
because presence is part of its identity—it is there, just like humans are here, a token of 
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order and vision. To engage with art is to engage with life; it is to ask, who am I, what is 
this, and how can it be? 
 Other essays approach these considerations also. Alice van Buren Kelley’s 
collection, To the Lighthouse: The Marriage of Life and Art is just one example. This 
study argues that artistic sensibility is vital to understanding and meaning. That is, the 
artist is willing to go beyond accepted forms of thought; the artist asks what it is that 
makes understanding and meaning possible in the first place; a sense for the basic 
material that is molded into hard and fast reality and a willingness to remold that reality 
into one that fits the individual. Van Buren Kelley states her position: “So life is not 
chaotic, threatening, destructive, but ordered and whole, if only we can see it. If we can 
uncover the pattern, reveal the balance that keeps all oppositions in equilibrium, we shall 
see what the artist sees, and what is really there: the fact that life is a work of art” (74). 
Through art, then, one can create the terms of one’s reality; one can see that paradox and 
opposition and tension are part of being and instead of trying to ignore them one can 
incorporate them into one’s understanding; no longer subversive and subterranean, now 
included, now in balance.    
 Numerous critics have thought about Woolf’s work and have attempted to 
interpret her novels; each has engaged with the texts and tried to put in words his or her 
particular understanding: each critic has his or her own particular history, language, and 
way of thinking; the novels, then, when interpreted, are restated, reassembled, 
assimilated; a mediation occurs. Here there is a paradox: in order for the novel to remain 
the same, to be itself, it must be put into a new language; a language that fits the 
interpreter and resonates, so that the meaning is maximized; all approach an originary 
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meaning, one that is stated and restated. It is this particular dynamic that Gadamer 
explores in his philosophy—the nature of interpretation. His philosophy is multi-layered 
and many-sided. Overall, it is based on two, complementary ideas, which exert a back-
pressure, the one on the other; when one changes, so does the other. First, and most 
importantly, is human being’s relationship to the world; the world in and of itself means 
something, is to be interpreted. The second idea is how to interpret a text: to consider the 
identity of a text. When one confronts a text, there is a fixed meaning that nevertheless 
varies depending on the interpreter. Here the reader is reminded of language; the role of 
language in interpretation. Whatever a text means has to do with what the world means.  
 Although no critic has chosen to use Gadamer’s philosophical outlook to frame 
his or her interpretation of literature, many critics have considered his philosophy, its 
impact and implications. In fact, many critics have approached this idea that different and 
new facets of the world appear when we engage with it. Jens Kertscher’s essay “‘We 
Understand Differently, If We Understand at All’: Gadamer’s Ontology of Language 
Reconsidered” is one such example. This essay hinges on the following point: “Rather 
than a matter of grasping an objective meaning, understanding becomes, therefore, a 
matter of the taking up of a meaning that has already been revealed” (149). Because we 
have language, we always have a picture of the way things are, but the picture is always 
and forever incomplete. However, the more we participate, the more we feel in tune with 
the world, uniquely, and for us.  
 Gunter Figal’s analysis, “The Doing of the Thing Itself: Gadamer’s Hermeneutic 
Ontology of Language” is another essay that presents similar themes. Here the reader is 
reminded of the idea that language speaks us instead of we speak language. That is, by 
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way of language, the world presents itself. The impulse to use language is the impetus to 
be at one with the world, to belong. When we use language, there is always an 
undercurrent of possibility—what is right and what is appropriate is never truly known, 
but the language itself is nevertheless valid and legitimate in its own right; this legitimacy 
leads to further clarification, to an openness for more, a foundation for asking questions 
and gaining insight: “What already has been, for example a text, is as an event, because it 
addresses one with a question. And the interpretation happens as the saying again and the 
further saying of the said” (111). The need to use language is the need to answer a 
question; all language both answers a question and asks a question: the world becomes, 
simultaneously, both more understandable and more mysterious. Mystery, though, 
becomes less antagonistic and less of a saboteur, acquiring an element of productivity, an 
avenue to truth.  
 For its part, understanding is an important concept in Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics. Understanding is an idea that we all relate to in our own, individual way; it 
is not a technical term; furthermore it is a term that allows for more technical, scientific 
approaches to even be possible. In a way, Gadamer’s concept of understanding depends 
on this sense of understanding—that it is non-technical and that all rely on understanding 
and participate in understanding; however, Gadamer shapes an entire philosophical 
outlook based on this very concept: understanding is primordial and it is valuable. To this 
end, Jean Grondin has written an essay to clarify the concept: it is titled “Gadamer’s 
Basic Understanding of Understanding”. In the essay, Grondin divides understanding into 
several different categories: understanding can imply and relate rather variously. On the 
other hand, Grondin also attempts to abstract and enfold the various categories into one 
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overarching approach: “The understanding that he characterizes, following Heidegger, is 
the ‘original form of the realization of our existence’” (36). To be is to understand; how, 
of course, and in what way and to what end—these are considerations that demand 
further clarification, a delicate ecosystem that also demands revision, adjustment and 
readjustment.  
Engagement, one might say, is the path to self-fulfillment. For Gadamer, 
engagement inheres the notion of linguisticality, the need to put into words. Words are 
the primordial and original way that any human being has a world. People forget about 
words, though; part of why they mean so much has to do with the power of their very 
presence; in the end, they can never be discarded or discounted—precisely because they 
are forever forgotten. Words allow the world to appear and it is in their appearance that 
the world is understandable; to submit to language, to commit and to enact—Grondin 
highlights just such a notion as central in Gadamer’s thought: “The important idea for 
Gadamer’s notion of interpretation and its inherent linguisticality is that the listener be 
taken up by what he seeks to understand, that he responds, interprets, searches for words 
or articulation and thus understands” (42). One might say that meaning is a wave that 
carries the participant to new places; having arrived, then, the new is to be mediated by 
what has come before; the means for doing this is language: now the world is different 
but, if named, more understandable.  
Because the seconds pass and the world is different with each one, because 
language is never stable and meaning changes with each moment, individuals are 
provoked and pushed to find a momentary stability: we speak, we write and the words are 
a testimony. The words are a fortress, a defense against the void, nothingness. The 
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appearance of words mediates a curious tension: on one side, they are never entirely 
accurate (more can always be said); on the other, they are self-legitimating—their 
appearance is their meaning. This tension leads to the idea that all language use is a kind 
of translation and that the practice of translation helps the participant to become aware of 
this dynamic. Translation reminds the interpreter that there is an original meaning; that 
this meaning is related to the human being’s relationship to the world. This idea guides 
John Sallis’ essay “The Hermeneutics of Translation”. This essay might be summarized 
in the following manner: “Because the manifold of discourse as such is produced by 
translation, each fold is a likeness or symbol of that back upon which it is folded. This 
multiple folding, this manifold that translation produces in and as discourse as such, is the 
originary complication” (68). Put in other words, one might say that any time language is 
used it is a kind of translation. Each application of language, each particular situation, is 
always different: up to that point, the words have appeared to describe something else—
now they are to be used (translated) for the new situation. Translation, as such, is a 
hermeneutical guidepost, a reminder of the interpretive demand that we all experience 
when pushed to use language.  
Gadamer’s hermeneutics has to do with the concept of truth and it also has to do 
with (what he calls) the human sciences as they contrast with natural sciences. Overall, in 
general, the concept of science might be thought about as a kind of construction that 
depends on methodology, rigor, discipline, constraint, and many other factors. 
Furthermore, the natural sciences hinge on distanciation—so that the scientist’s 
prejudices do not cloud his or her results. Many humanists decided to adopt this model 
and study their object as if the object studied were a thing in and of itself, independent of 
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the interpreter and his or her prejudices. Gadamer rejected this model, instead arguing 
that the identity of the object belongs to and is part of the identity of the interpreter. The 
two cannot be separated. He therefore chose to favor the model of participation, as 
Weisheimer points out in his forward to Gadamer’s late collection, In Praise of Theory: 
“The belonging endemic to the human sciences hardly proves that, not being susceptible 
of method, these sciences are not rational—indeed not sciences. Quite the contrary, the 
human sciences represent a kind of ‘reason incarnate in existence’, a kind of 
knowledge—Gadamer calls it practical knowledge—that comes from participation rather 
than distanciation” (ix). When studying philosophy or history or literature, the student 
belongs to the thing studied: the object studied is articulated in language, something the 
interpreter possesses also; the object studied takes place in history, something the 
interpreter is a part of—the interpreter is conditioned by history to such an extent that the 
historical object is filtered through the present moment. To recognize this 
conditionedness can yield a greater sense of truth.  
Indeed, the human sciences are essential for the revelation of truth. In his 
introduction to the book, Gadamer in Conversation, Richard E. Palmer clarifies 
Gadamer’s understanding of truth:  
For Gadamer, following Heidegger, [the disclosure of 
truth] is not a disclosure of some eternal, changeless 
essence; rather, for Gadamer it yields an existential sense 
that ‘this is the way things are’. In the presence of great art, 
says Gadamer, one says to oneself, ‘so ist es!’ (yes, that’s 
how things are!) […] The ontological word ‘is’ is deeply 
implicated with truth. It is not an essentialist but an 
existential truth; it is not an infinite but a finite, fallible 




Once again, readers are led back to the ideas of participation and engagement. It is in 
human being’s nature to understand and to have a world; to engage with art or language 
is to experience an increase in being. It is in the encounter when the interpreter is put to 
the test: his or her sense of truth, of the way things are, is put to the test; to pass the test, 
the interpreter has no choice but to revise and incorporate; truth is dependent on this 
revision, in fact.  
In existence, unless something is presented the world is amorphous and 
undefined. Until presented, there is nothing to interpret; once presented, we are drawn to 
interpretation. What something means, though, belongs to that presentation; to engage 
with presentation is to engage with life, with meaning. Ontologically, a presentation is the 
outpouring of the thing itself; the appearance of the thing itself. In David E. Linge’s 
introduction to Gadamer’s collection of essays, Philosophical Hermeneutics, we note this 
dynamic: “Like the game, the text or artwork lives in its presentations. They are not alien 
or secondary to it but are its very being, as possibilities that flow from it and are included 
in it as facets of its own disclosure. The variety of performances or interpretations are not 
simply subject variations of a meaning locked in subjectivity, but belong instead to the 
ontological possibility of the work” (xxvi). It is common to think about a symphony or a 
dramatic play as examples. A symphony is nothing unless it is presented. Every time it is 
presented it is going to be different yet it is still going to be the same symphony; each 
performance is an interpretation of the symphony. A text is a little different but it still has 
the same basic identity. There are several ways of thinking about the presentation or 
performance of a text. For one, a text can be read out loud; in that reading, the reader 
infuses meaning into the text and it becomes alive; it will never be read or understood in 
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that exact manner ever again; the performance belongs to the circumstance of the reading. 
Silent reading is a little different, but still uncannily similar. Like everything else, the text 
is nothing until it is experienced; in that experience the reader is challenged and pushed; 
the language is necessarily different than that of the interpreter. The interpreter is faced 
with the task of assimilating the meaning: to do this he or she must find a language that 
fits his or her outlook and way of being. Overall, then, the performance or the 
presentation is the only way that the world can appear meaningfully. In the presentation, 
we are prompted to dwell on the appearance, to ask what the appearance means; for its 
part, the meaning is both self-evident and self-legitimating and self-different at the same 
time; each time the thing is presented or performed it is both different and the same.  
In his book Philosophical Hermeneutics and Literary Theory Joel Weisheimer 
approaches these considerations. In this book Weisheimer looks at the implications of 
philosophical hermeneutics as they relate to literary theory. His basic argument is that 
language should be looked at as an enactment of being: basically what the word says and 
what the word is are one and the same; to engage with language is to know the world. 
Weisheimer makes his point: “The world is as indivisible from its coming to language, 
and the meaning of a word is as indivisible from its utterance, as is a symphony from its 
performance and an image from the thing it reflects” (107). In literature we are reminded 
that the world depends on its presentation, like a book depends on its being read; the 
language in literature cannot be parsed—it has no exact meaning, the language falls back 
upon itself; its appearance is its meaning. Furthermore, in each presentation, the thing 
presented acquires a new identity; now it is seen differently, from a different angle; all 
presentation is a kind of interpretation: “A picture is an interpretation of what it pictures” 
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(109). For his part, Gadamer likes to use landscape art as an example. He notes that the 
Swiss Alps were seen as menacing and even ugly until artists began to paint the Alps; 
then, once they were pictured, they were seen as beautiful and majestic—they were seen 
in a new way.  
Gerald Bruns, in his essay “The Hermeneutical Anarchist: Phronesis, Rhetoric, 
and the Experience of Art,” makes a similar point. He too argues that the only way for the 
world to be understandable is for it to presented or performed: “Performance is not 
something added to the work or a rendition or a version of it; it is the appearance of the 
thing itself. The point to grasp is that the thing itself exists in no other way. Its mode of 
appearance is its mode of being” (61). Bruns’ explanation of Gadamer’s philosophy hits 
the mark; it is for this reason that Gadamer prioritizes art to such an extent. Of course, 
Gadamer’s starting point is language, but art and language are intimately bound together: 
in all cases the appearance of the world is irrefutable; the appearance is the truth. 
For Gadamer, art is ordered and whole; in it there is a continuity that we do not 
find in existence. We are drawn to art because it affords us the possibility of finding 
order; this order makes the world understandable. In his introduction to Gadamer’s work, 
The Relevance of the Beautiful, Robert Bernasconi notes this aspect of art: “The 
challenge that Gadamer issues to the idea of art as a special magical realm is carried 
through by showing the continuity between the world of art and our everyday world. ‘We 
sublate (Aufheben) the discontinuous punctuality of experience (Erlebnis) in the 
continuity of our existence (Dasein) (TM, 86)” (xvi). That is, part of the identity of art is 
that it possesses continuity; if the parts do not relate to each other, then it is not art. 
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Because of this, we look to art for answers and explanations, with insight as the ultimate 
yield.  
These considerations our approached by Nicholas Davey in his encyclopedic 
entry in Key Writers on Art: 20th Century. He begins his summary with the following 
heading, “What happens to us in the experience of art?” (130). By doing so, Davey 
recognizes Gadamer’s philosophical claim—that art does not represent a static reality, it 
“can transform actuality” (131). Art allows the world to appear meaningfully: “Art is no 
longer subordinate to its conceptual subject but becomes a vehicle of its sensuous 
appearance” (131). In this case, the subject matter is the world and human being’s 
relationship to it and to others. Davey goes on: “Art does not cloak reality in appearance 
but allows actuality to reveal itself more extensively” (132). Art is revelatory because it is 
ordered and whole. In it there is closure and determinacy: “The indeterminacy of 
existence means tolerating a world in which the things (subject matters) which concern 
us—meaningfulness, goodness, love—remain uncertain in nature and outcome. The 
capacity of art to draw unresolved threads of concern into a coherent determinate 
pictorial or narrative structure allows a clearer vision of what in actuality remained 
unclear […] Art often enables us to see clearly what we often only perceive indistinctly” 
(132). However, the subject matter presented in art is never entirely finished. Each artistic 
presentation leaves a space for further interpretation: “If a subject matter is always more 
than can be said or depicted of it, then every time an artwork attempts an interpretation of 
a Sache, a residual untranslatable space is opened between the subject matter and its 
rendering. This space, since it involves a residual tension between what has and has not 
yet been said or shown, is autopoietic in the sense that it drives the attempt of subsequent 
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interpretations to close it” (135). Indeed, our interpretive project is never complete, but, 
as we try, at least, we notice its contours.   
Finally, I would like to talk about poetry and what has been said about Gadamer’s 
emphasis on poetry. Gerald Bruns has something to say about this topic also. As an 
introductory piece for Gadamer’s ruminations on the poetry of Paul Celan, Gadamer on 
Celan: ‘Who Am I and Who Are You?’ and Other Essays, Bruns penned the essay, “The 
Remembrance of Language: An Introduction to Gadamer’s Poetics”. In it he discusses 
how Gadamer prioritizes one particular aspect of poetry: that it reminds us of the role of 
language in our lives. Overall, we can never entirely account for the role of language in 
our lives. It is impossible. Of course, linguistics, logic and other systems attempt to do so, 
arguing that we can understand language for what it is. These attempts are useful, but 
they do not have the last word: any and all attempts to step out of language take place in 
language. Poetry reminds us that language allows the world to mean at all: “Rather it is 
that poetry alters our relation to language. Poetry is an event […] in which language 
interrupts our attempts to reduce it conceptually or instrumentally; it takes itself out of 
our hands” (7). In poetry, the meaning of words acquires a new luster: the occasion that 
prompts the poetic word is one of necessity; the writer needs the words to describe his or 
her world; once accomplished, the world is seen in a new way.  
Dialogue is an important concept for Gadamer and it is crucial for his 
understanding of the poetic word. He argues that all language is the result of dialogue: in 
dialogue language appears out of necessity. Language is the appearance of the world, but 
it belongs neither to you nor to me; instead, it results from the need to recognize the 
world for what it is. All intimacy and all relationships are productive and combustive, 
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drawn towards this tremendous need, where something new appears, where insight is 
gained. In poetry, too, there is always an ‘I’ and a ‘you’. The ‘I’ is the ‘I’ of the narrator, 
the person prompted to use language; and the ‘you’ is the ‘you’ that understands, that 
follows along, the ‘you’ every ‘I’ needs and wants. In the same essay, Bruns considers 
this unique character of poetry: “But what matters for Gadamer is not the identity of the 
‘I’ or the ‘you’ but the intimacy between them—an intimacy which is outside the 
determinacy of meaning, or which is not an intimacy of knowing and being known but an 
intimacy mediated by strangeness” (27). The impulse to write and read poetry has to do 
with this need for intimacy, a need to connect: for the language of poetry pertains to who 
and what we are; it is a language that means something and is understandable; yet it is 
alien and different; to mediate between the two, to become what is different—that is the 
appeal of poetry.  
Mrs. Dalloway 
 Mrs. Dalloway  is the story of several different people on a June day in London. 
The titular character is, naturally, at the center but the other characters are essential to the 
impact of the novel, providing a kind of context, a means of framing.  That is, in many 
ways, the book is about one London day in June. Each character gives the reader a sense 
of the moment, of the meaning of that particular day and that particular place and 
particular society. Some of the characters are more fleshed out and others barely have an 
identity, but each character serves a purpose and informs the narrative. Some of the 
characters serve as examples of the upper class in London and others are more 
downtrodden. Some are men, and others women. For some, the war touched them deeply 
and for others, just peripherally, nothing more than an inconvenience. Overall, nearly all 
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of these characters are English, with Rezia as the principal exception. All were raised in 
the same milieu, with varying degrees of homogeneity. These people were conditioned to 
understand and think the same, to value the same things. Yet, at the same time, they are 
different. In Mrs. Dalloway, Virginia Woolf explores this intermediate space. Overall, 
then, this novel presents this June day in London as a series of moments which are 
meaningful yet temporary, moments that change who we are and challenge who we are. 
However, these are not just moments in time, they are also in space. The characters find 
themselves in the street, in the park, in shops, at home; and they encounter people at these 
places also. Each encounter—with people, with places—changes who we are. So, then, 
one day, one moment—each is part of a larger context: each moment inheres what has 
already taken place and contains within it an anticipation of the next moment. Our 
relationships with people comprehend a similar dynamic. We relate to and understand 
people based on our past relationships. Each new person is different—and should be 
treated as such—but our expectations, our means for knowing somebody, depend on our 
other relationships. Here, in this novel, the reader perceives a complex 
interconnectedness.  
 This emphasis on interconnectedness can be directly related to Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics, especially his preference for the concept of dialogue. As 
Gadamer says, “language is a we” (Gadamer in Conversation 56). Generally, all of these 
characters speak the same language and belong to the same history—yet, at the same 
time, this commonality allows them to develop different ideas and different outlooks. 
That is, they depend on their commonalities in order to be different. Because they have a 
common ground, they are able to find a language that allows them to interpret and grow 
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and discover. Clarissa, too, belongs to this particular London day. She is not especially 
clever, but she is smart enough to privilege her relationships and to recognize the value 
and reward of connecting with others. As readers, we get the following point: 
relationships are productive—the yield is often surprising, unexpected and, often times, 
insightful. Through our relationships we understand more.  
 Consider the main character, Clarissa Dalloway, for example. She is an upper-
class English woman who has recently turned fifty two years old. By all appearances, she 
is not a mouthpiece for transcendent meaning or deep insight, yet Woolf chooses to put 
the spotlight on her, decides to reveal the depth and passion that characterizes her life. 
Clarissa is, of course, in many ways, conventional. She has married a politician and has 
no real worries other than hosting parties and fulfilling her role as a good socialite. She is 
neither daring nor bold. Yet, she is still a person with thoughts and feelings that matter. 
Her life is equal to the life of anybody else, rich or poor, man or woman. Thoughts, 
concerns, perceptions: Clarissa experiences them all. Clarissa is alive and she is searching 
for something. She wants to understand. To this end, Clarissa has built relationships and 
engaged with others. Woolf presents her as a character who senses that relationships are 
always more than we know them to be: stemming from the relationship itself, individuals 
acquire the vocabulary and orientation to relate to others and to see the world a little more 
clearly. For this reason, Clarissa fixates on her relationships and her past: neither can nor 
should be discarded, both still crucial to her interpretive project. So, then, when Clarissa 
returns home from her flower shopping expedition and goes to her attic bedroom, she 
ruminates on what the bedroom means to her, for she sleeps separate from her husband, 
Richard. This image of the bed reminds Clarissa that she has never entirely given her 
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husband what he wants—or that she is incapable of giving it to him. She lacks something. 
This something is not laid out in the open, rather it is something intangible; something 
“central which permeated; something warm which broke up surfaces and rippled the cold 
contact of man and woman, or of women together” (Mrs. Dalloway 32). It is something 
that she senses when vulnerable, needy women come to her to confess, or seek 
absolution, or comfort. Then, when these women come to her, she takes notice of the 
obscure yet productive nature of relationships: 
Only for a moment; but it was enough. It was a sudden 
revelation, a tinge like a blush which one tried to check and 
then, as it spread, one yielded to its expansion, and rushed 
to the farthest verge and there quivered and felt the world 
come closer, swollen with some astonishing significance, 
some pressure of rapture, which split its thin skin and 
gushed and poured with extraordinary alleviation over the 
cracks and sores! Then, for that moment, she had seen an 
illumination; a match burning in a crocus; an inner meaning 
almost expressed. But the close withdrew; the hard 
softened. It was over—the moment (32). 
 
Here, Clarissa approaches a total meaning, one that comes from how she relates or 
interacts with people; her main concern is to recognize things for what they are.  Overall, 
the point is that her sense for what she lacks, for that thing that she is missing, includes a 
sense for meaning, a sense that has to do with the identity of relationships. Clarissa can 
perceive this shortcoming: she is unable to give in completely, to yield to the influence of 
the other. Woolf suggests that love is a difficult thing for Clarissa, but that Clarissa 
knows it is still the only thing that matters.  
To the Lighthouse 
  To the Lighthouse concerns the Ramsay family and the houseguests that visit 
their summer home. The patriarch, Mr. Ramsay, is a philosopher on vacation from his 
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lectures. The matriarch, Mrs. Ramsay, is, primarily, a mother of eight and wife, but she 
also invests considerable energy in helping and influencing friends and family. There are 
other characters in this fictive work, but—besides Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay—Lilly Briscoe 
is the most important. In its structure, the book points toward a triangular relation among 
these three characters. Certainly, the story focuses on the transaction that takes place 
between husband and wife—sometimes dissonant, sometimes resonant, the marriage 
creates the conditions for the identity and growth of the couple: both learn and understand 
because of the difference and affinity of the other; each a source of support and a 
challenge to the status quo. Lilly takes note of this relationship between Mr. and Mrs. 
Ramsay—its essential nature—and is fascinated by it. Her feelings toward Mr. Ramsay 
run hot and cold but she knows that she cannot easily dismiss him; for Lilly is enamored 
with Mrs. Ramsay, a woman who has chosen Mr. Ramsay; he is demanding but because 
he has such high standards he also is a source of insight—he challenges himself and 
everybody else. Lilly is drawn toward this attitude but is also repulsed. Mr. Ramsay leans 
toward doubt and precision while Mrs. Ramsay leans toward sympathy and hope. Each 
needs the other, depends on the other, to compensate for limitations, to gain a more 
complete picture. But it is not just the Ramsay couple and Lilly that negotiate; there are 
other characters, too, who depend on the other, who both relish and reject their 
companions. For this novel hinges on the space between people: each character makes a 
claim that cannot be discounted; each is different, after all; each has something to say, the 
words a challenge. When it comes to hate or love, emotion and feeling, there is a 
necessary movement, a kind of dialectic:  in Woolf’s imaginary world or in our daily 
experience, these feelings only come because we care and each character too; each offers 
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something; we feel communion or antipathy because we recognize an opportunity; 
whether we hate or love, it is because the other challenges us and we can or cannot meet 
the challenge. It is this dynamic that Woolf explores. When, for example, the Ramsay 
family and their guests gather around the dinner table, the narrator describes the state of 
mind of the different characters based on the reflection, the relationship, of the different 
members around the table. Each character depends on the other, understands because of 
the other, is because of the other. This dinner scene is exemplary of the narrative posture 
of the entire novel: no character is presented in a vacuum—the identity of each character 
swivels, depending on who judges.  
 In its overall structure, this novel presents its principal thematic concern—people 
are mysterious and also understandable; no matter how frustrating, the frustration is 
worth the reward. Gadamer suggests that people have different strategies for coming to 
terms and each may be valid, depending on the level of attention and engagement; 
depending, too, on the willingness to take risks. What is the payoff? What risks might 
people take? To answer, let’s look at the tripartite structure of the novel that Woolf 
creates. Divided into three parts, it consists of, first, The Window, then Time Passes, and 
finally The Lighthouse. The Window takes place in one day. On this day, the Ramsays 
discuss if they might go to the lighthouse the next day—a journey yearned for by their 
youngest son, James. Mr. Ramsay says that there is no chance the weather will permit 
such a sojourn, while Mrs. Ramsay says that it is possible, the weather difficult to predict. 
It also includes Mrs. Ramsay sitting at a window with her son James, knitting and then 
reading to him. But she is not just sitting, she is also modeling for Lilly, who happens to 
be painting the scene. The day ends with the family and guests gathered around the 
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dinner table and then, finally, a moment of intimacy between Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay. The 
next section is Time Passes. In it, ten years fly by: here, we are reminded that time is 
indefatigable; no matter our opinion, no matter what we think, time marches on. It does 
not care about our wants and needs, hopes or desires, unfeeling and impersonal, its 
dominion remains, forever and always. So people die. So things change: Mrs. Ramsay 
dies, war happens—young men die in their prime. For Mr. Ramsay and Lilly, these are 
life-changing events, but in the context of billions of years, just grains of sand—so 
Woolf’s narrative presents these events. Then we reach the other side in the novel, ten 
years later, another day in the life of the Ramsay family, on vacation once again, hosting 
guests once again, once again a trip planned to the lighthouse, though this time without 
Mrs. Ramsay who had died in the intervening years. In this section of the novel, the most 
notable characters are Mr. Ramsay and his two children, James and Cam; Lilly Briscoe is 
back also; she who had begun her painting ten years ago and now intends to finish it. 
Lilly has unfinished business—her painting—and so too James and Mr. Ramsay—their 
trip to the lighthouse. Although the day ten years ago was not particularly special, it 
continues to be vital to these characters: James sitting with his mother, James hoping to 
go to the lighthouse, Lilly thinking about Mrs. Ramsay, Lilly working on her painting, 
Mr. Ramsay consorting with his family, connecting with his wife. That day remains, 
framing this new day. So Lilly decides to finish her painting, so Mr. Ramsay and his 
children depart for the lighthouse. Each accomplish their goal, in the end—an homage to 
inspiration, to Mrs. Ramsay. For she unites these disparate characters. Yes, each reach 
their goal and make the best of the situation. Although life has been hard and family life 
strained, Mr. Ramsay does not concede, he fights on, fully aware that life does not stop 
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and start at his convenience—adaptation or annihilation his only options. In the case of 
Lilly, the intimate link between life and art commands attention. In her painting, Lilly’s 
goal is to present what she has learned from the Ramsays. Lilly knows that in their 
relationship there is a clue to a more complete understanding; that Mrs. Ramsay and her 
relationships were genuine, in those relationships there were contained a kind of truth—
the world became more real. Lilly, then, paints because she wants to test herself and push 
herself: the painting, after all, could be anything; it could be anything but it has to be 
something; in her decisions she asserts a form on the world; the world has now taken 
shape. Once complete, the painting will always be itself, the deposit of effort, 
engagement and participation. For years, Lilly had contemplated this painting, had 
contemplated Mrs. Ramsay and her family—how does this family, how does this painting 
relate to the meaning of things?—its completion moving her a little bit closer to the 
answer.  
 To explicitly link this novel and Gadamer, it is useful to return to this triangular 
relationship between husband, wife and artist and the tripartite structure—one day, the 
passage of ten years, then another day. In husband and wife we notice a good example of 
dialogue; also, in the transaction between Lilly and Mrs. Ramsay.  We are reminded of 
Gadamer’s words: in dialogue, “‘world is disclosed’” (Truth and Method 443). Each 
depends on the other for a starting point, for a sense of stability—standing on this level, 
well-anchored platform, each can take risks, explore, well aware that, after jumping, each 
will land on level ground.  So, then, each has an interlocutor with whom he or she can ask 
and answer questions; here, Gadamer’s words prove fitting: interpretation “implies 
pointing in a particular direction” (“Composition and Interpretation” 68). Indeed, these 
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characters interpret and explore new territory, exposing themselves to the new, to the 
potential. Woolf’s perception of this is apparent in that Lilly, through her art, engages this 
dynamic. She has always recognized the meaningful heft of this couple, of the family, of 
Mrs. Ramsay and her son James: in all of them she can sense a clue to help her answer 
her own enigmas. But, instead of passively ruminating on these implications, she actively 
engages with them: she creates a painting that presents these interactions in visual 
language. She tarries with this image, entertaining the unlimited possibilities, but she 
eventually makes choices, commits herself to a structure. By doing so, she has put into 
form what was previously shapeless: the day, the family, life—all have now been 
interpreted. Once again, Gadamer’s philosophy resonates:  “The world that appears in the 
play of presentation does not stand like a copy next to the real world, but is that world in 
















GADAMER ON LANGUAGE 
 
As the topic is hermeneutic ontology, language is the appropriate starting point, 
for language is the means by which human being interprets and understands itself and the 
world: prior to any and all knowledge constructions, language, interpretation, and 
meaning, indivisible in their aims and accomplishments. Language is always present and 
to recognize its determinative influence is to avoid sabotage. When discounted, when the 
world is objectified and nothing else, we become victims, the world now one thing and 
just that; of course, language and its imaging of the world outpace any and all 
objectification, but in discounting language we are too easily sidetracked. In objectifying 
the world, one sees it from a point of view that has validity, but it is only valid as just 
that—a viewpoint. There is more to the picture. To say that it is the whole picture is to 
invite turmoil and subterfuge: the world and its meaning antagonistic or deficient, always 
static, obstructing adjustment and revision, lacking attunement. There needs to be a 
counterbalance. When the world is projected as an immobile entity there is no room for 
imagination or insight: the world is always one thing and this means that we will never 
meet it for what it is. In all cases, both negatively and positively, the matter is one of 
degree. One can ignore language and its influence to a greater or lesser extent; so too one 
can privilege language more or less. As language is something that we do not possess but 
instead, more correctly, possesses us, using language is not a matter of conscious effort; 
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instead, languages hinges more on engagement and participation. As one engages with 
language, one learns to follow its trail: flush with hints and possibility, it is a constant 
balancing act; with nothing certain, we latch onto potentiality and head down a path that 
leads us in a direction that compels, legitimate because we have listened, but still 
shrouded in darkness. This is the dynamic: whether or not we choose to recognize it as 
such, language is our guide and our master; to come to terms with this situation is 
fundamental because it improves our sense of balance; to truly understand things for what 
they are there needs to be humility and maximum attention; the world and its meaning are 
always changing and we need to keep up with this flux. 
Language is imminently influential: part of the identity of language is that we 
never can truly know it for what it is; we can never entirely account for its sway. As 
Gadamer puts it, language intends content and never can be altogether self-reflexive: 
“Language intends the other person and the other thing, and not itself. That means that 
the covering over of language as language has its basis in language itself and accords 
with the human experience of language” (“Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and 
Language” 44). Language is determinative: any attempt to use language is already shaped 
by language; to say otherwise is to stunt understanding and invite distortion. Language 
always intends content and that content concerns matters of fact; what is; the way things 
are; meaning; that we perceive something as something: “Language is not just one of 
man’s possessions in the world; rather, on it depends the fact that man has a world at all” 
(Gadamer, Truth and Method 440). So, then, methodologically speaking, language and 
world are one and the same. The world and its understanding are primordial: from there, 
having a sense for the meaning of the world, one can further define its identity and 
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nature. To do so is natural but is also prey to abuse: things become settled and defined 
and we too easily forget that the very definitions depend on the questions we ask; we 
forget that identity can also be variable if our questioning is imaginative and incisive. 
Sure, it is natural to construct objects, but the appropriate and correct application of this 
construction hinges on the idea that these constructions do not have the final say. They 
belong to an ontological background that shapes their identity and usefulness: “Our 
verbal experience of the world is prior to everything that is recognized and addressed as 
existing. That language and world are related in a fundamental way does not mean, then, 
that world becomes the object of language. Rather, the object of knowledge and 
statements is always already enclosed within the world horizon of language” (Gadamer, 
Truth and Method 447). 
Indeed, language is always already present. To listen to language and to use 
language is our fundamental means of confronting ourselves and the world. It is the most 
meaningful record that we have. With this element of language in mind, Gadamer makes 
the following statement: “Being that can be understood is language. The hermeneutical 
phenomenon here projects its own universality back onto the ontological constitution of 
what is understood, determining it in a universal sense as language and determining its 
own relation to beings as interpretation. Thus we speak not only of a language of art but 
also of a language of nature—in short, of any language that things have” (Truth and 
Method 470). Here, language and understanding fall back on one another: to understand 
one needs language and to use language one has already understood—understanding 
fulfills itself in the verbal act. Being, too, is part of this equation: Gadamer argues for the 
non-distinction between interpretation, understanding, language and human being. We 
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are always trying to understand and it is language that is the true medium for that 
comprehension: when something has a language, it is understandable and lends itself to 
further understanding. 
Language and the world are inseparable; the appearance of language and its 
interpretive content too; a subject matter is always in question, a process of elaboration 
and identification. In language there is identity: something is what we proclaim it to be. 
That identity, though, is provisional—the subject matter—whatever it may be—has 
acquired a stability in language, but temporality and our discursiveness present the new 
and unexpected: we return to language, at this point, to appropriate the moment—and 
language grows in its connotations, complexity and power—its naming power not 
diminished, but increased. Here there appears to be a contradiction: language stabilizes 
the world yet also shapes it. How does Gadamer reconcile this tension? He places 
language within the context of conversation: “we are endeavoring to approach the 
mystery of language from the conversation that we ourselves are” (Truth and Method 
370). All statements and assertions, all language use in general, have an addressee, 
however definite or indefinite he or she may be. The point is that this language is 
understandable and is presented in just that way: the difference and individuality of the 
interlocutor requires that we accommodate our language, that it represent a point of 
mutual contact and a mutual world, an accommodation of development. It is this dynamic 
of dialogue, of addresser and addressee, that shapes the development of language: in the 
very presence or anticipation of the other, in his or her look or his or her words, the 
individual receives a challenge, a blow of awareness that the world is more than we know 
it to be.  
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This dynamic of dialogue is primary, over and above the consciousness of either 
member in the conversation; language does not belong to either member—it instead lies 
in the give and take, in the relation itself, a back and forth that never stops. That is, 
language and conversation have their own spirit and energy, a kind of buoyancy that 
envelops the interlocutors: “Understanding or its failure is like an event that happens to 
us. Thus we can say 
that something was a good conversation or that it was ill-fated. All this shows that a 
conversation has a spirit of its own, and that the language in which it is conducted bears 
its own truth within it—i.e., that it allows something to ‘emerge’ which henceforth 
exists” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 385). Certainly, one can confirm this statement by 
recalling the emphasis that people place on personal relationships: the people in our lives 
are our greatest source of fulfillment. Without them the world would shrink; so vital 
precisely because each mediates this tension between stability and change. They occupy 
an important place in our lives because we share something with them and also because 
they compel—something in them demands that we take notice of their claim, a persistent 
challenge to become more.  
 By locating language within the dynamic of dialogue, Gadamer transcends the 
subjectivity that one typically associates with language—the I that understands and the 
thing that is to be understood. In doing so, language acquires its true breadth—as a 
medium in which truth occurs even when—or because—it is unexpected: neither member 
knows where the conversation is going or what will come of it. This nature of language is 
important: the world and its truth assert themselves in language but do not ever settle, 
both provisional and in search of greater articulation. There is no final version: language 
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is a provocation. This places language on firm ground: as the articulation of its identity 
and meaningfulness, the world appears in language and becomes what it is—something 
else and something more, incompletable in its completedness.  
 To further explain the priority placed on language as ontologically 
determinative—prior to any subjective intention—Gadamer turns to the concept of play. 
Play is useful because it is a structure that binds the player while enabling a kind of free 
movement that is not tied down to any particular goal: it is “a form of restraint and 
freedom at one and the same time” (Gadamer, “The Play of Art” 130). Gadamer contends 
that play is pervasive and fundamental to how one interacts with the world: in our 
embeddedness in the world we are already under way towards play. Our interactions with 
the world are never entirely open—the world cannot be everything—and in everything 
we do there is transformation: the world gains identity while still remaining open for 
more. For Gadamer, language belongs to the world of play: “Play is the process that 
bridges the gap between a not yet semantically articulated form of communication and 
word communication. Play appears to me to be a type of pre-linguistic dialogue. It is 
already in the play of the infant with its own fingers and movements, and especially in 
the play that includes others” (“Boundaries of Language” 14). Language is a kind of play 
in which the movements of the players (the interlocutors) are determined by the play 
itself (the conversation), a never-ending back and forth:  
When do we speak of play and what is implied when we 
do? Surely the first thing is the to and fro of constantly 
repeated movement—we only have to think of certain 
expressions like ‘the play of light’ and the ‘play of the 
waves’ where we have such a constant coming and going, a 
movement that is not tied down to any goal. Clearly what 
characterizes this movement back and forth is  that neither 
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pole of the movement represents the goal in which it would 
come to rest (Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful 22).  
 
As in play, in a dialogue the words spoken are determined by the subject matter, a 
movement that takes place in language, a movement that never rests 
 This back and forth action—unbound and self-propulsive—helps explain why 
Gadamer would say that language and understanding are an event of being and not a 
willful act of consciousness: “Understanding too cannot be grasped as a simple activity of 
the consciousness that understands, but is itself a mode of the event of being. To put it in 
purely formal terms, the primacy that language and understanding have in Heidegger’s 
thought indicates the priority of the ‘relation’ over against its relational members—the I 
who understands and that which is understood” (“On the Problem of Self-Understanding” 
50).  Language bounces back and forth between two interlocutors like a ping pong ball; 
as it does, the truth of the subject matter asserts itself. This dialogue and movement does 
not necessarily need to take place between people directly speaking with one another. It 
also happens when we read texts. In texts there is an I that understands and something to 
be understood. When someone reads a text there is language that refers to something, 
something that both the writer and reader share: a common world. As the world appears 
in language, the reader is provoked: the content of the words are understandable yet they 
are new and different; the reader asks questions and the text volleys back answers; the 
text asks questions and the reader answers; the meaning of the words and the meaning of 
the world in concert.  
In any dialogue, whether between two people who speak to each other or between 
a reader and a text, the shared content, the disputed content, is the meaning of the world. 
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This meaning does not lie in any one person. It lies in the anticipation of the other and the 
response of the other. The temptation to use language is the temptation to address 
someone—so that the world is understood and so that it can be further understood: “To 
speak means to speak to someone. The word should be the right word” (Gadamer, “Man 
and Language” 65). Put in different terms, the desire to use language is a desire for more: 
the world does not belong to any single person, so it is only by way of question and 
response that we approach the true nature of the world, a being that we all vaguely 
understand but can never entirely possess. In our orientation to the world we have a 
diffuse sense for the nature of things, but because language is infinite and variable, there 
is never a final answer; in language the world is defined but it is a definition that belongs 
to a larger context, the context depending on the definition and the definition depending 
on the context: “Communication takes place when the other person takes part in what is 
imparted to him—and in such a way that he does not, as it were, only receive in part what 
is communicated, but shares in this knowledge of the whole matter that is fully possessed 
by both of them” (Gadamer, “The Play of Art” 128). In language use, then, one is pushed 
to modulate and recalibrate: as the world is defined in language the very act demands 
reassessment, for in the effort one recognizes truth, an irrefutable event that includes 
possibility within itself. 
 As two interlocutors converse—whether it is a conversation between a reader and 
a text or face to face—the meaning of the world is disclosed. In this interaction, there is 
an impulse that is out of the control of either member: the subject matter asserts itself and 
both are pushed to respond. But why are we pushed to respond? What is the 
accomplishment of language? Essentially, one can say that the world changes as it is 
52 
 
named and its meaning too. Language appears because it is our way of confronting the 
world and recognizing it for what it is: “To come into language does not mean that a 
second being is acquired. Rather, what something presents itself as belongs to its own 
being” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 457). Here, language comprehends simply 
everything, everything that has a name. Something only has meaning when it is there to 
be evaluated and something can only be evaluated when it is there in the first place. 
Language is our way of entering into the concrete and the definite. The world is diffuse 
and self-concealing, but in its appearance in language it is there and it is distinct. 
Language clears a path and points in a direction. Yes, there is an unrestricted freedom in 
language, but the possibilities of expression are limited by the current moment: 
everything is not possible at any time. A path has already been cleared and we cannot go 
backwards.  
 The world already means something and it is only by engaging with that meaning 
can one coax it into something more. As one reads or listens, the complexity and the 
connotations gain in power. Each new moment is different, thereby demanding new 
expression; this new articulation changes how one experiences the moment too: “A 
person who speaks […] is so oriented toward the particularity of what he is perceiving 
that everything he says acquires a share in the particularity of the circumstances he is 
sharing” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 427). The articulation of the subject matter—
whether narrow or broad or in-between—alters its very identity: it is now something 
definite and understandable—it is what it is—yet in the naming there remains a residual 
space, an opening for further clarification. In their articulation, we know things as they 
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are, but those things are never settled, for as they are named the very things shift, 
belonging themselves to the situation.  
Of course, there are innumerable ways of expressing this idea that the world 
changes as it is named; we belong to the world and the world belongs to us: the world 
provokes us to respond and as we do so it morphs into something else. The very identity 
of things depends on one’s engagement: “We are simply following an internal necessity 
of the thing itself if we go beyond the idea of the object and the objectivity of 
understanding toward the idea that subject and object belong together” (Gadamer, Truth 
and Method 457). To recognize this oft-concealed nature of language is to parry with the 
verifiable and the provable; language and its use has its own truth, one that shapes our 
assertions and one’s attempts to prove them. We are reminded of this aspect of 
language—as an event in which there is no difference between the idea presented and the 
presentation of the idea—every time we are stopped short and notice the limits of our 
understanding: every time we realize that we do not know and never will; language and 
its truth cannot be proven, for it is the medium that shapes  the questions we ask and the 
world we perceive.  
Language is ever-present and it is our means of understanding. The world has 
meaning because of language—but how does language work exactly? Why is it so 
powerful? What happens when a word is spoken? Gadamer points to language’s 
evocative capacity: “The universal nature of all speech—namely, the fact that what the 
word evokes is there” (“On the Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth” 113).  It is 
a curious paradox: language allows us to commune with the world yet in language use we 
also acquire a distance from the world. When we ignore language we notice how the 
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world impinges on us, as if we lost all ability to shape our future; something overwhelms 
us because it is unidentified—we cannot see it for what it is. In language, though, the 
world comes to appearance—it is there for all of us, together; it is not idiosyncratic and 
particular. As something shared, we receive reassurance by way of language: we trust its 
possible accomplishment. Language has been vetted, acquiring a body and a presence 
that coincides with the thing itself: “In the end, the true being of things becomes 
accessible precisely in their linguistic appearance” (Gadamer, “The Nature of Things and 
the Language of Things” 77). As we cannot be everywhere at once, nor can we travel to 
the past or the future, language allows us to engage with everything that is not 
immediately present: “Speech can present something, place it before us as it is, even 
when it is not present” (Gadamer, “Boundaries of Language” 10). In this 
accomplishment, we overcome our provincialism and acquire a sense for the context of 
our being. 
 This distance is important because it promotes contemplation: the thing is there as 
it is; we can therefore take it at its word and work out the implications therein. Gadamer 
puts it this way: “[I]n naming, things are proclaimed to be what they are for us. It is 
correct that one recollects them in naming and that endows contemplation” (“Towards a 
Phenomenology of Ritual and Language” 26). In language there is recognition and 
affirmation: “In taking up a distance, the word achieves two things for us: recognition of 
oneself in another, and recognition along with others of what has been affirmed by 
everyone” (Gadamer, “Culture and the Word” 10). Indeed, language is the product of a 
shared world—in it, the definite and the real and the true. To engage with language is to 
enter into a process of understanding, to confront the world as it is: “Learning to speak 
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does not mean learning to use a pre-existent tool for designating something somehow 
already familiar to us; it means acquiring a familiarity and acquaintance with the world 
itself and how it confronts us” (Gadamer, “Man and Language” 63). In this confrontation 
there is recognition—something appears and in this appearance we approach the idea. 
 In language we confront the world and recognize it for what it is: the world and its 
appearance are one and the same. But what appears? For language is always changing, 
always variable, never self-same. Language is an attempt to work out the context of one’s 
very being. In language one has a sense for a general idea and as the language is used that 
general idea changes. In articulation, language is shaping one’s sense for the possible: as 
it is articulated the world gains in presence and body, but this new awareness is 
provisional, the context having changed. Language itself is interpretive, meaningful: 
“Language […] consists in delun (revealing), in making the real states of affairs manifest. 
That means that we do not merely point to something but also recognize it for what it is. 
Now this, clearly, is the life-world of language: it is itself an interpretation of the life-
world” (Gadamer, “The Expressive Force of Language: On the Function of Rhetoric in 
Gaining Knowledge” 128). The implications of this statement are clear: language can be 
a guide. If one listens to language and uses language and accepts its force and power and 
influence, then the world might mean something that truly matters; things might be 
understandable—instead of alienation, communion. 
 But it is, indeed, very tempting to see the world as a collection of objects that are 
meant for consumption and control, or—at the least—verification. In this verifiability 
there is comfort but there is also potential for abuse. When one downplays the role of 
interpretation in existence then one becomes subject to a world that terrorizes precisely 
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because it cannot change: either we will never truly know it or we think we do and it will 
disappoint, fraudulent. As we pay attention to language we are reminded that it is the 
ultimate mediator: “Is the given not in fact the result of an interpretation? It is 
interpretation that performs the never fully complete mediation between man and world, 
and to this extent the fact that we understand something as something is the sole actual 
immediacy and givenness” (Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation” 30). What things are, 
then, depends on interpretation; interpretation depends on language; one interprets 
because one has language and one has language because one interprets. In other words: 
“Language is the universal medium in which understanding occurs. Understanding 
occurs in interpreting” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 390). For this reason, one does not 
really feel that one has understood something until one has verbally expressed the idea: it 
is nothing until it is there to be understood; the expression itself is the understanding; the 
verbal expression of understanding belongs to the thing being understood: “The verbal 
explicitness that understanding achieves through interpretation does not create a second 
sense apart from that which is understood and interpreted” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 
399). The verbal act is interpretation manifest, each—interpretation and the verbal act—
impossible without the other. 
 As one searches for the right word and the right expression one is reminded of the 
essential rightness, appropriateness, and correctness of language. In his or her experience 
one is prompted to search for words that fit the moment—one has an undeniable feeling 
that the right word is out there—precisely because one lives in words and these words 
truly are a testimony of one’s engagement with the world, the world and word indivisible; 
when one finds the right word the world is at rest:  
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[I]n the utilization of the linguistic interpretation of the 
world that finally comes about, something of the 
productivity of our beginnings remains alive. We are all 
acquainted with this, for instance, in the attempt to 
translate, in practical life or in literature or wherever; that 
is, we are familiar with the strange, uncomfortable, and 
tortuous feeling we have as long as we do not have the right 
word. When we have found the right expression […], when 
we are certain that we have it, then it ‘stands’, then 
something has come to a ‘stand’. […] What I am describing 
is the mode of the whole human experience of the world. I 
call this experience hermeneutical, for the process we are 
describing is repeated continually throughout our familiar 
experience. There is always a world already interpreted, 
already organized in its basic relations, into which 
experience steps as something new, upsetting what has led 
our expectations and undergoing reorganization itself in the 
upheaval (Gadamer, “The Universality of the 
Hermeneutical Problem” 15). 
 
Human experience is hermeneutical, oriented towards meaning and interpretation: the 
unconsciousness that is part of our beginnings never abandons us. Just as when we first 
begin to grow up in a language and things acquire expression in our day to day life, this 
process continues throughout our life. As we grow, the world does acquire a stability, but 
we also encounter the new and the unexpected; we are pushed to modify and readjust; the 
words we use confront these changes, but in that confrontation the words are no longer 
the same: the words bloom and fade—some fall into disuse, others appear unexpectedly 
and others acquire new shades of meaning as they are combined to fit the new situation.  
 As we look backwards and forwards, one can see how Gadamer could place “the 
whole human experience of the world” within the context of linguisticality. To 
summarize: language is the given—one cannot think without language nor is there 
meaning without language. Language, for its part, does not belong to any one person: its 
appearance depends on the addresser and the addressee, but belonging to neither. And 
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what appears in language is no different than the thing itself, the thing described; the 
thing only has identity in language. As this is the case, then language can make things 
appear even when we are not there, enabling us to acquire a distance from the world and 
see it for what it is. So, then, as we use language we see things for what they are, but, at 
the same time, the reference and the referent only acquire a temporary stability, for the 
passage of time pushes for more. The primary emphasis placed on interpretation becomes 
evident: language is already an interpretation but that interpretation is necessarily 
deficient, describing the world of the past and not of the present moment.  
 Language has already accomplished much of our interpretive work. As we listen 
to language and use it this interpretive work is harnessed so that it fits the new situation; 
language is combined so that the world becomes more meaningful; the interpretive work 
of language is flexible, capable of unexpected combinations:  
If a person transfers an expression from one thing to the 
other, he has in mind something that is common to both of 
them; but this in no way needs to be generic universality. 
Rather, he is following his widening experience, which 
looks for similarities, whether in the appearance of things 
or in their significance for us. The genius of verbal 
consciousness consists in being able to express these 
similarities. This is its fundamental metaphorical nature, 
and it is important to see that to regard the metaphorical use 
of a word as not its real sense is the prejudice of a theory of 
logic that is alien to language (Gadamer, Truth and Method 
428). 
 
Gadamer emphasizes the fundamental metaphoricity of language. All language and all 
meaning depend on each other; a hall of mirrors, as the angle of the reflection changes so 
too the image; as the words are combined the meaning of each word shifts—but only 
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because of how the words are combined and their reference: these combinations lead to 
an ever-widening understanding of possibility and possibility of understanding. 
 This is a circular argument—and intentionally so. In the realm of language and 
understanding, there is no first principal: “The hermeneutic circle says that in the domain 
of understanding there can be absolutely no derivation of one from the other, so that there 
the logical fallacy of circularity does not represent a mistake in procedure, but the most 
appropriate description of the structure of understanding” (Gadamer, “Text and 
Interpretation” 30). In other words, that which we understand depends on our 
understanding and our understanding depends on that which we understand. Each attempt 
to understand is accidental, occasional and finite, yet language itself belongs to an overall 
context that envelops anything and everything we do: that we have language at all shapes 
what we do with language in the particular moment. Our fundamental linguisticality is 
bound to our sense of the possible: there is a push to inhabit the space that language 
opens up, but that space can never entirely be filled, as it shifts and expands with our 
movement. As language appears, then, we acquire a more definite sense for our place, 
bound by what has been said, and an even greater sense for what has not been said—all 
that might be said in order to correctly understand everything. This is a never-ending 
process, for we will never correctly understand everything; we are bound to the moment 
and finite; in this sense, everything said is a provocation for more:  
“But there is another dialectic of the word, which accords 
to every word an inner dimension of multiplication: every 
word breaks forth as if from a center and is related to a 
whole, through which alone it is a word. Every word causes 
the whole of language to which it belongs to resonate and 
the whole world-view that underlies it to appear. Thus 
every word, as the event of a moment, carries with it the 
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unsaid, to which it is related by responding and 
summoning. The occasionality of human speech is not a 
casual imperfection of its expressive power; it is, rather, the 
logical expression of the living virtuality of speech that 
brings a totality of meaning into play, without being able to 
express it totally. All human speaking is finite in such a 
way that there is laid up within it an infinity of meaning to 
be explicated and laid out. That is why the hermeneutical 
phenomenon also can be illuminated only in light of the 
fundamental finitude of being, which is wholly verbal in 
character” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 454). 
 
Language mediates the infinite and the finite. Language is finite because it is in a process 
of development, changing as it is applied to each moment. It is infinite because what we 
mean to say is never entirely exhausted in we what actually say: more can always be said 
and there are infinite ways to express what we mean. Gadamer puts it this way: “Now the 
true nature of speaking is such that what is meant constantly goes beyond what is said” 
(“Reflections on My Philosophical Journey” 52). With each expression, a claim is 
made—this is how things are—but such a claim does not exhaust the potential for future 
claims: the very identity of future assertions depends on what has come before—
possibility is now something else. 
 We are always trying to find the right words—so that what we mean to say and 
what we actually say are one and the same. This is—for the sake of freedom—
impossible. Otherwise we would have nothing to work towards—the matter would be 
settled, and then what? Instead, one’s sense for the possible changes as one engages with 
the concrete. The use of language itself is a means of gaining insight: one’s sense for the 
way things are and how they appear are united. Each articulation, then, is manifest: but 
there is never one approach—each attempt has its merits and its deficiencies, pointing in 
a direction that carves out a space but also seals up a concurrent opening: “Self-bestowal 
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and self-withdrawal—such a dialectic of uncovering and withdrawal seems to hold sway 
in the mystery of language” (Gadamer, “From Word to Concept: The Task of 
Hermeneutics as Philosophy” 139). For this reason, we make conjectures, test out 
possibilities and play with language: we never know what will be revealed. Each attempt 
brings the world to language in a new and unique way: “For man language is variable not 
only in the sense that there are foreign languages that one can learn but also variable in 
itself, for it contains various possibilities for saying the same thing” (Gadamer, Truth and 
Method 442). There are other ways of describing this dynamic—that the world is more 
understandable when one engages with it, yet this understanding is directional; it leads us 
on a path that reveals truth but obscures insights that we might have gained otherwise. To 
understand that we are pointed in a direction and what this entails of us can assist us in 
our attempt to illuminate the truth and value of that orientation:  
“Explicating the whole of meaning towards which 
understanding is directed forces us to make interpretive 
conjectures and take them back again. The self-cancellation 
of the interpretation makes it possible for the thing itself—
the meaning of the text—to assert itself. The movement of 
the interpretation is dialectical […because] the word that 
interpretively fits the meaning of the text expresses the 
whole of this meaning—i.e., allows an infinity of meaning 
to be represented within it in a finite way” (Gadamer, Truth 
and Method 461). 
 
In this commentary, Gadamer points to the idea that the interpretive word should include 
everything that is not said in what is said and should be understood as such. By keeping 
in mind possibility—the whole of meaning—then the interpretation can place itself on 
firm ground: where it does not fit into this overarching context, it does not belong; it only 
means anything because of its placement within the context. Of course, here Gadamer is 
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speaking of the interpretation of texts, but the division between the interpretation of texts 
and interpretation in general is not really a division: the interpretation of texts is 
fundamentally related to interpretation of experience and vice versa—we engage with 
texts because they are foundational to our interpretive project.  
 We can never, of course, completely articulate this entirety, this whole—instead it 
envelops us and surrounds us: “It is a way of language that holds itself open to the whole 
of being. […] Totality is never an object but rather a world-horizon which encloses us 
and within which we live our lives” (Gadamer, “Reflections on My Philosophical 
Journey” 37). Any attempt to engage with meaning, to understand, is an entry into the 
particular, the concrete, the moment. In all cases, it is a mediation between unity and 
difference: “Being is visible not only as the one but also, and just as originally, as the 
other and as the multiplicity of differences, and as the identity and difference that comes 
into language” (Gadamer, “Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language” 44). It is 
a mediation that is never complete. The task of language is to put into words the manner 
in which things fit together and how things are connected. But it is also the nature of 
language that those connections vary, including the very meaning of the words, as the 
words are applied to the situation. Once again, careful consideration of this back and 
forth can yield hermeneutical fruit: “Hermeneutics has the task of revealing a totality of 
meanings in all its relations. The individuality of the sense intended corresponds to the 
totality of definitions” (Truth and Method 467). 
 As we experience the passage of time, we encounter the new and unexpected. We 
try to interpret the moment, but there are so many possibilities, with no guarantee as to 
which is right. Somehow, though, we have a sense for what might work and we try to 
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follow that scent, making sure that the conditions are right, with no distractions and an 
adequate level of volume, that we are tuned to the right frequency, a message worth our 
maximum attention. Then, when we feel we have listened, we make a statement that 
interpretively fits—or so we hope: the only verification that is possible depends on the 
very means of that which is being verified. Always, though, we have to commit: “To be 
this and not that constitutes the determinacy of all beings” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 
442). With each manifestation, there is no return. Sure one can revise and amend, but 
every new assertion depends on what has been said before: the very shape of possibility 
morphs. We are not in a position to reject the hermeneutical situation to which we 
belong: we can only move forward. To incorporate our situation, to recognize that we 
belong to it, promotes clarity, a diminishing of distortion. We see things as provisional 
and recognize them as such—instead of flawed, enabling: so that our individuality 
matters, so that our viewpoint provides insight, capable of inspiring. Each view has its 
own truth: “The infinite perfectibility of the human experience of the world means that, 
whatever language we use, we never succeed in seeing anything but an ever more 
extended aspect, a ‘view’ of the world” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 444). 
 Language and its use point us in a direction: one that is valid but also one that 
requires that we recognize it as just that—an interpretation and not the final word. 
Through language, one can expand and extend one’s horizon: one’s possibilities of 
knowledge and understanding can and do grow. How is language able to accomplish this 
expansion? Here, Gadamer’s words prove helpful: “Where the word fulfills itself and 
becomes language, we must take it at its word” (“From Word to Concept: The Task of 
Hermeneutics as Philosophy 139). That is, when the word means something, when we 
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enter into the discourse and forget about how something is said and only have before us 
the content of what is said, when the words refer backwards and forwards, self-verifying 
and self-legitimating, then the word is entirely convincing and altogether valid. This 
nature of the word—that it is self-verifying—is of special note. A word, as a genuine 
expression of meaning, can never be false. It is there as a word and this presence is 
irrefutable: the appearance of the word and its meaning are one and the same. Gadamer 
puts it this way: “It would no longer be a word if it could be false as a word. A discourse 
formed of words can be false or true only if its expressed opinion concerning a state of 
affairs is in question” (“On the Truth of the Word” 135). The word, language in and of 
itself, is what allows for things to be true or false in the first place. Words and one’s 
impulse to use them inhere a legitimacy that cannot be refuted: before one can challenge 
the sovereignty of language, it has already asserted its influence. 
 There are other ways of talking about this situation: for example, by way of the 
metaphysics of light and of the beautiful. Light is important because it allows what is 
there to be seen. Without it, all would be indistinguishable. Words contain within them a 
similar quality, allowing what is there to be understood—to be what it is: “The light that 
causes everything to emerge in such a way that it is evident and comprehensible in itself 
is the light of the word” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 478). So, until the words are used 
to name the thing, the thing has no identity, undefined and incomprehensible; once 
named, it is itself, truly what it is. Now, the concept of the beautiful is important for 
similar reasons: in beauty there is radiance—the idea of the beautiful belongs to the 
appearance of beauty, emanating. In the appearance of the thing in words, there is a 
similar sensation of emanation and radiance: the distance between the idea of the thing 
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and its appearance is dissolved. There is no difference between the words and what is 
said in the words: “All coming into language […] has about it something of this quality 
of self-attestation […] In using words what is given to the senses is not put at our 
disposal as an individual case of the universal; it is itself made present in what is said—
just as the idea of the beautiful is present in what is beautiful” (Gadamer, Truth and 
Method 483). The very attempt to describe one’s perceptions and one’s sense for the 
meaning of those perceptions belong together. Words are there to say something and 
whatever they say will be put to task, with no choice but to define and contrast 
themselves based on other words. The words acquire a validity when they are challenged 
but remain strong; they are not empty, capable of expressing something that matters: “To 
be a word means to be saying […] In order to find those words that are the most saying 
from among the infinite variety of possible words, we must remember what truly 
characterizes ‘a word’: that it stands and one stands by it. This clearly already implies 
that the word lays claim to an enduring validity through what it says or sayingly does” 
(Gadamer, “On the Truth of the Word” 138-9). 
 Now, up until now I have been focusing on language as it appears in conversation. 
But, as I have already mentioned, there is more to consider. Texts are important too:  the 
identity of texts depends on the identity of language and the identity of language depends 
on the identity of texts. As we look at the nature of texts, we will see that much of what 
has been discussed will now appear with greater clarity. Texts intensify and emphasize 
understanding and the identity of language. In texts the character of language appears in 
bold relief, the nature of language more noticeable because there is nothing but language 
in texts. In texts, there are advantages and there are challenges; they have a definite 
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identity, are repeatable, and are entirely intentional—the writer is aware that the reader 
has nothing but the text to understand what is there. Indeed, part of the identity of 
language is that in its development the words become fixed, the meaning of each word 
shared, more and more there. The script, for its part, is the culmination and intensification 
of this fixation—the words, then, immutable: “How the words are developed that one 
needs, and one learns the correct words, and so learns how one learns things, that is not 
conscious learning and practicing. Nevertheless this process of linguistic exchange 
accomplishes the solidification of the use of language. To that extent the fixation by 
means of script is anticipated in the developmental history of every language” (Gadamer, 
“Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language” 33). The movement towards script 
is a movement towards interpretation. It is a recognition that the words mean something 
and that such a meaning should be preserved. By doing so the words make a claim: these 
words matter and will always matter, their very meaning dependent on nothing but 
themselves. Gadamer describes this nature of the text: “The verbal expression of what is 
meant in the text must be constructed in such a way that, without any help of voice and 
gesture, the text articulates itself and actually ‘presents’ what is meant by it. […] This 
distinctive feature of writing enables and limits the text to the pure transmission of sense” 
(“The Eminent Text and Its Truth” 5).  In a text, the reader is forced to confront this 
claim: if the words are intentionally there and will forever be there, then the reader has 
the responsibility to do the words justice; however, the exact meaning of the text is 
always different for each reader and every time someone reads; to listen to the text and 
understand it for what it is, the reader will interpret each time, for the hermeneutical 
situation demands adjustment. 
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 Part of the identity of a text is that it demands interpretation. It is the task of the 
writer to recognize this dynamic and to construct the text in such a manner that the 
meaning is clear and understandable. The text should be identifiable and repeatable—the 
meaning should reside in the text and nowhere else; the text should be a witness to 
itself—but precisely because the text is so transparent, the reader notices his or her 
interpretive responsibility to an even greater degree: the words are understandable and 
they are there, but their exact meaning is still disputable. Here the writer pushes the 
reader to understand something—what is there in the text—but the very meaning of the 
words are not stagnant—the reader completes the meaning, a completion that changes as 
the process takes place. The writer has a double task: to be as transparent as possible in 
presenting the ambiguity, fecundity and dynamism of language. Here, Gadamer’s words 
are helpful: 
What prescribes to all reifications in writing their task is 
precisely that this thing being announced should be 
understood. The printed text should fix the original 
announcement […] in such a way that its sense is 
unequivocally understandable […] The task of 
interpretation always poses itself when the meaning content 
of the printed word is disputable and it is a matter of 
attaining the correct understanding of what is being 
announced […] Accordingly, we must say that a text is not 
simply a given object but a phase in the execution of the 
communicative event (“Text and Interpretation” 35). 
 
The words need to be presented in such a way that they are understandable yet 
incomplete; the reader has no choice but to interpret, to bring his or her own perspective 
and horizon to the interaction: when something is read, the words are the same yet 
different for every reader. It is the writer’s task to recognize this dynamic and to include 
all possible interpretations within the very identity of the text: the text includes potential 
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interpretations within itself and is presented in this manner. In writing, there is 
anticipation: “Writing is more than a repetition in print of something spoken. To be sure, 
everything that is fixed in writing refers back to what was originally said, but it must 
equally as much look forward; for all that is said is already directed towards 
understanding and includes the other in itself” (Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation” 34). 
 All writing includes the reader within itself: its purpose is to guide and lead the 
reader. In the concept of text there is an intimate connection between writer and reader: 
both comprehend understanding and interpretation. The text is so vital because it 
demands that the individual include the other within itself. When reading a text, each is 
forced to ponder the meaning of words: the meaning is different for the writer and the 
reader yet there is a point of contact; the world as it appears in language is in a process of 
transition. By way of text, the reader engages with this movement—the meaning 
understandable but also questionable: “Only on the basis of the concept of interpretation 
does the concept of the text come to constitute a central concept in the structure of 
linguisticality; indeed, what characterized the concept of text is that it presents itself only 
in connection with interpretation and from the point of view of interpretation, as the 
authentic given that is to be understood” (Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation” 30). That 
is, we use language to interpret and understand the world but we rarely become aware of 
this interpretive process: language already includes interpretation within itself. But when 
confronted with a text, where there is nothing but language and that language is 
permanent, we are prompted to consider how we understand and interpret in the first 
place: the text resounds only when the words already mean something, when they truly 
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matter. Writing, reading, and the text are “[a] fruitful model for all experience” 
(Gadamer, “Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language” 34).  
 In the same breath, one might talk about the book of nature and “[t]he readability 
of the world” (Gadamer, “Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language” 34). 
Reading is a fruitful model because the words only mean something when the reader 
anticipates the meaning and follows through with this anticipation as he or she reads. 
That is, the anticipation of content and the act of reading are one and the same yet also 
include adjustment and revision within the very same act. In the same way, in our 
experiences we expect things to be a certain way and these expectations shape the very 
identity of the experiences while also undergoing revision as our expectations are 
thwarted. For this very reason, we place such a heavy emphasis on texts and the act of 
reading—as an enactment and intensification of our interpretive process—from reading 
we learn lessons. Gadamer notes that reading aloud highlights the true nature of reading: 
“Reading aloud demonstrates quite clearly, I think, that reading is a completion-of-
meaning which is one’s own and is fulfilled within itself in the same act of fulfillment” 
(“Reflections on My Philosophical Journey” 51). Reading is such a dynamic process that 
it is impossible to parse the different elements that form it: the meaning of the text, one’s 
own meaning, anticipation and realization—all feed off each other and grow from one 
another. 
 As one interprets and as one lives, one understands to a greater or lesser degree. 
Yes, we already understand, but to what to extent one can harness this understanding and 
enact its truth depends on one’s level of attention and one’s willingness to listen even 
when one does not know—to move further and beyond. As one reads, he or she is 
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reminded and drawn into this dynamic of knowing and not knowing. For something to 
mean anything at all, it already has to mean something; but this does not suggest that 
meaning is ever exhausted—it is a process that takes place in phases; when something is 
understood, more is to be understood: “What we call reading means to read with 
understanding. So reading itself is already an interpretation of what is meant. And thus 
reading is the basic structure to all carrying out, all realization, of meaning. […] It 
therefore also holds that for the text about to be read, the reader who gives the work its 
full presentness will experience an increase in being” (Gadamer, “Reflections on My 
Philosophical Journey” 53). This idea that the reader experiences an increase in being is 
central. As we read a text, its various words and sentences respond to one another and 
combine and re-combine, a process of regression and progression: the possibilities of 
meaning fluctuate, moving towards harmony, never entirely reaching it, demanding that 
the reader participate and keep the words in balance—each moment, each word, a task in 
itself. The attentive reader, then, makes this effort and in doing so becomes more—more 
able, more aware, more understanding, of his or her burden and what this entails: that we 
project our world and respond to our world, its meaning both a question and an answer.  
 The text, for its part, can make such a demand because it is removed from all 
contingencies. It is pure meaning, pure sense. For this reason, the reader knows that the 
text could have something to say: its potential truth cannot be refuted. The reader’s aim, 
then, is to engage with this potential—to confirm and expand what is known:  
Thus, precisely because it entirely detaches the sense of 
what is said from the person saying it, the written word 
makes the understanding reader the arbiter of its claim to 
truth. The reader experiences what is addressed to him and 
what he understands in all its validity. What he understands 
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is always more than an unfamiliar opinion: it is always 
possible truth. This is what emerges from detaching what is 
spoken from the speaker and from the permanence that 
writing bestows (Gadamer, Truth and Method 396).  
 
Sure, the text may not necessarily be true but the reader does not know until the text has 
been read and even then truth is not verifiable or provable. It is the reader’s job to make 
his or her own conclusions: to test hypotheses and find resonance. Where there is 
inspiration, the text has succeeded. 
 As a text is always possible truth and truth is variable, occasional and of the 
moment, then its permanence is of special importance: the reader can always return to the 
text. Here are Gadamer’s words on the subject: “A text is not to be understood as an 
expression of life but with respect to what it says. Writing is the abstract ideality of 
language. Hence the meaning of something written is fundamentally identifiable and 
repeatable” (Truth and Method 392). The text has a definite identity and this places 
demands on the reader. The text should be understood with respect to what it says but the 
content of these words only counts when the reader brings them into his or her own 
viewpoint and own understanding, when the identity of the words remains valid while 
still occupying a position of change and difference; where the reader respects the words 
by asking what they mean: “When one brings a text to speak through reading, even if 
such reading be without any audible articulation, one takes up the meaning that resides in 
the line of meaning that the text has and builds it into the universe of meaning which the 
reader himself or herself has already opened up” (Gadamer, “Reflections on My 
Philosophical Journey” 52).  
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 As has been alluded to throughout this discussion, the reader finds him or herself 
in a kind of dialogue with the text. The text has something definite and precise to say, yet 
the exact meaning depends on the horizon of the reader. Each word means differently for 
each person. What the text has to say, exactly, depends on the questions that the reader 
poses to the text:  
To understand a text is to come to understand oneself in a 
kind of dialogue. This contention is confirmed by the fact 
that the concrete dealing with a text yields understanding 
only when what is said in the text begins to find expression 
in the interpreter’s own language. Interpretation belongs to 
the essential unity of understanding. One must take up into 
himself what is said in such a fashion that it speaks and 
finds an answer in the words of his own language 
(Gadamer, “On the Problem of Self-Understanding” 57).  
 
The text answers and subsequently poses more questions—the answers leading to new, 
previously unconsidered consequences and implications. Only when the words truly 
mean something and only when they truly provoke will the reader incorporate the 
meaning of the text into his or her understanding: here the context of being and language 
shape both the reader and the text. What is being said and why does it matter? The 
answer is always a personal one, depending on the circumstances of the individual, meant 
to be weighed, thought through, a journey of excursion and return.  
 Yes, something is shared by the two partners, the text and the reader. In this case 
it is a common subject matter. Here the writer has articulated the subject matter, has 
attempted to place it within a context and make it real. The presence and body of the text, 
then, entrances the reader: the words matter and the reader responds because they apply 
to his or her own life—the words illuminate and enlighten, unique and personal yet 
belonging to a shared world: “Only through [the interpreter] are the written marks 
73 
 
changed back into meaning. Nevertheless, in being changed back by understanding, the 
subject matter of which the text speaks itself finds expression. It is like a real 
conversation in that the common subject matter is what binds the two partners, the text 
and the interpreter, to each other” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 389). We really are 
bound by a common subject matter, but it is a subject matter that is questionable. We are 
pushed to interpret texts because their resonance and implications are variable. Texts 
themselves are defined by their complexity, their overarching structure that is self-
legitimating, each word supporting every other; as we encounter texts, there is clarity and 
obfuscation—the message is right there, but the implications are infinite: “We find the 
hermeneutical relationship involved in our concept of text whenever we encounter 
resistance to our primordial assumption of the meaningfulness of the given” (Gadamer, 
“Text and Interpretation” 31). Indeed, when we do not know, we ask questions—in them, 















GADAMER ON ART AND LITERATURE 
 
As we enter into this discussion of art and literature, it is first necessary to 
reestablish the identity of language, for its nature is decisive. Language is the means by 
which we have a world. As we grow up in the world, language appears: in language, 
things become what they are; without language, things have no identity, meaningless. 
The only way we know the world, though, is as something; before we ever question the 
names of things and their meaning, the linguisticality of the world has already asserted 
itself: something has already been understood. Nevertheless, identity and meaning do 
evolve, for each are up for debate. That is, the temptation to use language is an urge to 
understand more: in each utterance, the words become more concrete, the referent more 
and more defined, but also exposed to the individuality of the other. Here, the interlocutor 
or addressee demands an accommodation—that the language mediates the difference of 
each. In this mediation there is reassurance—these words are meaningful and they matter, 
in them inspiration and provocation: in this process, too, the words gain in presence and 
body—more and more real, more and more true. This movement never ends. The passage 
of time requires change and so does the individuality of each and everyone. As the world 
is articulated, some things are brought to the fore and others remain in the background. It 
is a constant effort to find the right balance: to include all that we do not know right along 
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with what we do know and to be understood as such. Art, for its part, belongs to this 
process of understanding. 
In art, something-comes-to-being. That is, in art, something is presented as 
something and is understood as such; identity, presentation, performance and 
representation conflate—become one. What is presented, though, belongs to itself yet is 
different. In other words, in the attempt to foreground presentation and representation, 
meaning, coherence, balance, and unity have already asserted themselves, for they belong 
to the nature of the world and our perception of it; yet, each performance, each encounter 
with art is accidental, of the moment, necessarily unique. As time passes, loose ends, 
uncertainty and incoherence arise unchecked—and unavoidably so—but we are 
concurrently equipped to confront these challenges. Art is a part of this effort. So, then, 
art appears and we engage with it because it promotes a greater sense of balance—things 
are in order, at least temporarily. But it is not only because coherence is part of its 
identity that art is so central to our interpretive project, its importance also lies in the fact 
that the artwork is different each time it is presented, yet it is the same. The artwork 
places demands on the participant. The meaning of the artwork belongs to itself, yet it is 
also mediated by all who experience the artwork. In each encounter, the artwork asks 
questions of the participant and the participant asks questions of the artwork. In this back 
and forth, a movement of integration occurs. Mediated by the present moment and all 
who participate, the artwork must change to remain itself—in this there is interpretive 
gold: a challenge to adapt that belongs to one’s very concept of understanding and truth.  
Definitively, language is the starting point, as meaning and the world cannot be 
separated, but what we see and what we understand is not static. Our hermeneutic 
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responsibility can never be denied. In art, there is an echoing of this linguisticality: a 
representation of the world is presented and in this presentation we are reminded of the 
(possible) representation(s) of the world. With each artwork, then, representation is the 
main topic and theme. As we make and engage with artworks we are confronted with 
how we perceive and understand. Artworks only mean anything because they belong to 
our experience of the world: so tantalizing, so seductive, so true—because they reflect 
our engagement with the world and each other—in this, greater awareness. As an artwork 
is a self-enclosed whole that admits no outside verification, we turn to art as a means of 
understanding our own lives, for we aim to make our lives just like that—as self-enclosed 
wholes in which all of the parts fit together. Of course, such a task is never entirely 
possible but to say so does not deny the essential orientation towards integration. For an 
artwork demands that we relate its content to our own lives, and in the process we see 
what otherwise may have remained dim:  
Language signifies memory. Mnemosyne is, however, the 
mother of all the muses and so the patron of art. Art—
whether picture, word, sound, song, or whatever its origin 
was or its present social function may be—means, in the 
final analysis, a way of confronting ourselves in which we 
become mindful of ourselves. In word as in picture, in 
petroglyph as in the song, and still in the refined and 
mediated forms of later literature, the world as a whole—
the whole of our world experience—has become present. 
And even the most silent forms of modern painting, which 
radiate a brooding silence, evoke in us the ‘you are that.’ 
Such an experience of the whole, in which we confront 
ourselves, occurs through the continual new-awakening of 
the echoing of art. In this lies the actual distinguishing 
characteristic of humans (Gadamer, Hans-Georg Gadamer 




When we encounter art we are reminded of how we perceive and what we perceive and 
how we understand and what we understand; the answers, though, are never certain and 
torturously ephemeral, but the artwork is solid and there, a token of stability and insight, 
an anchor amid the flow of time.  
 Compellingly, Gadamer contends that it is through the echoing of art that we 
recognize things for what they are. Of course, it is hard to parse cause and effect, but 
certainly the picturing of the world does change its identity. Each time the world is 
presented in art, it is no longer the same, now something new. In this context, Gadamer 
discusses the ontological valence of the picture: “In it we can see without any doubt that a 
picture is not a copy of a copied being, but is in ontological communion with what is 
copied. It is clear from this example that art, as a whole and in a universal sense, 
increases the picturability of being. Word and image are not mere imitative illustrations 
but allow what they present to be for the first time fully what it is” (Truth and Method 
137). To say that we would not know the world without art is an unwieldy contention, but 
to say that the world is more understandable, more true and more compelling as a result 
of art seems justified. Each time the world is (re)presented more and more of its layers 
and nuances are revealed. Each time the world is (re)presented differently, we see it and 
understand it from a unique angle, as itself and as something more. Part of art’s 
responsibility is to prompt us to see and understand creatively; the thing represented—the 
content—might be the same in several different artworks, but the way it is presented 
constitutes the value and truth of the artwork: “the picture itself is what is meant insofar 
as the important thing is how the thing represented is presented in it” (Gadamer, Truth 
and Method 134). In an artwork there is a dynamic interaction between the content and 
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the manner in which it is presented: the aim, in all cases, is to present the subject matter 
in a way that reveals its truth, so that we know it for what it is. Of course, something can 
be presented in many different ways, but each successful presentation already belongs to 
the identity of the content:  
That the picture has its own reality means the reverse for 
what is pictured, namely that it comes to presentation in the 
representation. It presents itself there. It does not follow 
that it is dependent on this particular representation in order 
to appear. It can also present itself as what it is in other 
ways. But if it presents itself in this way, this is no longer 
any incidental event but belongs to its own being. Every 
such presentation is an ontological event and occupies the 
same ontological level as what is represented. By being 
presented it experiences, as it were, an increase in being. 
The content of the picture itself is defined as an emanation 
of the original (Gadamer, Truth and Method 135).  
 
In this statement, certainly, we can discern the value of art and the impetus to engage 
with art. In the experience, the participant becomes more because the world becomes 
more. In each encounter, different aspects of the world spring forth. 
 In its representation in art, then, the world is seen differently and is recognized for 
what it is. But this recognition is not static; part of the identity of art is that it conceals 
itself as it reveals itself; its depths are unfathomable: what people recognize and what 
they understand includes ambiguity within itself. Something is presented that cannot be 
denied, but belonging to the very identity of the artwork is its own variability: it means 
something but what it means includes difference within itself—in each encounter, the 
participant must interpret. In this context, Gadamer discusses the concept of play. 
 Play is essential to Gadamer’s hermeneutic ontology. In his exposition of art and 
language, Gadamer emphasizes play because play envelops the players and shapes the 
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movements of the players. Before making any conscious choices, play has already 
asserted itself: “Here the primacy of play over the consciousness of the player is 
fundamentally acknowledged […]. Play clearly represents an order in which the to-and-
fro motion of play follows of itself. It is part of play that the movement is not only 
without goal or purpose but also without effort. It happens, as it were, by itself” 
(Gadamer, Truth and Method 105). Once the participants commit to the play, the 
movements and decisions of the players belong to the nature of the play and constitute 
the self-presentation of the play. In this respect, the identity of the play is of utmost 
importance, for once someone has committed to the play, then the play itself is decisive 
and not the player: “The players are not the subjects of play; instead play merely reaches 
presentation (Darstellung) through the players” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 103). 
 According to Gadamer, art is a kind of play. In art there is a movement back and 
forth between the artwork and anyone who experiences the artwork. The artwork, in fact, 
is created in anticipation of the person who experiences it. Each time the play of art takes 
place, it reaches presentation. But why is art a kind of play? Why does it demand this 
never-ending movement? Art is a kind of play because play is regulated movement; it is 
not just unfettered movement; it is free movement within a binding structure: “The 
function of the representation of play is ultimately to establish, not just any movement 
whatsoever, but rather the movement of play determined in a specific way. In the end, 
play is thus the self-representation of its own movement” (Gadamer, The Relevance of the 
Beautiful 23). Art, then, is a kind of play because the movement between the artwork and 
the participant is a kind of regulated movement; the artwork makes demands and the 
participant is drawn to respect those demands. The artwork has its own structure that is 
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binding, yet belonging to this structure is variability. What is understood changes with 
each encounter, yet it is still the same artwork:  
We started from the position that the work of art is play—
i.e., that its actual being cannot be detached from its 
presentation and that in this presentation the unity and 
identity of a structure emerge. To be dependent on self-
presentation belongs to what it is. This means that however 
much it is transformed and distorted in being presented, it 
still remains itself. This constitutes the obligation of every 
presentation: that it contain a relation to the structure itself 
and submit itself to the criterion of correctness that derives 
from it (Gadamer, Truth and Method 120).  
 
The artwork has an identity. It is itself. But what is presented in the artwork is a content 
that includes our understanding of the world and our perception of it. Something is 
presented. The thing that is presented is there and it is intended: “‘Acting as if’ seems a 
particular possibility wherever the activity in question is simply a case of instinctual 
behavior, but one that ‘intends’ something” (“The Play of Art” 124-5). Something is 
intended and it is a representation, but the meaning and identity of the representation does 
not belong to anybody; what is there, exactly, is the subject of the play, for what we 
understand and recognize is never self-same, always different.  
 Indeed, play is a kind of structure that determines the movements of the players, 
but the movements, as such, are variable and free within this structure. The creation of an 
artwork, then, is a kind of play: a structure is created that determines the movements of 
the participants but the structure includes variability within itself. It is only in the 
performance, the experience, that the artwork is present at all; in each encounter, the aim 
is to engage with the artwork so that it remains the same and to do this the performance 
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has no choice but to adapt to the present situation. Each encounter with art is an attempt 
to allow it to be what it is:  
I call this change, in which human play comes to its true 
consummation in being art, transformation into structure. 
Only through this change does play achieve ideality, so that 
it can be intended and understood as play. Only now does it 
emerge as detached from the representing activity of the 
players and consist in the pure appearance (Erscheinung) of 
what they are playing. As such, the play—even the 
unforeseen elements of improvisation—is in principle 
repeatable and hence permanent (Gadamer, Truth and 
Method 110).  
 
This concept of transformation into structure is important because it is only as a structure 
that the artwork has an identity. The only way that anybody can access an artwork is 
through its performance and each performance is different; nevertheless, all participants 
have a sense for the identity of the artwork: the play is an attempt to bring to appearance 
the structure of the artwork, an attempt that can never be more than an approximation. 
 Yes, an artwork is a structure. It is not something that can be planned and created 
on a step by step, methodical basis. It is something that has its own unity and grows out 
of itself.  With this in mind, certain elements can be added or taken away, and it can still 
remain itself. All performance and engagement with this structure is an attempt to realize 
its ideality, when it is at its most coherent and most self-legitimating. Gadamer describes 
this organic aspect of structure, or “Gebilde”, in the following manner:  
The general meaning of ‘Gebilde’ suggests something not 
understood from the vantage point of a preplanned finished 
state one knows in advance but rather something that has 
developed its own pattern from within and thus is perhaps 
to be grasped in further formations [Bildung]. To 
understand this idea is, in itself, an important task. The task 
is to build up and establish what a Gebilde [shaped form, 
structure] is; to construe something that is not 
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‘constructed’—and that means that all efforts at 
construction are withdrawn (“Text and Interpretation” 49).  
 
This concept of structure, then, privileges attentiveness and process. It is in the 
engagement and participation that the structure emerges; our fundamental orientation to 
meaning shapes this engagement, a back and forth process that strives for unity and 
coherence.   
As we engage with art we engage with a structure—and this structure 
fundamentally inheres insight because something emerges that we would not have 
noticed otherwise. Something emerges that is understandable and complete: what once 
was inchoate is now entire—all of the parts fit together. The structure is the only 
measure—it depends on itself to validate itself. In the artwork everything belongs and 
everything is in balance. There is no incongruence: everything appears as if it had no 
choice but to be there. All that appears in the artwork is what is meant; the appearance 
and the idea are one: “Thus the concept of transformation characterizes the independent 
and superior mode of being of what we called structure. From this viewpoint ‘reality’ is 
defined as what is untransformed, and art as the raising up (Aufhebung) of this reality 
into its truth” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 112). Art allows us to see things for what 
they are. Something is identified as what it is and this identification is legitimate because 
it belongs to a context that depends on nothing but itself, a context that has emerged out 
of itself:  
Transformation into structure is not simply transposition 
into another world. Certainly the play takes place in 
another, closed world. But inasmuch as it is a structure, it 
is, so to speak, its own measure and measures itself by 
nothing outside it. […] It no longer permits of any 
comparison with reality as the secret measure of all 
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verisimilitude. It is raised above all such comparison—and 
hence also above the question whether it is all real—
because a superior truth speaks from it (Gadamer, Truth 
and Method 111-2). 
 
 As the artwork is so coherent and so understandable—as the idea and the 
appearance merge into one—the artwork yields insight—we relate the meaning of the 
artwork to the meaning of life: “The transformation is a transformation into the true. It is 
not enchantment in the sense of a bewitchment that waits for the redeeming word that 
will transform things back to what they were; rather, it is itself redemption and 
transformation into true being. In being presented in play, what is emerges. It produces 
and brings to light what is otherwise constantly hidden and withdrawn” (Gadamer, Truth 
and Method 112). In art something is presented and we dwell on that appearance: we ask 
what it means and why it is there. We are prompted to enter into the artwork more and 
more profoundly. In doing so, we do not reach a final answer and then discard the 
question. We continue to ask questions and in the questioning the complexity and depth 
of the artwork—its very meaning and identity—demand that we consider and take into 
account all of the contributing variables, a slew of factors that stem from one’s 
experience of the world, an accounting and confrontation that would not happen if it were 
not for the artwork.   
Art echoes one’s experience of the world and it is in this echoing that one 
understands more and better; in art, the world appears as we would not otherwise have 
seen it. For this reason, art is everywhere and it is unavoidable. Art belongs to our very 
process of understanding the world; we are tuned to engage with it. But some people 
choose to seek it out and engage with it in a conscientious manner. In doing so, there is 
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even greater yield, a more acute sense of communion, a clearer path to truth. It is the 
case, in fact, that art reminds us of our plight: that time passes inexorably, that we appear 
out of nowhere and belong to a world not of our choosing—all of this shapes us and 
determines our actions. Before we make any decisions, the possibility of that decision has 
already been molded. To come to terms with this lack of control and to harness the 
influence that we do have belongs to our experience of art. Our engagement with art is 
like this: something is there that places demands; we are not free to see or understand 
whatever we choose; yet there is freedom and necessarily so—in order for the artwork to 
be what it is, it must be adapted to the current hemeneutical situation. In the encounter 
with the artwork, there is a reflexive movement: one’s place in the world and one’s 
interpretation of the world is the whole that envelops each and every one of us; at the 
same time, the artwork is its own whole, undeniable in its presence. There is, then, a back 
and forth movement between the interpretation of experience and the interpretation of the 
artwork. In this movement, one relates the whole of one’s experience to the artwork and 
one relates the whole of the artwork to one’s experience: “Amidst the variety of art, this 
same message of the whole addresses us over and over again. Indeed, this seems to 
provide a more precise answer concerning the significance of art and beauty. This means 
that in any encounter with art, it is not the particular, but rather the totality of the 
experienceable world, man’s ontological place in it,  and above all his finitude before that 
which transcends him, that is brought to experience” (Gadamer, The Relevance of the 
Beautiful 32-3). In art there is a contemporaneity and a timelessness because it, in fact, 
engages those experiences that shape our sense of time and our historicality. An artwork 
belongs to a cultural moment and is a testimony of that moment. However, it is precisely 
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this sense that the artwork is a part of history that is timeless and universal. In all 
encounter with artwork, then, the participant is reminded of history and change. Yet, in 
the mediation between the past and the present, the participant takes note of a meaning 
that belongs to both: the past belongs to the present and the present belongs to the past. 
Furthermore, the experience of art is one that takes place through time. As one actively 
engages with an artwork, the significance and meaning of each moment is uncertain; yet 
the parts do fit together to make a meaningful whole, however indeterminate the meaning 
may be. This construal requires active participation, a restless back and forth energy; an 
action that never entirely settles but does approach completion, even if it never gets there. 
These experiences of time are important and are reflected in how we experience time in 
our daily lives.  
The work of art is useful because it is a whole that strives for completion; a sense 
of fulfillment that we aim for in each performance and each encounter, a whole that we 
can never entirely enact; nevertheless, it is in the attempt, in the possibility, that we attain 
insight. For in each performance there is a possibility of correctness that shapes the 
experience; some aspects might be ignored and others might be emphasized, but it is only 
the identity of the artwork that places such constrictions; its identity belongs to the 
performance, which necessarily is filtered through the present moment, shaping the 
performance. It is this striving for correctness that constitutes the appeal of art. For in the 
attempt to respect the artwork, we also learn to respect and engage with the identity of 
our very existence:  
In as much as the verse and art are themselves such a 
whole, they incorporate us in themselves. They are, 
philosophically speaking, reflections in themselves. We are 
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ourselves encompassed by the whole, which we are and 
which is in us; but not encompassed in such a manner that 
the whole would be present for us as the whole. We 
encounter it rather as the totality and vastness, wherein 
everything is, only through adhering to what has been 
allotted us, ie., the nómos, whatever it may be (Gadamer, 
Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and History 
91). 
 
By way of art, we come to realize that each moment is new and makes its own demands: 
like we do with artwork, we do with life—we place each moment within a larger context, 
a dynamic interaction that requires attention, engagement and participation. We will 
never exactly know this larger context for what it truly is because of the nature of change, 
but to acknowledge that it is there and that each new moment requires revision has its 
own value, for then we know to pay attention and participate, then we have a better sense 
for our place in the world.  
When we engage with a work of art, it imposes its own structure on the 
participants, a structure that is only present in the performance. Each performance is 
different, but, at the same time, the only way that anyone can experience the artwork is 
through performance. All performances are necessarily deficient—they do not reach 
ideality; but it is not incidental to the work of art that it depends on performance—it is 
part of what it is: “The artistic experience is constituted precisely by the fact that we do 
not distinguish between the particular way the work is realized and the identity of the 
work itself. That is not only true of the performing arts and the mediation or reproduction 
that they imply. It is always true that the work as such speaks to us in an individual way 
as the same work, even in repeated and different encounters with it” (Gadamer, The 
Relevance of the Beautiful 29). It is of special importance that the work is always the 
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same even as the performances vary. This means that each performance belongs to the 
identity of the artwork; the identity of the artwork includes difference within itself; each 
possible interpretation and performance constitute the identity of the work playing itself 
out. It is in the performance that the artwork achieves absolute presence, a presence that 
places demands on the participant in which he or she tries to square the performance with 
the true identity of the artwork; here, though, the performance is all there is—it is only 
through its performance that the artwork has an identity. This is the special nature of art 
as play: “Play is structure—this means that despite its dependence on being played it is a 
meaningful whole which can be repeatedly presented as such and the significance of 
which can be understood. But structure is also play, because—despite this theoretical 
unity—it achieves its full being only each time it is played. That both sides of the 
question belong together is what we have to emphasize against the abstraction of 
aesthetic differentiation” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 116). As we look at the different 
mediums in which art can manifest itself, we notice the different ways that each artwork 
can be performed. Each medium is different, each demanding a different kind of 
performance. Theater is one example. In theater, each performance is in service of the 
artwork: so that the performance corresponds most fully with the identity of the work. 
That identity, of course, never completes itself; in the performance the artwork is never 
entirely what we imagine it might be. Furthermore, the audience, the actors, the play-
wright—all have an equal share in the identity and meaning of the play. In the case of the 
play-wright, he or she has written a play that is a guide for the production of the play: it is 
only in the performance that the play becomes what it is. In the case of the actors, they 
are given the task of embodying the play, so that it becomes something definite for 
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anybody who experiences it. Here, the actors succeed when the distinction between the 
presentation and the thing presented is a non-distinction: the actors’ only job is to allow 
the play to be understood for what it is. In this case, the play is presented for an audience: 
“openness toward the spectator is part of the closedness of the play. The audience only 
completes what the play as such is” (Gadamer, Truth and method 109). The play is meant 
for an audience: the identity of the play belongs to the participation of the audience, a 
situation where neither the actors nor the audience enjoy priority; instead, all who 
participate have the same burden and opportunity: to engage with the artwork so that it 
becomes itself. In the experience of the artwork, there is something that lies in between 
for all who experience it, unpossessed and awaiting appropriation: it is the task of each to 
accommodate the meaning of the artwork with the meaning of one’s own experience. 
This challenge alters with each encounter because the meaning of an artwork is 
inexhaustible: it includes difference within itself.  
As an example, I would like to highlight Ibsen’s drama, The Lady from the Sea. 
Although written to be performed, his work is widely considered to be literature, also 
meant to be read. Now, when I read this work there is an interpretive demand that is 
undeniable. Written in the late nineteenth century, his work is a pre-cursor of Woolf’s, 
inaugurating many of the themes that come to dominate Modernism. In it, Ibsen 
examines free will, existential determination, and the institution of marriage. As Ibsen 
sees it, marriage was a poisoned and corrupt institution. As a result, both men and women 
suffer and human being is stunted. Overall, marriage comprehends our economic, social 
and existential imperative. At the time, many women had to marry in order to survive: it 
was not a matter of choice but of necessity. Consequently, many marriages were initiated 
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on a slippery foundation: the union turns out to be less than the sum of its parts, each 
party diminished instead of exalted. In his play, Ibsen emphasizes free will and the 
continuity and coherence that we all strive for in meaningful existence. To slur over one’s 
past or deny the value of one’s history leads to fragmentation, frustration and confusion. 
One’s past should be acknowledged and confronted: only in this manner can one move 
forward and grow. And it is only in the context of one’s past that the decision to marry or 
not makes sense. Now, I am only able to interpret this play as such because I identify and 
recognize what it is like to have a personal story, what it is like to interact with people, 
what it is like to fuse my hopes and dreams with those of another. Of course, the 
historical and material conditions have changed considerably, but it also true that my 
personal context includes an awareness of this difference. Despite this difference, people 
then as now found fulfillment in their relationships and in marriage. In reading this play, I 
get a better sense for the dynamics of this union and the effort and actions required for it 
to yield personal fulfillment.  
Theater is an example of a reproductive art where performance is foregrounded, 
but all artworks are made to be performed. This is the case even for the plastic arts or the 
literary arts. Even a painting hinges on performance. When someone looks at a painting, 
it is an experience that occurs through time: a scanning process takes place. A painting is 
made to be viewed, and in this viewing something is understood, but that something is 
not the final answer; we return to the painting because there is something in it that 
compels, the nuances and relations in movement. Pablo Picasso’s Guernica is an example 
of a painting that emphasizes this sense of movement. Of course, we experience this 
kinetic energy with all paintings, but, to a considerable degree, the subject matter of 
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Guernica is this movement itself. Fiero describes the Cubist image in these terms: “The 
Cubist image, conceived as if one were moving around, above, and below the subject and 
even perceiving it from within, appropriated the fourth dimension—time itself” (6: 6). 
Produced in response to the bombing of the Spanish town Guernica, “the world’s first 
aerial bombardment of a civilian target”, Picasso’s aim was to represent the horror of this 
event. But, instead of representing it realistically, Picasso chose to represent it as a Cubist 
image. In many ways, Picasso’s Cubism is a refutation of the impersonality of violent 
technology. Each image can be seen from several different viewpoints and requires a 
scanning process that never completes itself. As one scans, the nuances and relations shift 
and change. It emphasizes the variability of the perceiving consciousness, the 
inexhaustibility of perception: the perception of each individual is of value and worth, 
contributing to our collective sense of truth and meaning.  
Overall, the painter has created the painting because it provides answers but also 
because it asks questions; queries and responses that depend on each encounter, forever 
vibrant:  
A dialectic of question and answer does not here come to a 
stop. On the contrary, the work of art distinguishes itself in 
that one never completely understands it. That is to say, 
when one approaches it questioningly, one never obtains a 
final answer that one now ‘knows.’ Nor does one take from 
it relevant information, and that takes care of that! One can 
never fully harvest that which resides in an artwork so that 
it is, so to speak, consumed. Apprehending a poetic work, 
whether it comes to us through the real ear or only through 
a reader listening with an inner ear, presents itself basically 
as a circular movement in which answers strike back as 
questions and provoke new answers. This is what moves us 
to tarry with a work of art, of whatever kind it may be. To 
be tarrying [Verweilen] is clearly the distinguishing mark of 
the experience of art. An artwork is never exhausted. It 
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never becomes empty” (Gadamer, “Reflections on My 
Philosophical Journey” 43-4). 
 
 An artwork is created with the experience in mind, one in which the participant 
encounters something that is true and understandable, yet variable and of the moment: a 
reflexive movement occurs—in order to understand what is there, the participant has no 
choice but to relate this new present to past experience. It is part of the identity of the 
artwork that the participant should feel challenged and also feel the need to face the 
challenge.  
Once created, the artwork belongs to no one, not even the artist—he or she 
confronts the artwork just like anyone else: as something that reveals itself in its 
abundance but also reposes in itself; the artwork has its own special identity that is 
autonomous and self-sufficient; the artwork is meant to be performed and in the 
performance it is both different and the same each time. This is part of its identity, in 
fact—that it encounters each participant as a thing that changes the participant: the 
artwork is always created in anticipation of the performance. The artwork only has an 
identity when it is performed: “The concept of play was introduced precisely to show that 
everyone involved in play is a participant. It should also be true of the play of art that 
there is in principle no radical separation between the work of art and the person who 
experiences it” (Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful 28). The work of art is created 
in anticipation of its experience and this experience mandates that the participant 
recognize what it is that is being presented. In order to understand what is being 
presented, the participant looks at his or her own life, relates what appears in the artwork 
to his or her own understanding and experience. In this, there is a horizon of possibility 
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that envelops and surrounds the participant: the artwork belongs to this horizon and asks 
that the participant reassess his or her place in the horizon because it has presented 
something that has never even been considered; once seen, the participant feels the urge 
to integrate. In this context, Gadamer’s words prove apt: “The play of art as appearance is 
played out between us. The one takes the creation simply as a creation, just as the other 
does. Communication takes place when the other person takes part in what is imparted to 
him—and in such a way that he does not, as it were, only receive in part what is 
communicated to him, but shares in this knowledge of the whole matter that is fully 
possessed by both of them” (“The Play of Art” 128). Yes, in art something is presented 
that appears and we relate this appearance to absolutely everything; everything, in fact, 
has an appearance. To come to terms with the appearance of everything, to try to square 
appearance with truth—this is the nature of hermeneutic ontology.  
The artist, then, creates an artwork so that all who experience it participates in the 
same effort: so that one might see and understand the world for what it is. Like an 
artwork, the world, too, has an identity and we each feel the need to commune with this 
identity. Art belongs to this process of fulfillment:  
What gives the work its identity as a work? What makes 
this what we call a hermeneutic identity? Obviously, this 
further formation means that its identity consists precisely 
in there being something to ‘understand,’ that it asks to be 
understood in what it ‘says’ or ‘intends.’ The work issues a 
challenge which expects to be met. It requires an answer—
an answer that can only be given by someone who accepted 
the challenge. And that must be his own, and given 
actively. The participant belongs to the play (Gadamer, The 




The artwork issues a challenge and we are drawn to this challenge because, instead of 
engaging with the diffuse gauze of an undifferentiated world, we encounter something 
that is definite, concrete, and complete. Yet, because the artwork never reveals all of its 
answers, because it must be performed to be at all, the work changes with each encounter. 
This meeting with difference is appealing because of our own experience of time: change 
is unavoidable and we are better off if we face it, if we too are fluid. It is a trial of 
adaptation and integration: “It is a question, therefore, of allowing what is to be. But this 
‘letting be’ does not mean the repetition of something we already know. We let the past 
be for us as we are now, not by repeated experience of it, but through an encounter with 
it” (Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful 49). The artwork is different for each 
person who experiences it and in each moment that one encounters it. In all, the artwork 
paves its own path, but it depends on the participant to follow the guideposts and to be 
able to read them; in order to do so, the participant has to accommodate his or her outlook 
and language in such a manner that he or she might decipher the hieroglyphics of the 
artwork. Yet, the artwork is created in such a way that it anticipates difference: it is made 
to be understood uniquely, depending on who encounters it—even as it remains itself. 
Gadamer puts it this way: “All artistic creation challenges each of us to listen to the 
language in which the work of art speaks and to make it our own. It remains true in every 
case that a shared or potentially shared achievement is at issue” (The Relevance of the 
Beautiful 39). The artist creates the artwork to be experienced, but it is not until this 
happens that the artwork is what it is supposed to be. In this encounter, the participant is 
changed and the artwork is more truly itself, a means of mediation.  
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The artwork is meant to be experienced and because of this the artwork includes 
the other within itself. In the same manner, the participant chooses to experience the 
artwork so that he or she might do the same—encounter the other so that he or she is 
more oneself. As one grows in the world, one tries to find one’s place in it and to 
understand it; it is an anxious question with no final answer, but there are moments of 
illumination and continuity. Art contributes to this effort:   
Self-understanding always occurs through understanding 
something other than the self, and includes the unity and 
integrity of the other. Since we meet the artwork in the 
world and encounter a world in the individual artwork, the 
work of art is not some alien universe in which we are 
magically transported for a time. Rather, we learn to 
understand ourselves in and through it, and this means that 
we sublate (aufheben) the discontinuity and atomism of 
isolated experiences in the continuity of our own existence 
(Gadamer, Truth and Method 83). 
 
An artwork is always new and different, yet its materials are the same as those that 
belong to one’s interpretive effort; the artwork is immediately accessible, requiring no 
effort other than a willingness to pay attention; in this encounter the world appears 
transformed and this transformation is so compelling and so true that we relate it to our 
own world, so that it too might be understood for what it is.  
An artwork is created in anticipation of its performance and each performance 
strives to present the artwork as it is. But what is the content of the artwork? Why does it 
belong to our understanding of the world? Well, up to now the answer has been alluded 
to, but it has not been mentioned explicitly: that an artwork presents something as 
something and is understood as such. Whatever is presented is intentional and is 
presented as appearance: “Mimetic imitation […] does not intend to be ‘believed,’ but to 
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be understood as imitation. Such imitation is not feigned, is not false show, but on the 
contrary clearly a ‘true’ showing, ‘true’ as a show. It is perceived just as it is intended, 
namely as show, appearance” (Gadamer, “The Play of Art” 127-8). In an artwork 
something is presented and that something is what it is meant to be. As we follow this 
line of thought, we might notice that something can only be presented when one knows 
what it is: in the artwork, something is there as one knows it to be. As one creates an 
artwork or encounters an artwork, the raw materials that we use to interpret the world are 
transferred into the artwork and, in this transference, these materials are removed from 
their contingent circumstances and we acquire a knowledge of the essence: “The concept 
of imitation can be used to describe the play of art only if one keeps in mind the cognitive 
import of imitation. The thing presented is there (Das Dargestellte ist da). That is the 
situation basic to imitation. When a person imitates something, he allows what he knows 
to exist and to exist in the way that he knows it” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 113). In art 
something is presented as we know it to be—anybody who encounters the artwork will 
then recognize what is represented; in the representation, the thing is presented as it is 
understood; nevertheless, what is understood, precisely, is part of the play, up for debate, 
agile.  
Art is a path into the true because in it there is no difference between the 
representation and the thing represented; the representation is the only available way for 
the thing to be understood; the thing is there as we know it: “the work of art does not 
simply refer to something, because what it refers to is actually there. We could say that 
the work of art signifies an increase in being” (The Relevance of the Beautiful 35). The 
work of art does not point away from itself; the reference is included within itself: to 
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engage with the representation, one already knows that which is represented. In other 
words, as one engages with representation, the thing represented is already there in the 
representation, for one would not be able to represent it if one did not know it: “With 
regard to knowledge of the true, the being of the representation is more than the being of 
the thing represented” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 114). Yes, the representation is 
paramount and shapes how we encounter the thing represented, but, in the same breath, 
the thing represented is encountered as it is because we recognize it in the representation: 
“For there is no doubt that the essence of imitation consists precisely in the recognition of 
the represented in the representation” (Gadamer, “Art and Imitation” 99). In other words, 
in an artwork, something is always presented as something; the content depends on the 
presentation and the presentation depends on the content. What, exactly, is represented, 
though, can vary widely. In its most abstract sense, one can represent the relations 
between things, their order: “This talk of imitation obviously derives from the fact that 
the universe itself, the vault of the heavens, and the tonal harmonies we hear, can all be 
represented in a miraculous way by numerical ratios, especially those between even 
numbers. […] Mimesis reveals the miracle of order that we call the kosmos” (Gadamer, 
“Art and Imitation” 101). For in our experience of the world, we encounter order all 
around us; it is only natural that we would represent this feeling of order in an artwork; 
here, an artwork reconciles the relations of things, a correspondence that we sense and 
strive for, incomplete and temporary yet flush with potential.   
When something is represented it is made present; this means that it is there to be 
encountered and in the confrontation one wonders what it is, exactly, that is there. One 
wants to recognize the thing that is there: “Recognition confirms and bears witness to the 
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fact that mimetic behavior makes something present” (Gadamer, “Art and Imitation” 98). 
Recognition is very important. When one recognizes something, one understands the 
thing for what it is:  
When I recognize someone or something, what I see is 
freed from the contingency of this or that moment of time. 
It is part of the process of recognition that we see things in 
terms of what is permanent and essential in them, 
unencumbered by the contingent circumstances in which 
they were seen before and are seen again. This is what 
constitutes recognition and contributes to the joy we take in 
imitation. For what imitation reveals is precisely the real 
essence of the thing” (Gadamer, Art and Imitation 99).  
 
Put simply, in art something is represented so that it might be recognized. What is 
represented is entirely intentional and is meant to be dwelt upon; it is meant to be seen 
and considered; the representation is meant to matter because it is all that is there: “What 
is shown is, so to speak, elicited from the flux of manifold reality. Only what is shown is 
intended and nothing else. As intended, it is held in view, and thus elevated to a kind of 
ideality. It is no longer just this or that thing that we can see, but it is now shown and 
designated as something. An act of identification and, consequently, of recognition 
occurs whenever we see what it is that we are being shown” (“The Play of Art” 129). An 
artwork allows for unlimited freedom: it can be anything. But an artwork is never 
everything. The artist has to make choices and in doing so he or she commits to a certain 
way of understanding and a certain way of seeing. Nevertheless, it is also the artist’s 
prerogative to situate his or her artwork within this paradigm of limitless possibility: by 
presenting a defined artwork with details, the artist provokes the participant to relate the 
specific identity of the artwork to the truth of art and all that it entails. In order for this to 
happen, the participant has no other option than to enter even further into the artwork: it 
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is only in the details that the universal appears. An artist presents something that is 
there—and this something is the only measure. It is the participant’s responsibility to 
engage with what is there and to recognize what is there.  
In an artwork something is presented that is intentional, meaningful, and 
universally relatable. The participant is able to see what is there because each artwork 
includes the other within itself: it is an attempt to go beyond the individual and identify 
those experiences that we all share. The more one engages with art, the more one grasps 
our commonalities. When something is shared, it is no longer idiosyncratic: one now 
trusts it for what it is. In this activity, there is an experience of growing familiarity: “The 
joy of recognition is rather the joy of knowing more than is already familiar. In 
recognition what we know emerges, as if illuminated, from all the contingent and 
variable circumstances that condition it; it is grasped in its essence. It is known as 
something” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 113). In our experience of the world, there is a 
rush of phenomena that we can never entirely trap: there is just too much to process; 
however, some of it does acquire meaning and some of it is understood, if not 
completely. In our perception, the world is already understood, at least up to a point. Art 
is a part of this process: “Recognition always implies that we have come to know 
something more authentically than we were able to do when caught up in our first 
encounter with it. Recognition elicits the permanent from the transient. It is the proper 
function of […] art in general to accomplish this” (Gadamer, The Relevance of the 
Beautiful 47). In art, our experiences of the world are reflected: in order to understand 
what is there in the artwork, we indubitably relate it to our own lives. In this action, the 
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contingent elements are removed, no longer depending on the individual situation, now 
part of a structure that relies on nothing but itself and therefore cannot be false.  
An artwork is an avenue to truth because it depends on nothing but itself. It is its 
own self-enclosed world that creates the terms of its own existence. In an artwork, we 
recognize the way things are because our own experience of the world is similar: it too is 
a self-enclosed whole that admits no outside verification. Gadamer describes this 
character of art in a similar fashion: “art is present whenever a work succeeds in elevating 
what it is or represents to a new configuration, a new world of its own in miniature, a new 
order of unity in tension” (“Art and Imitation” 103). We turn to art because it is 
permanent while still including change within itself: the work of art demands that its 
experience take place through time and in this undertaking the participant strives to allow 
the artwork to be what it is; it is an attempt that is always an approximation; the artwork 
makes a normative claim and we are beholden to this claim, but the exact parameters are 
never clear and they fluctuate with the passage of time. This balancing act, this mediation 
between the permanent and the transient, this attempt to accommodate identity and 
difference—all of this is part of our experience of the world. In art, we get the chance to 
engage with particulars; instead of something diffuse, we encounter something concrete: 
it is there and it is intentional and it is self-sufficient. An artwork is self-sufficient when 
everything belongs, everything is in its right place and in its right order: its truth cannot 
be refuted. The world of the artwork and the world of lived experience conflate.  
In the same breath, Gadamer discusses the symbolic character of art. To discuss 
the symbolic is similar to discussing the role of recognition in art. Yet, discussing the 
symbolic can provide its own clues and can yield a more nuanced picture of the nature of 
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art. In all cases, the point of art is to recognize the way things are and to become more 
familiar with the nature of the world; when something is recognized, it is understood for 
what it is; by engaging with art, one’s overall experience of the world is related to the 
particulars of the artwork, which, by nature, is complete and entire, with no loose ends. 
When we experience art, this feeling of completeness is transferred to one’s own 
understanding. For a second, the world, in all of its complexity, is unified:  
For our experience of the symbolic in general, the 
particular represents itself as a fragment of being that 
promises to complete and make whole whatever 
corresponds to it. Or, indeed, the symbol is that other 
fragment that has always been sought in order to complete 
and make whole our own fragmentary life. […t]he 
experience of the beautiful, and particularly the beautiful in 
art, is the invocation of a potentially whole and holy order 
of things, wherever it may be found (The Relevance of the 
Beautiful 32).  
 
We turn to art in order to find meaning, so that the different, distinct elements of life 
might fit together. As we live with art, its truth asserts itself, a declaration that is 
undeniable and overwhelming; in the experience, we gain insight that we would not gain 
in any other way. That is, the meaning of the artwork is included within itself, yet that 
very meaning is only understandable when related to the matrix of possible meanings; 
furthermore, one could say that the artwork changes the contours of possibility, for it 
presents something that had, up to that instant, not been considered or recognized: 
We typically encounter art as a unique manifestation of 
truth whose particularity cannot be surpassed. The 
significance of the symbol and the symbolic lay in this 
paradoxical kind of reference that embodies and even 
vouchsafes its meaning. Art is only encountered in a form 
that resists pure conceptualization. Great art shakes us 
because we are always unprepared and defenseless when 
exposed to the overpowering impact of a compelling work. 
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Thus the essence of the symbolic lies precisely in the fact 
that it is not related to an ultimate meaning that could be 
recuperated in intellectual terms. The symbol preserves its 
meaning within itself (Gadamer, The Relevance of the 
Beautiful 37). 
 
 By being there at all, the artwork is an impetus for further explanation, for one can never 
exhaust the particularity of each individual artwork; the artwork both refers to something 
else and includes its reference within itself. 
Art is a medium of truth, insight and meaning that is unique and irreplaceable. It 
is capable of all of these accomplishments because we are tuned to engage with art—it is 
a part of who we are and how we understand: art and being necessarily belong together, 
each reflecting the other. So when Gadamer says that art “resists pure conceptualization,” 
this statement should also be applicable to human being. If one thinks about how we 
understand, then it is easy enough to defend this position: for it is true that everything 
cannot be understood; when some things are brought to our attention, others are left in the 
background, unavoidably so. Here, Gadamer’s words prove useful: “precisely what is 
exhibited in the work of art ought to constitute the essence of Being itself. The conflict 
between revealment and concealment is not the truth of the work of art alone, but the 
truth of every being, for as unconcealedness, truth is always such an opposition of 
revealment and concealment. The two belong necessarily together” (“The Truth of the 
Work of Art” 107). An artwork does present something, but what it is exactly can never 
be completely determined. In this manner, we are asked to balance and unify, to identify 
the artwork while admitting that this identity is variable and in flux; in each encounter, 
the meaning of the artwork shifts because each constituent component only matters as 
each relates the one to the other, a constellation of meaning that is dynamic and fluid; the 
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experience becomes an exercise in revision and unification. In art, there is an 
indeterminacy that is part of its definition, requiring that the participant interpret: 
something is there, but that thing includes difference within itself. Life is not so different. 
In life, we are not sure about the meaning of things either. Yes, truth asserts itself, but as 
we come to know more, the mystery of things also becomes more apparent: 
“interpretation seems to be a genuine determination of existence rather than an activity or 
intention” (Gadamer, “Composition and Interpretation” 71). In all cases, interpretation is 
a part of existence and we engage with art to equip ourselves in this effort. 
 We can never know everything: we already know something and this orientation 
determines the questions we ask and all that we might consider. In this, we are bound to a 
moment and a situation. The act of interpretation is a working-out, a consideration of all 
those factors and elements that are determinative; it is an incompletable process and one 
with no final answer, for those things that shape our questions and the very act of 
interpretation can never be entirely accounted for. This is the case for the interpretation of 
existence and of art. The final truth, the root cause, the source—these will never be 
grasped: our blind spots, our incessant movement, this whirl that envelops us—these 
ensure our need for interpretation; this search for balance requires our attention, effort 
and engagement. As we consider the different elements—of all that is—we come to 
recognize and understand, a coherence and meaning assert themselves and the relations 
are further understood in all of their complexity and nuance: in all, the world becomes 
more. Yet, as the world becomes more the true complexity and mystery of things 
becomes more noticeable also. For as we understand more, we become more aware of 
everything that we do not understand. With any assertion, the world is pictured at a 
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certain angle: more can and needs to be said in order to account for the one-sidedness of 
each statement. The meaning of life, then, or of art, is never final. As we engage with life 
and art, the entire structure—the overall meaning—alters as we enter further into the 
structure: the whole changes with the parts and the parts change with the whole. In each 
moment, the meaning is new:  
To be sure, correct knowledge is made possible by the 
openness of the there. The beings that come forth out of 
unconcealedness present themselves for that which 
preserves them. Nevertheless, it is not an arbitrary act of 
revealing, an act of theft, by which something is torn out of 
concealedness. Rather, this is all made possible only by the 
fact that revealment and concealedness are an event of 
Being itself. To understand this fact helps us in our 
understanding of the nature of the work of art. There is 
clearly a tension between the emergence and the sheltering 
that constitute the Being of the work itself. […] Its truth is 
not constituted simply by laying bare its meaning, but 
rather by the unfathomableness and depth of its meaning 
(Gadamer, “The Truth of the Work of Art” 107).  
 
In life and in art the act of interpretation is required. In each case, the meaning shifts as 
we know more and differently. Art demands interpretation and it is part of its identity that 
it changes—becomes itself—as we change.  
 The interaction between the participant and the artwork is dynamic; related to this 
dynamism and contributing to it is the manner in which the participant experiences the 
artwork: instead of moving in one direction until reaching the end, instead of consuming 
the artwork so that all of its riches are acquired, the artwork requires that the participant 
encounter it on its own, autonomous time. Concerning the temporal dimension of art, 
Gadamer has this to say: “the work of art is […] determined by its own temporal structure 
rather than by the quantifiable duration of its existence through time” (The Relevance of 
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the Beautiful 43). In its occurence, the artwork has its own time, one that contrasts with 
our pragmatic, practical notion of time: instead of going forward, we tarry. In this case, 
the artwork suspends our usual sense of time: in the interaction, there is no time other 
than that of the artwork. The ideal feeling of time in the artwork is never quantifiable; 
instead, it depends on the structure of the artwork, an attempt to allow the artwork to be 
what it is at its most ideal; for our experience of time depends on rhythm and contrast; 
here, once again, it is a question of the relation of parts to whole and whole to parts. The 
proper tempo, then, depends on context: it is only within the context of the whole that the 
proper time can be found. This account of time has two parts: for one, there is the tempo 
of the performance, and for the other, the suspension of temporal duration. The two 
cannot be parsed. The point here is that the proper tempo depends on the relation of one 
moment to all of the other moments within the artwork; a sense for this relation, though, 
depends on a willingness to go backwards and forwards, a recognition that these relations 
are not fixed, changing in the experience itself. That is, in order to find the tempo 
appropriate to the artwork, one must first experience the artwork as a whole, an 
experience that is recursive and anticipatory; in this activity, there is a suspension of 
durationality and directionality. The more one dwells with the artwork, then, the more it 
reveals of itself:  
The temporal dimension that is bound up with art is, in fact, 
fundamental. In this tarrying the contrast with the merely 
pragmatic realms of understanding becomes clear. The 
Weile [the ‘while’ in Verweilen, tarrying] has this very 
temporal structure—a temporal structure of being moved, 
which one cannot describe merely as duration, because 
duration means only further movement in a single 
direction. This is not what is determinative in the 
experience of art. In it we tarry, we remain with the art 
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structure [Kunstgebilde], which as a whole then becomes 
ever richer and more diverse. The volume increases 
infinitely—and for this reason we learn from the work of 
art how to tarry (Gadamer, Gadamer in Conversation 77).  
 
Through the autonomous temporality of the artwork, we learn that meaning cannot be 
consumed and discarded, nor is there a final answer that we might someday capture; 
instead, meaning appears in the interaction: the more we occupy the structure the more its 
truth appears, the more we get a sense for the component parts and their relations. In the 
experience of art and, more specifically, in the act of tarrying we gather that meaning is 
inexhaustible and infinitely complex; with each new moment it becomes something else 
and it is our task to account for this—an act of intent that slips between our fingers but 
still leaves a trace, renewal and prophecy in tandem.  
 This temporal experience of art is universal. It applies to all mediums of art. But 
the specific concern of this project is literature and its identity. When one reads literature, 
one tarries; the connotations and complexity of meaning in movement also, always 
demanding more of the reader. But literature is not exactly the same as art either; it is 
different in that language is the root and measure of literature; of course, art depends on 
language, too, for art is always an experience of meaning, but other art forms are one step 
removed from language. Therefore, according to Gadamer, literature occupies a special 
and privileged position in the pantheon of the arts: instead of engaging perception which 
then leads to an experience of (in)determinate meaning, literature engages our 
linguisticality—in it we confront the reference and discourse contained within 
language—all that language can accomplish. That is, through our linguisticality we 
proclaim the identity of the world: something comes to being that was never before and 
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the world becomes something else as it is described. Literature depends directly on this 
linguisticality and art too, but art is a result of how we understand the world and define it; 
literature clears the way for art and is a model for it too: “Heidegger asserts that the 
essence of art is poeticizing. What he means is that the nature of art does not consist in 
transforming something that is already formed or in copying something that is already in 
Being. Rather, art is the projection by which something new comes forth as true. The 
essence of the event of truth that is present in the work of art is that ‘it opens up an open 
place’” (Gadamer, “The Truth of the Work of Art” 108-9). The commonality between 
poetry and art is undeniable. Poetry serves as a model for art because it transforms the 
world: our sense for the identity of the world depends on language and poetry engages 
this process of definition. Art is like poetry in that it too transforms its subject; even if its 
medium is not language, it is on its way to language: both art and poetry present 
something as something, but the exact meaning is never certain; one returns to the 
artwork again and again, aware that its truth is new each time. 
 All that has been said about art up to this point also applies to literature. But it is 
also true that literature belongs to a special category. It belongs to the domain of 
language. Literature lies at the intersection of art and language. At this point, then, it is 
worth returning to our analysis of language and what it means that we have language. Put 
simply, it is impossible to separate meaning from language or understanding from 
language. That is, we grow up and acquire a language and this is not a conscious effort: 
before we even notice, the names of things have staked their claim. This is our 
relationship to language, then: it is unconscious and we are oriented to the content of the 
discourse instead of the details of grammar or syntax; as we use language, we only notice 
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the meaning. The literary work of art engages this aspect of our linguisticality—that in 
language we come to know the world as it is:  
When we grow up in a language, the world is brought close 
to us and comes to acquire a certain stability. Language 
always furnishes the fundamental articulations that guide 
our understanding of the world. It belongs to the nature of 
familiarity with the world that whenever we exchange 
words with one another, we share the world. The word of 
the poet does not simply continue this process of 
Einhausung, or ‘making ourselves at home.’ Instead it 
stands over against this process like a mirror held up to it. 
But what appears in the mirror is not the world, nor this or 
that thing in the world, but rather this nearness or 
familiarity in which we stand for a while. This standing and 
this nearness find permanence in the language of literature 
and, most perfectly, in the poem (Gadamer, “On the 
Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth” 115).  
 
Literature is able to promote awareness and insight because it depends on nothing but 
language. When confronted with a poem or a novel, the reader comprehends that 
language is all that there is and this pushes the reader to wonder about the identity of 
language. Why is language so captivating? How is it so self-reliant? A reflexive action 
occurs: the reader wonders about the meaning of the words in a poem and subsequently 
relates those words to their meaning in life. Here the reader becomes aware that the world 
changes as his or her ability to describe it changes; the meaning of the poem depends on 
language and the meaning of life depends on language: in each, there is no other measure; 
in engaging with a poem, we engage with it as a coherent whole and attempt to 
understand some overall meaning—the same too with life. In life, language is decisive, 
but it has already asserted its dominion before we even notice—the world has already 
been born.  
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 The literary work of art means something that matters, but the exact meaning is 
ambiguous and many-sided; the words vanish into their meaning, but reappear because 
the meaning includes difference; here we have no option but to return to the words. In the 
literary work of art each word is unique and irreplaceable, the overall meaning and effect 
depending on the combination of words, with each word contributing; if one word were 
substituted, the text would be something else: “In poetry, there is no longer a gap within 
the act of meaning: what becomes represented in language bears witness to more than 
mere linguistic mastery. An enigmatic form of the non-distinction between what is said 
and how it is said gives to art it specific unity and facility and so, too, its own manner of 
being true” (Gadamer, “The Eminent Text and Its Truth” 10). Each word, then, is vital: 
each carries its own unique meaning, so unique that we notice how the meaning depends 
on nothing but itself. We notice that each word bears its own fruit, its own insight, each 
word reveals something different: in a literary text each word guarantees its own validity. 
 In a literary text language depends on nothing but itself and it is this aspect of its 
identity that is most decisive for this discussion. A literary text engages our 
linguisticality—that we have language at all. In a literary text we take notice of how we 
typically use language: we normally use language to express an idea, while still aware 
that the same idea can be expressed any number of different ways. Language in a literary 
text, though, is different. In it, each word resists being taken up into a discourse with a 
straightforward meaning; in this process, we are reminded of the potential 
accomplishments of language: language, in and of itself, can shape how we understand. 
We are reminded of this influence when we encounter literary works of art: “In this kind 
of text language emerges in its full autonomy. Here language just stands for itself; it 
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brings itself to stand before us, whereas normally its words are taken over by the 
intention in the speech and then after being used are just left behind” (Gadamer, 
“Reflections on my Philosophical Journey” 39). Here, Gadamer’s argument depends on 
the contrast between how we typically use language (where the meaning is 
straightforward and seemingly unambiguous) and the status of language as it exists in the 
literary work of art  (where the language resists a straightforward meaning, each word in 
play with the other, the final meaning never settled). In the literary work of art, each word 
carves out a space for itself. In language, there is an orientation to meaning and naming 
that cannot be escaped: as each word appears, the possibility of every other word is 
shaped; there is a natural progression, an inescapable coherence that shapes both the 
reader and writer—both strive for the feeling that each word fits, the parts and the whole 
in harmony. Gadamer expresses this idea in the following manner:  
In a literary work, a peculiar tension is generated between 
the directedness to meaning inherent in discourse and the 
self-presentation inherent in its appearance. Every part of 
speech, every member, every individual word that submits 
to the unity of meaning in the sentence, represents in itself 
also a kind of unity of meaning insofar as through its 
meaning something meant is evoked. So far as the word 
issues forth from the play within its own unity and does not 
function merely as a means of conveying the meaning of 
the discourse as a whole [Redesinn], to that extent the 
multiplicity of meaning within the word’s own naming 
power is allowed to unfold (“Text and Interpretation” 43).  
 
 A literary work needs nothing but words and this self-legitimation highlights the 
accomplishments of words and how we use them. A literary work of art is so important 
and compelling because, as Gadamer says, “what the word evokes is there” (“On the 
Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth” 113). Each word, then, has its own weight 
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and body and presence, demanding to be accounted for. The more the words are valued, 
the more impactful the literary work of art: as each word is respected, the reader is 
seduced. With the appearance of the first word, a direction has been chosen, and every 
other word depends on this beginning. The success of the literary artwork, then, depends 
on this interplay of words, the ability of the words to relate to one another, so that each 
word is magnified, felt, only there because of the exact combination: “a word becomes a 
poetic word […] because of the power of ‘realization’” (“On the Contribution of Poetry 
to the Search for Truth” 112). A poetic word hinges on the fact that it relies on other 
words. It is only when the appropriate combination is brought together that the words 
truly shine and are most truly themselves; it is only in this context that the connotations 
and complexities of words are at their most productive. Furthermore, it is in literature that 
the evocative character of language is at its most potent. In literature, we are seduced by 
the words and the world they create; this world, though, can be new and different, the 
words themselves the only measure; if they belong, then the world they picture has 
become what it is.  
 Yes, the literary work of art depends on nothing but our own experience of 
language and this event of language cannot be separated from our contact with the world. 
When we engage with a poem we grapple with the names of things and what it means 
that things have names. In being named, the world has already been identified for what it 
is: a poem takes advantage of this situation, using these words that we all know, mining 
our familiarity with the world, and asks us to reconsider what this familiarity means. 
Based on this familiarity, we define the world as it is and test and verify its nature. But 
any perception, any positing at all, has already been shaped by language—in the 
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questions asked, there is still mystery. Poetry takes notice of this aspect of language and 
runs with it. It recognizes that the words are alive and pushes to invigorate them with 
possibility. In this case the only legitimation required is the corroboration of other words: 
“It is a saying that says so completely what it is that we do not need to add anything 
beyond what is said in order to accept it in its reality as language. The word of the poet is 
autonomous in the sense that it is self-fulfilling. The poetic word is thus a statement in 
that it bears witness to itself and does not admit anything that might verify it” (Gadamer, 
“On the Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth” 110). To the extent that the 
words belong, there is insight. Here the words are combined in new and different ways, 
yet their aim is to express a meaning that is understandable and coherent. Although the 
words might be unexpected or surprising, they still matter because they congeal to make 
a completed whole. And this completed whole is a kind of mirror held up to the 
(in)completed whole of our experience in life, the one reflecting the other. In both, the 
world is alive and so are its words, nothing verifiable, everything there to be created, all 




GADAMER ON DIALOGUE 
 
Up to this point I have discussed the roles of language, art and literature in 
hermeneutic ontology. Implicit in these concepts and central to their understanding is the 
concept of dialogue. In each—whether in language, art or literature—a dialogue takes 
place. It might be between two people or between a person and an artwork or a person 
and a text. Whatever the case, a mediation occurs and something new comes to be. In all, 
it is a matter of negotiating the polarities of familiarity and strangeness: there is always a 
point of contact, a shared world; yet, at the same time, we, each of us, are individuals, 
particular, different and unique. As each person engages with meaning, that meaning 
acquires more nuance, in that the meaning applied to the situation adjusts to the moment 
and alters the very situation itself. The mutual world is the subject matter, up for debate, 
and this world is dynamic. Each dialogue is an opportunity, a chance to confront the 
moment and assimilate, an occasion to test one’s presuppositions and sort out the true 
ones from the false. We are all caught in a situation and it is impossible to step outside 
one’s situation, but in encountering the other we might see our circumstance with greater 
clarity, even if it will always remain a partial view. And in understanding our own point 
of view we might interpret better, for we belong to that which we interpret; we are 
participants in the meaning of the world. 
113 
 
In a dialogue our commonality is the topic, a world to which we each belong—
one that we know intuitively. The world already means something to us and it is this 
significance that shapes how and what we understand. Before we are even aware of it the 
world and its meaning has already been born. It is the linguistically constituted world that 
is brought into play when in dialogue. Each participant belongs to a shared world and it is 
only on the basis of this belongingness that the world might be further differentiated. 
Dialogue rests on a common understanding that includes difference within itself. As it is 
the same world that seeks further definition, both members submit to its truth, with 
neither member in possession of it entirely. Each person has his or her particular horizon 
and is unable to see beyond it. It is this very horizon that determines what we think and 
know. But this means that it is impossible to know what we know. As a way of testing 
our horizons and expanding our horizons, as a means of breaking up our narrowness and 
bias, we enter into dialogue. In doing so our horizon is put to the test: in dialogue it is the 
law of the subject matter that gains ascendancy. Neither member of the dialogue is in 
control; both parties submit to the dialogue and no one knows the potential result. The 
orientation to meaning is so great that the dialogical participants are possessed by it. As 
each are drawn to the same truth without being able to express it in its totality, both are in 
a process of movement towards fulfillment, even if it is never entirely attainable. The 
means of doing so is dialogue. Dialogue is necessarily hermeneutical: the world is 
interpreted and becomes what it is. The truth of the subject matter asserts itself and seeks 
further clarification: “The nature of the hermeneutical experience is not that something is 
outside and desires admission. Rather, we are possessed by something and precisely by 
means of it we are opened up for the new, the different, the true” (Gadamer, “The 
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Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem” 9). In dialogue each member is possessed by 
the commonality of the world, a belongingness that strives for transcendence. As we 
cannot escape our orientation to meaning, dialogue inheres a loss of self-possession and 
self-control:  
The basic constitution of the game, to be filled with its 
spirit—the spirit of buoyancy, freedom and the joy of 
success—and to fulfill him who is playing, is structurally 
related to the constitution of the dialogue in which 
language is a reality. When one enters into dialogue with 
another person and then is carried along further by the 
dialogue, it is no longer the will of the individual person, 
holding itself back or exposing itself, that is determinative. 
Rather, the law of the subject matter is at issue in the 
dialogue and elicits statement and counterstatement and in 
the end plays them into each other. Hence, when a dialogue 
has succeeded, one is subsequently fulfilled by it 
(Gadamer, “Man and Language” 66).  
 
In the end, we can either account for this loss of control and include it in our 
understanding or we can think we are in control and fail in our understanding, 
undermined. Because we cannot help but understand, dialogue is an opportunity for 
fulfillment, to become what we might be. As a result, we understand better, for the 
uniqueness of the other demands that we accommodate his or her individuality, the world 
now assimilated more fully and with more recognizable contours.  
 In the dialogical exchange, the participants attempt to overcome the one-sidedness 
of the other. Each assertion demands a counterbalance. All are embraced by possible 
truth while unable to express everything that is possible: “Most astonishing about the 
essence of language and conversation is that I myself am not restricted by what I believe 
when I speak with others about something, that no one of us embraces the whole truth 
within his beliefs but that the whole truth can, however, embrace us both in our 
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individual beliefs” (Gadamer, “What is Truth?” 46). The whole truth does embrace us 
despite our individuality: we participate in dialogue in order to overcome our 
idiosyncrasies and discover the universal. In submitting to dialogue, we do so in an effort 
to glean what is common; the particularity of each blends into greater understanding:  
“Neither partner alone constitutes the determining factor; rather, it is the unified form of 
movement as a whole that unifies the fluid activity of both. We can formulate this idea as 
a theoretical generalization by saying that the individual self, including his activity and 
his understanding of himself, is taken up into a higher determination that is really the 
decisive factor” (Gadamer, “On the Problem of Self Understanding” 54). We are so 
attuned to the contentions of the other that we respond and reply before we are conscious 
of it: both members sublate his or her individuality to a greater truth. 
 As an example of dialogue, I have chosen to highlight my interaction with 
Virginia Woolf’s novels. To begin with, I both belong to the same world as Woolf and 
our worlds are different. Before making any overt attempt to interpret or overcome 
difference I already understand her novels (to a certain degree) in a self-evident manner: 
her world is linguistically constituted and so is mine. It is only on the basis of this 
unconscious congeniality that I might ask questions and identify the productivity of this 
dialogue. My aim is to recognize what the words mean, but they only mean anything 
within the specific context of the present moment. This moment and my individuality will 
shape what I understand. Of course I might bring in anticipations to the reading that are 
erroneous. It is only on the basis of the reading process itself that I might notice the 
falsehood of these anticipations. This mediation of transparency and obscurity leads to an 
interrogation, a means of confronting what is there in the text: “The real power of  
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hermeneutical consciousness is our ability to see what is questionable” (Gadamer, “The 
Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem” 13). As I probe Woolf’s novels something is 
comprehended but this knowledge will only be made secure when I ask how I 
understand: one should “try to say how one understands” (Gadamer, Gadamer on Celan 
144). When one reads a literary work he or she carries his or her world into the text and 
this is inescapable: it is the reader’s task to recognize this mediation and account for it. 
But it is only on the basis of the linguistically constituted world that the reader 
understands anything at all. In order to understand what is there, we must confront our 
interpretation, our own world. It is, however, only on the basis of the text itself that we 
confront our presuppositions, our language. And before any attempt to include any 
supplemental knowledge in the reading it is the language of the literature and of the 
interpreter that is decisive:  
No reader can understand without specialties, and yet every 
reader only understands when the specialty of the occasion 
is sublated by the universality of occasionality. This means 
that the poem does not bring to language a specific, unique 
occurrence known only to witnesses or those enlightened 
by the poet directly. It means that every reader can respond 
to what the language gesture conjures up, as if it were an 
offer. All readers must supplement what they can perceive 
in a poem on the basis of their own experience (Gadamer, 
Gadamer on Celan 134).  
 
Each reader should understand based on the language of the text itself, but this means that 
the text will be understood differently (because of the reader’s particularity) and it is his 
or her responsibility to account for this friction. And there is a considerable amount of 
difference. The reference of the language in Woolf’s novels and my world are 
undoubtedly in tension and this variance should be overcome as much as possible. But it 
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is only on the basis of the meaning of the text and its demands that I should bring in any 
supplemental knowledge to my interpretation.  
 As a male born in Louisville, Kentucky in 1983 I belong to a very different world 
than that of Virginia Woolf. However, I would contend that (to a considerable extent) 
mine is an inherited world—in many ways similar to that of Virginia Woolf’s: many of 
the precepts and foundations of my cultural world have their grounding in the epoch-
changing era of Woolf. A figurehead of British Modernism, Woolf and her fiction 
engaged many of the same questions with which we still wrestle. Her era and her fiction 
saw fit to challenge many of the stale notions of the past: in Modernism there was a 
radical questioning of all that was taken for granted. Interpretation took center stage and 
many writers, intellectuals and artists sought a new grounding for interpretation. Instead 
of a static world whose meaning was there to be discovered and mapped out, these 
thinkers saw that the world and its meaning depended on our interaction with it—
interpretation and meaning were dynamic and in movement. There was no certainty and 
there was no accepted truth. It was up to the individual to ground his or herself and find 
firm footing. This continues to be our task up to the present day: “the change from 
Modernism to postmodernism is not a difference in metaphysic so much as a different 
stage in the digestion of the same metaphysic” (Bell, 9). But what are the precepts of 
Modernism? What alternative did writers like Virginia Woolf provide? First of all, 
Modernism was an era of crisis. The thinkers of the era saw that the grounding and 
foundation of civilization was untenable. The world had descended into violence and 
chaos, hierarchical, power-hungry and exploitative. There was no solidarity; there was no 
community; many did not see themselves in each other nor recognize the value of shared 
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existence. Woolf belonged to this world: where she was less just because she was a 
woman; a world of colonial powers exploiting the subjugated in order to amass land, 
wealth and prestige, an existence far too familiar with the ravages of war. These crises 
prompted the writers and artists of the day to seek out new language, new forms—
creations that might promote community and solidarity, an awareness of one’s collective 
plight:  
This century had scarcely grown used to its name, before it 
learned the twentieth would be the epoch of crisis, real and 
manufactured, physical and metaphysical, material and 
symbolic. The catastrophe of the First World War, and 
before that, the labor struggles, the emergence of feminism, 
the race for empire, these inescapable forces of turbulent 
social modernization were not simply looming on the 
outside as the destabilizing context of cultural Modernism; 
they penetrated the interior of artistic invention (Levenson, 
2).  
 
For these artists, there was a sense that the world had been led to crisis because of a lack 
of imagination; people too easily obeyed orthodoxy: because people did not contribute to 
their own meaning there was no sense for the power and profundity of what the world 
might be as a participant in its very creation. In creating new forms, the Modernist artists 
challenged the populace to think in new ways: “they all knew themselves to be engaged 
in forms of creative violence. For these figures the aim could never be simply to set the 
imagination free; it was rather first of all to challenge an unfreedom, the oppressions of 
journalism, of genteel audiences, of timid readers, of political and religious orthodoxy” 
(Levenson, 2). In the case of Woolf, who acutely felt the strictures of oppression on a 
daily basis, she turned to the novel as a weapon of liberation. The novel at this point had 
enjoyed a long tradition and was generally considered to be an unbiased record of the 
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relations between people, straightforward and clear. Novels were generally understood to 
be transparent, the meaning the same no matter the reader. Woolf herself enjoyed and 
participated in this tradition, but she came to realize that the traditional novel no longer 
sufficiently probed the questions of the new era. As a response, Woolf mined this 
tradition in order to turn it inside out, so that the readers were forced to participate, to 
engage with meaning and interpret: “The response of [Woolf] to a dominant literary 
culture lies in breaking with a literary tradition by totally immersing herself within it, at 
once appropriating it and interrogating it” (Herrmann, 2). 
 The aim was liberation but this also meant a new freedom and a new 
responsibility. If people were no longer told what to think, then each had to interpret. In 
the Modernist era, “the question of interpretation lies at its heart” (Bell, 9). Science itself 
was even challenged as people came to realize that the conclusions of science are a result 
of the questions asked, depending on the observer and the conditions of the experiment: 
“science does not ‘explain’ the workings of the universe, it merely describes what 
happens in given conditions” (Bell, 11). The Modernist thinkers recognized that the 
meaning of the world relies on each one of us and is different for every individual. Even 
the transparency of history was challenged. History was now seen as an interpretive 
discipline: the historian no longer merely described what happened in the past, but 
instead interpreted the past based on the interests of the present moment and the historical 
pressure that shapes the historical question: “The prestige of historicism was undermined 
by the questioning of the scientific model, for the word history refers both to the 
unimaginably vast process of events making up collective human life and to the 
interpretive discipline through which it is understood” (Bell, 14). 
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 As the primary grounding of our access to the world, language was given a 
special priority in the thought of Modernists. They saw language as a “construction 
within a void” (Bell, 12). One might prioritize engagement with language and as 
recompense one might feel at home instead of alienated or lost. One could build a world 
that belongs to the builder, understandable because personal: “rather than describing or 
reflecting the world, language was now seen to form it” (Bell, 16). But language, of 
course, is not something that anybody can control, shaping our knowledge, ultimately 
unfathomable. Language is inseparable from what it means to be. As a way of engaging 
this self-created world and our interpretive responsibility, art acquired a special role in 
this matrix. It was considered to be “an intuition of Being” (Bell, 29). Art was a means of 
engaging our interpretive faculties and confronting our self-created world. Art was there 
and it was irrefutable, directly engaging our existence and demanding interpretation, part 
of our perception and understanding of the world. In the pantheon of art, literature was 
accorded a special category. Literature accomplished everything that art could, but it also 
directly involved the participant’s linguisticality, forcing the reader to confront the role of 
language in his or her life and to face existential questions that could not be confronted in 
any other manner: the Modernists placed “an especially primordial philosophical burden 
upon imaginative literature, […in it] the active means of questioning and discovering 
fundamental values, truths, and understandings for which there was no alternative 
grounding” (Bell, 29). In literature, there was an opportunity to understand the world as it 
might be, a world in which the reader participated in its very creation. 
 As a reader of Woolf’s novels, I too am a participant in their meaning. This 
participation is possible because the same truth embraces myself and Woolf (incarnate in 
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her novels) even if it is impossible to entirely commune with it. We are oriented to this 
truth and this orientation defines our very existence. It is in our nature to understand and 
to seek further understanding. For its part, understanding is realized in language. Now, 
because of time, language evolves and so does meaning. It is always the same world that 
is named in language, but each moment is variable, and the language shifts as it describes 
the world: always inherited, acquiring new resonances, the world becomes something 
else as it is articulated, looking ahead to the future. When entering into dialogue this 
orientation to understanding is decisive—it is what shapes the subject matter and the 
language of the participants:  
How is understanding possible? […U]nderstanding is not 
just one of the various possible behaviors of the subject but 
the mode of being of Dasein itself. It is in this sense that the 
term ‘hermeneutics’ has been used here. It denotes the 
basic being-in-motion of Dasein that constitutes its finitude, 
and hence embraces the whole of its experience of the 
world. Not caprice, nor even an elaboration of a single 
aspect, but the nature of the thing itself makes the 
movement of understanding comprehensive and universal 
(Gadamer, Truth and Method xxvii). 
 
 Because of time and change and individuality, our experience of the world is the 
foundational concern, shaping all other questions.  
 We are oriented to understanding and this sense of significance is fluid. 
Something is always understood but motion pushes us to revise and adjust, our angle of 
vision now something else. No matter what, we use language and our words are an 
interpretation of the world: “Our starting point is that verbally constituted experience of 
the world expresses not what is present-at-hand, that which is calculated or measured, but 
what exists, what man recognizes as existent and significant” (Gadamer, Truth and 
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Method 452). The raw material that we take to be distinct from our understanding 
actually belongs to it, for once something is given a name and included in our discourse, 
it belongs to a context that shapes it while also shaping the context, ensnared in a web of 
meaning. For our linguistically constituted world defines the nature of something in the 
first place, belonging to the interpretive concerns of the speaker: “Pure seeing and pure 
hearing are dogmatic abstractions that artificially reduce phenomena. Perception always 
includes meaning” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 80). Perception is irreducible from 
meaning, so that the things of the world belong to its participants; the linguistic 
understanding of things defines their identity: “Is the given not in fact the result of an 
interpretation?” (Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation” 30). 
 We partake in dialogue to test our horizons and expand our horizons. Up to a 
point, we already understand the world, but this understanding is provisional and is itself 
the result of an interpretation. We participate in the hermeneutic process to secure our 
understanding and to define the world a little more clearly. As the world is different with 
each moment, every instant is an opportunity:  
It is the world itself which is communicatively experienced 
and continuously entrusted (Traditur) to us as an infinitely 
open task. It is never the world as it was on its first day but 
as it has come down to us. Always present when we 
experience something, when unfamiliarity is overcome, 
where enlightenment, insight, and appropriation succeed, 
the hermeneutic process takes place in bringing something 
into words and into the common consciousness” (Gadamer, 
“Reflections on My Philosophical Journey” 29).  
 
Now, the world itself can never be entirely possessed as it truly is because our own 
hermeneutic situation is inescapable and this predicament shapes the understanding 
process. As we read, it is our task to account for our outlook, to recognize that we belong 
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to the very meaning of that which is understood. In the hermeneutic encounter, something 
is understood, which leads to greater assurance and familiarity, and at the same time false 
presuppositions are refuted because they are repudiated by this new, more complete 
understanding.  
 In the encounter with tradition, in dialogue and in the hermeneutic process, we are 
afforded the chance to have a better sense for the truth of things and our role in the 
formation of this meaning. In each dialogical meeting we come to know more and to 
understand better, but as this process occurs the nature and truth of the subject matter 
morphs also: the more we understand the more want to account for our lack of 
knowledge; the more that is said the more we notice everything that is unsaid. The act of 
understanding includes interpretation within itself: as we belong to a situation and cannot 
step out of our situation, we have the task of interpreting because each situation is 
different—the interpreter brings his or her foreknowledge and foremeanings to the 
subject matter and as he or she does so some of them are confirmed and some refuted; 
that we have a situation at all is essential: the hermeneutic situation implies questions, 
lack of knowledge and interpretation. To a significant degree, we already understand but 
it is our opportunity and burden to further secure this understanding and refine it: “In all 
human knowing of the world and in all orientation within the world the nature of the 
moment of understanding has to be worked out” (Gadamer, “Reflections on My 
Philosophical Journey” 28). This attempt, of course, is incompletable. Interpretation is 
unavoidable: Gadamer points to “the inexhaustibility of the experience of meaning” 
(“Text and Interpretation” 24). As we try to interpret the world certain aspects are 
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highlighted and others fade into the background, unnoticed; and as we recognize certain 
aspects this movement alters their meanings, as each relates the one to the other:  
Interpretation shares in the discursiveness of the human 
mind, which is able to conceive the unity of the object only 
in successiveness. Thus interpretation has the dialectical 
structure of all finite, historical being, insofar as every 
interpretation seeks to supersede the one-sidedness which 
that inevitably produces. […H]ermeneuetics has the task of 
revealing a totality of meaning in all its relations. The 
individuality of the sense intended corresponds to the 
totality of all definitions (Gadamer, Truth and Method 
476).  
 
Every interpretation has to start somewhere and at a certain moment in time: this means 
that each interpretation is limited in its own way. The success of an interpretation 
depends on the interpreter’s ability to assimilate, include and account for this 
shortcoming. In doing so, the accidental nature of interpretation might become a positive. 
Each time we interpret, we have to adapt to the exact situation—which is always 
different—if we hope to succeed: this means recognizing the situation and how it relates 
to the subject matter and the overall meaning.  
 In every hermeneutic encounter we bring our own foremeanings, presuppositions 
and prejudices into the process. And until we engage with the hermeneutic object we 
have no way of sorting out the true, enabling prejudices from the false, distorting ones. 
But once we become involved we begin to foreground our horizon against that of the 
interpreted subject matter, to account for and overcome difference:  
Let us consider what this idea of foregrounding involves. It 
is always reciprocal. Whatever is being foregrounded must 
be foregrounded from something else, which, in turn, must 
be foregrounded from it. Thus all foregrounding also makes 
visible that from which something is foregrounded. We 
have described this above as the way prejudices are brought 
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into play. We started by saying that a hermeneutical 
situation is determined by the prejudices we bring with us. 
They constitute, then, the horizon of a particular present, 
for they represent that beyond which it is impossible to see 
(Gadamer, Truth and Method 304-5).  
 
We do not become aware of our own horizon until we encounter the horizon of the other 
and in this meeting we acquire a more complete view, even if it remains partial.  
 There is no such thing as an objective interpretation; the world interpreted always 
includes the concerns and horizon of the interpreter. The interpreter belongs to 
understood meaning: “In all understanding an application occurs, such that the person 
who is understanding is himself or herself right there in the understood meaning. He or 
she belongs to the subject matter that he or she is understanding” (Gadamer, Gadamer in 
Conversation 47). Whether we recognize it or not, something only means anything at all 
because it means something to us. If we ignore our own role in interpretation then that 
reading will come off as arid, stale, and lifeless. But if we include ourselves and account 
for our role then the interpretation has the potential to be exciting, vigorous, insightful. 
 There are many occasions for dialogue; the most important and most basic 
circumstance is conversation—the result of two individuals who share a world and yet 
are different: when brought together each relies on a common ground on which more 
might be understood. Another occasion for dialogue is the historical artifact. When one 
encounters a historical artifact one is confronted with the task of interpreting it within the 
entire narrative of history, to explain its place in the secuence. The historical artifact is 
always the same but its meaning will change based on the interpreter. The historian 
brings his or her own interests, concerns, points of view, and historical moment into the 
interpretation. The interpreter cannot do otherwise. It is the interpreter’s job to account 
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for the historical moment and his or her individuality and include it in the interpretation; 
the past impinges on the present and the present impinges on the past. The interpreter 
cannot move beyond history; it is only because of history that we understand anything at 
all or have anything to say:  
In fact history does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long 
before we understand ourselves through the process of self-
examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way 
in the family, society, and state in which we live. The focus 
of subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of 
the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of 
historical life. That is why the prejudices of the individual, 
far more than his judgments, constitute the historical 
reality of his being (Gadamer, Truth and Method 278).  
 
In choosing to interpret history one is granted an opportunity: one might better 
understand the context of being. That is, we inherit a moment and this point in time is the 
result of a long tradition. This heritage—whether custom, artwork, language or text—has 
been passed down through time: in some cases, like language, the tradition evolves and 
changes; in others, it remains solid and permanent, as in an artwork or text. In the case of 
custom or language, history has shaped its present iteration, always in process, adapting 
to the moment. But in encountering history we might better understand where we come 
from and how we might participate in our evolution. There is value in studying history: 
the past decides who we are and in its study we might confront this formation instead of 
accepting it unquestioningly. 
 Before we even realize it we already understand. When someone speaks to us we 
understand. When we read a book we understand. When we view an artwork we 
understand. We understand because it is always the same world that is presented, even 
though its particulars change with the passage of time. So, too, when we study history we 
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understand. But this meaning can be made secure. We can confront this significance and 
try to think about what is being understood and how and why it is understood. In doing so 
we might place this interpretation on firmer ground. This means that, more than anything, 
the study of history is an attempt to comprehend the present moment, for history informs 
the present moment and the present moment shapes how we understand history: “History 
is only present to us in light of our futurity. Here we have all learned from Heidegger, for 
he exhibited precisely the primacy of futurity for our possible recollection and retention, 
and for the whole of our history” (Gadamer, “The Universality of the Hermeneutical 
Problem” 9). And the future is only accessible in light of our past. In the two, the future 
and the past, there is a continuity: “Historical knowledge can be gained only by seeing 
past in its continuity with the present” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 325). For its part, 
this continuity is always an open question. The historian cannot go beyond his or her 
historical situation and this means that there is always a mediation that the historian ought 
to recognize. Each attempt to interpret history should be understood as a mediation: “The 
truth is that historical understanding always implies that the tradition reaching us speaks 
into the present and must be understood in this mediation—indeed, as this mediation” 
(Gadamer, Truth and Method 325). 
 Historical interpretation implies a mediation between the interpreter and the 
historical object and so too the interaction between the interpreter and an artwork. Art, 
belongs under the rubric of dialogue or play; in it there is a loss of subjectivity in which 
the subject matter gains ascendancy and determines the movements of the participants. 
When we experience an artwork we lose control and the truth of the subject matter asserts 
itself: “When a work of art truly takes hold of us, it is not an object that stands opposite 
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us which we look at in hopes of seeing through it to an intended conceptual meaning. Just 
the reverse. The work is an Ereignis—an event that ‘appropriates us’ into itself. It jolts 
us, it knocks us over, and sets up a world of its own, into which we are drawn, as it were” 
(Gadamer, Gadamer in Conversation 71). Before we even know what we know the 
artwork has already made its claim to truth. We are not in a position to possess the 
meaning of an artwork before it has been experienced: if the experience of an artwork is 
genuine then it will always surprise us and take us on a journey; in the artwork there is an 
indeterminacy that provokes the participant, asking us to reevaluate our interpretive 
process and overall understanding. We are drawn into the world of the artwork and in this 
movement we become something else.  
 Dialogue in and of itself is a matter of mediating identity and difference. Play, for 
its part, serves the same role. In play there is a regulation of movement that also includes 
variation. This idea of regulated movement is essential. Once completed, an artwork is 
self-same, it is there, and it is immutable. An artwork is intentional and it has an identity: 
“It is clear here, especially in the phenomenon of repetition itself, that identity or self-
sameness is intended” (Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful 23). The artwork has a 
definite identity because it regulates the interaction between itself and the interpreter: 
“The function of the representation of play is ultimately to establish, not just any 
movement whatsoever, but rather the movement of play determined in a specific way” 
(Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful 23). This movement of the play is determined 
by the artwork, by its structure. An artwork, for its part, is meant to be a completed whole 
in which each element interlocks. This is the nature of the artwork and part of its identity, 
but the artwork also has the responsibility of accommodating itself to all potential 
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participants, of anticipating the individuality and difference of all who might experience 
the work. The artwork is made in anticipation of its experience: it engages fundamental 
categories of perception and understanding, representing an attempt to acknowledge our 
commonality. This unity, though, splits into individualities and differences as we enter 
into concrete application and participation: “This definition of the work as the focal point 
of recognition and understanding also means that such an identity is bound up with 
variation and difference. Every work leaves the person who responds to it a certain 
leeway, a space to be filled in by himself” (Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful 26). 
Our shared world includes a tension within itself that is inescapable. An artwork is a self-
enclosed unity with no loose ends, yet this fulfillment is only possible because of the 
person who experiences it. The participant is tasked with the completion of the artwork 
so that it is unified, but success is only possible if the participant relates the world of the 
artwork to his or her own world.  
 An artwork is so compelling because it belongs to our world and we belong to it, 
but an artwork represents more than a faithful reproduction of reality. It is, instead, the 
world transformed into a meaningful unity: “The mimetic is and remains a primordial 
phenomenon in which it is not so much an imitation that occurs as a transformation” 
(Gadamer, “Poetry and Mimesis” 121). Transformed into a new, coherent whole, the stuff 
of perception is mined and becomes meaningful. Released from the contingency of 
circumstance, the meaning of perception is placed within an overarching structure that is 
intentional, thereby releasing it from the circumstance and allowing it to be there as it is, 
true because it has found a home within the overall structure and significance of the 
artwork: “Where something is recognized, it has liberated itself from the uniqueness and 
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contingency of the circumstances in which it was encountered. It is a matter neither of 
there and then, nor of here and now, but it is encountered as the very self-same. Thereby 
it begins to rise to its permanent essence and is detached from anything like a chance 
encounter” (Gadamer, “Poetry and Mimesis” 120). Essential to this discussion of 
mimesis and transformation is the concept of recognition. In art, we recognize the way 
things are: “there is no doubt that the essence of imitation consists precisely in the 
recognition of the represented in the representation” (Gadamer, “Art and Imitation” 99). 
Yes, it is through art that we become more familiar with the world, but part of this 
improved understanding includes greater mystery. We are not able to completely possess 
the meaning of an artwork, instead we tarry with the artwork and enter into its depths, 
always understanding more and better, yet for this very reason pushed to ask more 
questions as the exact correspondences and relations alter and adapt: “a work of art, 
thanks to its formal aspect, has something to say to us either through the question it 
awakens, or the question it answers” (Gadamer, Gadamer in Conversation 71).  
 This entire discussion of dialogue hinges on the idea that language and meaning 
have their origin in conversation. Before there was ever such a thing as a text or an 
artwork, there were two people, each in the presence of the other, using gesture, facial 
cues, and, most importantly, language to communicate. Before any words are uttered, 
neither partner knows what exactly he or she wants to communicate: language blooms as 
each encounters the other. We are oriented to language, to meaning, and we cannot do 
otherwise. This model is decisive—precisely because it allows for question and response. 
Every utterance is spoken within a definite context and it is the role of the conversation 
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partner to clarify, ask questions, and place it within a broader horizon, so that its meaning 
is more relatable and ultimately clearer:  
“Now every single statement that we make acquires its 
ultimate meaning (that is, what it says to someone) from 
the question to which it supplies an answer. This is what I 
call the hermeneutic character of speech: when we speak to 
one another we do not so much transmit well-defined facts, 
as place our own aspirations and knowledge into a broader 
and richer horizon through dialogue with the other” 
(Gadamer, “On the Contribution of Poetry to the Search for 
Truth” 106).  
 
We have everything to gain by using language and participating in conversation. In 
conversation we engage our very understanding of the world: our horizon shifts as the 
dialogue progresses and as we converse with different people. Each time we actually try 
to say something to someone, the world becomes something else. In point of fact, the 
hermeneutic character of text and writing relies on this model of conversation: “What 
characterizes a dialogue, in contrast with the rigid form of statements that demand to be 
set down in writing, is precisely this: that in dialogue spoken language—in the process of 
question and answer, giving and taking, talking at cross purposes and seeing each other’s 
point—performs the communication of meaning that, with respect to the written tradition, 
is the task of hermeneutics” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 361). This dialogical model is 
so compelling because it places meaning under the rubric of transcendence. Each 
statement can be clarified and expanded: more can always be said. 
 In any dialogue there is a loss of subjectivity; the participant’s horizon of 
understanding shapes his or her subjective response. The participant submits to the 
dialogue and it determines the responses of the participants; however, there is always free 
will and choice. Instead of trying to fight this loss of subjectivity, the participant can 
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make choices to harness this wave of meaning—by asking questions, by enquiring, what, 
exactly, is happening. Like conversation, texts are also defined by dialogue. Conversation 
itself guides the reading process. In a conversation the world is shared and further 
defined: something comes out of it that neither participant can anticipate or predict. 
Furthermore, the understanding that occurs in a conversation is not purely linguistic: 
there are extra-linguistic cues that supplement and shape the understanding; the 
participants have a sense for what is being conveyed but neither is able to exhaust the 
articulation of this content. For its part, a text encompasses a communicative event in 
which there is a hermeneutical distance. There is no opportunity for clarification and 
there are no extra-linguistic cues. A text is pure language, autonomous and timeless. It is 
the writer’s task to acknowledge this aspect of the text: to compose a text in such a way 
that it communicates itself based on nothing but itself. The writer composes the text in 
anticipation of its interpretation:  
While in living conversation one tries to reach 
understanding through the give-and-take of discussion, 
which means that one searches for those words—and 
accompanies them with intonation and gesture—that one 
expects will get through to the other, in writing the 
openness that is implied in seeking the words cannot be 
communicated because the text is printed. Therefore a 
‘virtual’ horizon of interpretation and understanding must 
be opened in writing the text itself, one that the reader must 
fill out (Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation” 34). 
 
This means that it is the writer’s responsibility to find and use language that is universal 
and not idiosyncratic—to use language that represents our general relationship to the 
world. And in order for a language to be universal it should also be applicable to each 
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individual’s particular situation. In each application the language acquires greater nuance, 
meaning and volume.  
 The text should be understandable in and of itself yet it should also apply to the 
reader and his or her particular circumstance. Something is understood in the text, but 
what, exactly, is debatable. The interpreter is trapped in a hermeneutic situation. Because 
of this, all texts inhere an openness and indeterminacy that is unavoidable; it is the 
reader’s task to account for this indeterminacy by asking questions and developing a 
dialogue between the reader and the text: “When it is interpreted, written tradition is 
brought back out of the alienation in which it finds itself and into the living present of 
conversation, which is always fundamentally realized in question and answer” (Gadamer, 
Truth and Method 362). In reading, the text becomes alive: the reader reads and 
transforms the words into meaning. The interpreter, though, wants to respect the text as 
much as possible and does not want his or her reading to be arbitrary; the text should be 
understood as it is. But the text as it is depends on its enactment. The reader’s goal, then, 
should be to recognize his or her role in the meaning of the text and to avoid all false 
anticipations that obstruct the text as it is meant to be: “We who are attempting to 
understand must ourselves make it speak. But we found that this kind of understanding, 
‘making the text speak,’ is not an arbitrary procedure that we undertake on our own 
initiative but that, as a question, it is related to the answer that is expected in the text. 
Anticipating an answer itself presupposes that the question is part of the tradition and 
regards himself as addressed by it” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 370). 
 A text always constitutes an answer to a question and the reader interprets with this 
element in mind: he or she anticipates the content of the text based on the question to 
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which it is an answer. Above all else, something is understood only because it is shared, 
as each of us belong to a tradition and a world that is both understandable and 
mysterious.  
 More than anything, dialogue represents a chance to acquire experience. As we 
gain experience the world becomes more discernible, its outline colored in, more 
nuanced, more textured, more vibrant. Also, part of the nature of experience is that with it 
we get a sense for what the world is not: “Experience is a process. In fact, this process is 
essentially negative” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 347). With each experience, we 
broaden our horizons and the viewfinder becomes more focused; the essential relations of 
things becomes clearer. Into each experience we bring certain expectations and these 
anticipations inflect the nature of the event; with each experience certain expectations are 
thwarted and this means that we are more prepared for further experience and its possible 
yield; then, with the subsequent undertaking there are fewer distractions and misguided 
anticipations. The upshot is that with each experience we become more open to—and 
prepared for—further experiences, encounters that allow for the truth of the subject 
matter to radiate:  
The truth of experience always implies an orientation to 
new experience. That is why a person who is called 
experienced has become so not only through experiences 
but is also open to new experiences. The consummation of 
his experience, the perfection that we call ‘being 
experienced,’ does not consist in the fact that someone 
already knows everything and knows better than everyone 
else. Rather, the experienced person proves to be, on the 
contrary, someone who is radically undogmatic; who, 
because of the many experiences he has had and the 
knowledge he has drawn from them, is particularly well 
equipped to have new experiences and learn from them. 
The dialect of experience has its proper fulfillment not in 
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definitive knowledge but in the openness to experience that 
is made possible by experience itself (Gadamer, Truth and 
Method 350).  
 
The experienced person is someone who knows what the world is not and because of this 
has a better sense for what it is. What it is, of course, varies and belongs to each new 
experience. And the experienced person seeks out experiences because he or she knows 
that is his or horizon is limited and so is his or her knowledge; each new experience is a 
chance to gain greater insight, so that further experiences are even more fruitful: “Insight 
is more than the knowledge of this or that situation. It always involves an escape from 
something that had deceived us and held us captive. Thus insight always involves an 
element of self-knowledge and constitutes a necessary side of what we called experience 
in the proper sense. Insight is something we come to. It too is ultimately part of the 
vocation of man—i.e., to be discerning and insightful” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 35). 
 Through dialogue we acquire experience and through experience we become 
discerning and insightful. Dialogue constitutes an experience because through it we get a 
sense for our mistaken notions—because the dialogical partners must find common 
ground and this means that the shared and the true are the valid. The result is a greater 
openness to experience, an ability to share and recognize those elements that are binding 
while still remaining receptive to potential meaning. Engagement with tradition is an 
important means of gaining experience:  
Hermeneutical experience is concerned with Tradition. 
This is what is to be experienced. But tradition is not 
simply a process that experience teaches us to know and 
govern; it is language—i.e., it expresses itself like a Thou. 
A thou is not an object; it relates itself to us. […T]he 
relationship to the Thou and the meaning of experience 
implicit in that relation must be capable of teaching us 
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something about hermeneutical experience. For tradition is 
a genuine partner in dialogue, and we belong to it, as does 
the I with a Thou (Gadamer, Truth and Method 352).  
 
One gains experience when reading a text because one projects his or her world into the 
text and not all of this world is valid or true. Some of it is mistaken. Until reading the 
text, though, we do not know the extent to which our world includes falsehood. It is only 
by reading the text and adhering to the text, by respecting the text and interpreting it 
correctly—to allow it to be what it is at its most fully—that we come to realize the error 
of our notions and the limitedness of our horizon; the text places its own demands and 
refutes our expectations when they do not align with the text. All one can do is listen 
intently and ask questions: “One intends to understand the text itself. But this means that 
the interpreter’s own thoughts too have gone into re-awakening the text’s meaning. In 
this the interpreter’s own horizon is decisive, yet not as a personal standpoint that he 
maintains or enforces, but more as an opinion and a possibility that one brings into play 
and puts at risk, and that helps one truly to make one’s own what the text says” 
(Gadamer, Truth and Method 390). It is the text itself that determines the validity and 
truth of one’s horizon. Some of it is legitimate, but it is never perfect. It can be improved, 
though, by engaging with the text and allowing the text to be the arbiter of validity—as 
we put the text into our own words, it is the text itself that determines the legitimacy of 
those words, forcing us to renounce certain expectations and include others that had been 
previously ignored. 
 All that has been said about the text and dialogue also applies to the relationship 
between the interpreter and the literary text, but the literary text belongs to its own special 
category, for the literary text mines human being’s linguisticality and orientation to 
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meaning; literature is, in fact, defined by our orientation to language. We grow up with 
language and this unconscious acquisition determines the nature of what we understand. 
Furthermore, each life is its own sort of whole, one that is coherent but still in search of 
meaning and definition. Language is the means of confronting this entirety: each time we 
use language, each word is only understandable in the context of the whole and the 
context of the whole is understandable because of each word. It is a never-ending 
dynamic process. However, the literary text represents a chance to engage with a 
coherent unity that does not change. As is the case with life, the literary text is made up 
of words, but these words are eminently coherent—each one links with the other—and 
these words depend on nothing but themselves—each word discloses, presenting a web 
of relationships and meaning that guarantees its truth. In life we are oriented to a whole 
that is incomplete, a need for fulfillment that is made up of language; meanwhile, a 
literary text allows us to engage with this language, but in this case the language is 
complete in itself, able to constitute a meaningful unity, each word depending on the 
other. A literary text represents self-fulfillment: “A poetic text is not like a sentence in the 
ongoing flux of speech, but rather it is like something whole which lifts itself out of the 
stream of speech that is flowing past” (Gadamer, “The Eminent Text and Its Truth” 6). 
As the literary text is a unity that depends on nothing but language, it places unique 
demands on the reader. The reader, too, has language but the interpreter’s language and 
circumstance is necessarily different than that of the text. It is the reader’s challenge to 
allow the literary text to be what it is by adapting it to his or her present situation. With 
each reading, we want the text to be at its most coherent, so that it truly does fulfill itself, 
but, at the same time, the interpreter must constantly adapt for this to happen. With each 
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new moment, the interpreter understands differently: “No work of art addresses us always 
in the same way. The result is that we must answer differently each time we encounter it. 
Other susceptibilities, other attentivenesses, other openness in ourselves permit that one, 
unique, single, and self-same unity of artistic assertion, to generate an inexhaustible 
multiplicity of answers” (Gadamer, “Reflections On My Philosophical Journey” 44). The 
artwork presents a challenge to the interpreter—one of revision and adaptation. It is a 
fluid procedure: as each word combines it is a matter of looking forwards and backwards, 
always seeking coherence, always forcing the reader to ask questions, never static. In 
fact, the literary text includes the potential reader within itself, includes difference within 
itself: “the literary text […] is simply accompanied by the interpreter’s constant co-
speaking” (Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation” 46).  
 The interpreter is able to participate in the meaning of the literary text because of 
the nature of language: the word says something—it has something to say. There is no 
such thing as a word that does not say anything. The literary text, for its part, taps into 
this aspect of language and takes full advantage. Instead of using language to describe a 
verifiable state of affairs, it harnesses language to create its own world, its own truth. 
Based on what each word says, every other word must cohere: “In literary texts the word 
attains its highest coherence with the whole of the text (Gadamer, “On the Truth of the 
Word” 149). In a literary text the words acquire extra value because they are 
corroborated. Each word fulfills itself, depending on nothing but every other word: “The 
word is true in the sense that it discloses, producing this self-fulfillment. The poetic word 
suspends the positive and the posited as that which might serve to verify whether our 
statement corresponds with what lies outside it” (Gadamer, “On the Contribution of 
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Poetry to the Search for Truth” 112). In this case, in the context of dialogue and 
interpretation, it is up to the reader to participate in this self-fulfillment, an act of 
completion that includes the reader’s own linguisticality, a need to complete the text so 
that it is what it is meant to be, an effort in which the language resounds even if there is 
no final resolution.  
 The reader is a participant and it is up to the reader for the text to be itself. A text 
is not a text unless it is meant to be read. This reading process, though, is variable and 
dynamic. And it is precisely because of its variability that a text—and, in our case, a 
literary text—represents such a tremendous opportunity. A literary text is always the 
same, yet it includes within itself an infinite possibility of different interpretations. 
However, there are good interpretations and bad ones too. It is the reader’s task to 
understand what is there. But what is there depends on the reader, changing with each 
reader and each moment. In order for an interpretation to be more correct, the reader has 
no choice but to recognize and include his or her role in the active construction of 
meaning. Each interpreter belongs to the meaning of that which he or she interprets:  
There cannot, therefore, be any single interpretation that is 
correct ‘in itself,’ precisely because every interpretation is 
concerned with the text itself. The historical life of a 
tradition depends on constantly being assimilated and 
interpreted. An interpretation that was correct in itself 
would be a foolish ideal that mistook the nature of 
tradition. Every interpretation has to adapt itself to the 
hermeneutical situation to which it belongs (Gadamer, “On 
the Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth” 112).  
 
A text only means anything based on its overall context; this matrix of sense, however, is 
mobile, twisting and widening, subject to unforeseeable contortions. The reader belongs 
to this context and so does the text. It is up to the reader to identify where there is 
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overlap, to recognize that the text belongs to an overall meaning that is shared. But it is 
also the case that we do not know what we know, for everything we know is prior to—
and determines—everything we think we know. As a way of understanding better and 
further and more, we read texts. In doing so we strive to interpret the text correctly: 
thereby we discard misguided notions and falsehood. For a text represents a completed 
whole, language at its most coherent and stable. We strive to enact this fulfillment and in 
this act we recognize our own false presuppositions, for they do not accord with the 
prescription of the text—that it fulfills itself:  
The hermeneutical experience also has its own rigor: that of 
uninterrupted listening. A thing does not present itself to 
the hermeneutical experience without an effort special to it, 
namely that of ‘being negative toward itself.’ A person who 
is trying to understand a text has to keep something at a 
distance—namely everything that suggests itself, on the 
basis of his own prejudices, as the meaning expected—as 
soon as it is rejected by the sense of the text itself 
(Gadamer, Truth and Method 460).  
 
It is the reader’s responsibility to listen intently because it is the text’s identity to achieve 
maximum coherence; this completeness, though, depends on the reader recognizing how 
the words mesh; this only happens when they are not distorted by the reader’s false 
expectations; the reader senses that these anticipations are false when they do not gel with 
the overall meaning of the text. 
 The reader occupies a situation and a text too. A literary text is identifiable and 
stable but also productive of an endless quantity of interpretations. Each interpretation is 
more correct when the reader recognizes his or her role in interpretation, that the text 
depends on assimilation in order for it to be itself. But how does the reader avoid 
arbitrary fancies? How does he or she secure the interpretive act? Here, it is up to the 
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reader to accept that there is a fusion between the reader and the text and probe what this 
means. The meaning of a text belongs to a context that includes the reader. To recognize 
this context and identify it is part of the reader’s responsibility. This context, though, is 
an open question, different for every reader. The only way that the reader can get a sense 
for how and why the text means anything at all is to ask questions. In point of fact, in the 
act of reading a literary text, the dialectic of question and answer never comes to a stop. 
Every answer is motivated by the question to which it is an answer and every question 
includes an answer within the confines of the question. A question is only a question 
when it accepts certain givens while trying to open them up in a new direction: “Posing a 
question implies openness but also limitation. It implies the explicit establishing of 
presupossitions, in terms of which can be seen what still remains open” (Gadamer, Truth 
and Method 357). Questions are absolutely vital because the world cannot be everything. 
By asking questions one limits and defines the subject matter while opening it up for the 
new. This nature of the question is applicable, of course, to the act of reading. A text only 
has meaning because we anticipate its meaning. One is only able to anticipate meaning 
by recognizing the specific subject matter of the text; the text does not concern 
everything. And it is only as an answer to a question that the text resounds; the text 
belongs to a context and it is within this context that the text makes sense. It is also true 
that this act of anticipation leads to further questions. The text means something but it can 
always mean more. By asking questions the reader gets a better sense for his or her role 
in the act of meaning—the manner in which the reader belongs to the text and also a 
technique for excluding false anticipations; the context for which a text has meaning is 
forever open:  
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Thus a person who wants to understand must question what 
lies behind what is said. He must understand it as an answer 
to a question. If we go back behind what is said, then we 
inevitably ask questions beyond what is said. We 
understand the sense of the text only by acquiring the 
horizon of the question—a horizon that, as such, 
necessarily includes other possible answers. Thus the 
meaning of a sentence is relative to the question to which it 
is a reply, but that implies that its meaning necessarily 
exceeds what is said in it (Gadamer, Truth and Method 
363).  
 
If a reader understands a text as answer to a question then it follows that there are an 
infinite number of possible answers to the question. The reader and the text play an equal 
part in providing possible answers to the question. Furthermore, a question only has 
meaning if we understand the presuppositions of the question. In order to determine the 
presuppositions of the question, the reader then asks even more questions, so that its 
meaning is contextualized. This act of contextualization does not cease because the 
overall meaning is never rigid; the interaction between the reader and the text necessarily 
remains open because of the unbridgeable distance between the two:  “Understanding the 
word of tradition always requires that the reconstructed question be set within the 
openness of its questionableness—i.e., that it merge with the question that tradition is for 
us” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 367). A text only has meaning because it addresses our 
own experience; an experience that belongs to tradition but is also new and different. 
 We are able to understand a text because we belong to the same world as the text; 
we try to enact the text at it most authentic and this act includes assimilating the text to 
our own particular situation; this effort necessarily includes anticipating the content and 
relating it to our own world; however, when the text does not align with our own 
experiences and expectations, then our primary recourse is to ask questions. “The 
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negativity of experience implies a question. In fact we have experiences when we are 
shocked by things that do not accord with our expectations. Thus questioning too is more 
a passion than an action. A question presses itself on us; we can no longer avoid it and 
persist in our accustomed opinion” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 360). Indeed, we cannot 
help but ask questions, but the questions only sprout when we are engaged with the text. 
It is our desire to bring the text to its original authenticity and this means that we ask 
questions; we do so because our world is both the same and different as that of the text 
and it is our aim to highlight this mediation—so that, instead of distortion, we achieve 
communion. For when we read a literary text, when we have a hermeneutic experience, 
we interrogate because our horizon has altered—the text is now seen from a new angle 
and we want to understand the implications of this shift. By asking questions, then, we 
further define the world and come closer to the truth. For each question already includes 
true presuppositions and is an attempt to further sort out the true ones from the false: “All 
dialectical negativity contains an adumbration of what is true” (Gadamer, Truth and 
Method 460). We interpret as a result of our engagement with the text, as a means of 
placing the text in the context of our interaction with it; it is a matter of having the right 
expectations, of confirming certain anticipations and refuting others. In point of fact, all 
meaning includes interpretation because all meaning is necessarily open, for all that is 
said only has meaning as it relates to what might be said: “Nothing that is said has its 
truth simply in itself, but refers instead backwards and forward to what is unsaid” 
(Gadamer, “Man and Language” 67). Undoubtedly, we have no choice but to interpret, 
but in asking questions we might further secure our interpretation; we might even inch a 






Tracing the rhythms of the day, Mrs. Dalloway highlights the variety of ways that 
people experience one moment to the next. Illuminating the manner in which people are 
oriented to understanding and fulfillment, this novel presents characters whose 
perceptions and outlook are shaped by the need for resolution. Each character in the 
novel has undergone a series of experiences that define his or her world: now, in the 
midst of another day, these characters confront a sequence of moments in which they are 
drawn to resolve the past with the present as it looks toward the future. Each character in 
this novel has lived his or her particular story, one in which he or she developed binding 
connections: first, with a mother and father, with family, and then, with the surrounding 
community. Gadamer advises us that to interpret literature we recognize that the 
characters’ first experiences of love and commonality are not conscious, but they 
determine their orientation to the world. In this manner these characters learn to speak 
and use language; the world begins to take shape. At the same time, when the world 
seems to acquire its lasting appearance things continue to shift and change. Nevertheless, 
there is something in these characters’ understanding that recognizes the possibility of 
communion, of living in a world that belongs to them and to which they belong. At this 
point, they turn to the people who matter most in their lives—those very people who were 
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decisive in forming the world as it has become, those who inspire the very language that 
shapes understanding—and remember that it is through them that the world becomes 
meaningful; that it is at its most true when it is shared. 
 Mrs. Dalloway emphasizes the productive, unfathomable nature of relationships 
and human interaction: the outcome of all dialogue, of all human interaction can never be 
predicted. This interaction provides the impetus for language, meaning, and greater 
understanding. It forces one to reassess and acknowledge one’s blind spots, to notice 
those aspects of one’s horizon that that are mistaken. Mrs. Dalloway stresses that all 
knowledge should be tempered with the knowledge that one does not know; more can 
always be said and knowledge is limited. These, in fact, are central concerns of 
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. In many ways, these ideas resonate with much of 
the critical effort to interpret this novel, but they also undermine and transcend much of 
the critique. For example, DiBattista correctly argues that concepts such as truth and 
reality are elusive in Mrs. Dalloway: “The imaginative center, where truth and beauty, 
life and death coexist as terms in the transparent equation of reality, eludes, as Mrs. 
Dalloway dramatizes, the spirit’s grasp” ( 24). DiBattista’s analysis is appropriate—truth 
and reality are, to a certain degree, elusive—but she fails to appreciate how, and in what 
manner, they are accessible. For life is not entirely mysterious; there are moments of truth 
and understanding too. Mrs. Dalloway explores this tension. In it are characters who seek 
truth and make an effort to reach it. Although not always successful, the possibility is still 
decisive. The actions and thoughts of these characters are oriented toward approaching 
truth and understanding reality: these characters seek out interactions that will contribute 
to this effort, interactions that determine truth and reality, terms that are dependent on 
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engagement and participation. For his part, Ruotolo echoes this idea that the dynamic of 
human relationships is decisive: “Typically for Woolf, human intercourse occurs on the 
boundary of the mind’s knowledge, some obscure communion deeper than ideology and 
more fundamental than sex” (114). Ruotolo is on the right track, but his analysis does not 
fully consider the ontological consequences and implications of this “obscure 
communion.” This concept of human connection is decisive, productive of meaning and 
language, the very world of each character. Human relationships may be shrouded in 
darkness, but they are still one’s primary avenue towards improved meaning and 
understanding. 
 In Mrs. Dalloway we encounter characters who are entangled in time’s web: to a 
considerable extent, each has already developed his or her outlook, his or her worldview, 
but this day is a new day and, like any other, it presents its own particular set of 
challenges. As each individual moves about the world, as each encounters strangers and 
friends, the world becomes something else. For these characters, the world has already 
become what it is, but, with every new experience, each has no choice but to synthesize 
these new experiences, to accommodate these new experiences so that they square with 
the past.  This, in fact, is the nature of hermeneutical experience:  
[I]n the utilization of the linguistic interpretation of the 
world that finally comes about, something of the 
productivity of our beginnings remains alive. […]  What I 
am describing is the mode of the whole human experience 
of the world. I call this experience hermeneutical, for the 
process we are describing is repeated continually 
throughout our familiar experience. There is always a 
world already interpreted, already organized in its basic 
relations, into which experience steps as something new, 
upsetting what has led our expectations and undergoing 
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reorganization itself in the upheaval (Gadamer, “The 
Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem” 15). 
 
Mrs. Dalloway is the story of a June day in London and the different characters 
who populate the city. Clarissa Dalloway is at the center of the narrative. A middle-aged 
socialite, she is hardly the obvious candidate for transcendent meaning (she is just a 
housewife, neither an artist nor an intellectual), yet she experiences thoughts and feelings 
that do matter, that do represent a willingness to go deeper; she too wonders about the 
meaning of life and her role in its drama. Set right after the end of World War I, the 
meaning and impact of this novel hinges on the particular concerns of its time and place. 
Certainly, the author and her English compatriots were still reeling from the savagery of 
this conflict. In many ways, this novel is a response to this schism-producing world 
event. For the war was a symptom of a larger problem, of social and historical trends that 
culminated in outright conflict. To a considerable extent, this war was the result of 
modernization, of blind faith in science and technology, industrialization and 
imperialism. Certainly, the era preceding the War was one of rapid change. For many, 
there was a sense of unidirectional progress: with science and technology, the world was 
becoming more understandable and so was the ability to control and distribute its objects 
and resources. People moved to cities en masse, hoping for an easier life: cities promised 
technological infrastructure, jobs in industry and a resultant source of steady food and 
reliable housing. With this movement, though, there was a growing sense of inequality 
(as those with capital exploited those without), of increased competitiveness, and an 
alienation stemming from the loss of home and place. This industrialization and faith in 
progress could not be stopped. Indeed, the European powers embraced science, 
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technology and industry. Soon their goal was to amass resources, control markets and 
develop technology that would aid in these efforts. To this end, the competitive instinct 
was primary: all technology, all industry was necessarily good as long as they promoted 
their sense of progress. But competition, technology, and industry are not necessarily 
good. For these countries became increasingly competitive in the race for resources and 
markets. Rivalries grew, eventually metastasizing into bloody conflict.  
For its part, the artistic, intellectual, and philosophical movement known as 
Modernism is a response to these trends. For, with all of this blind faith in science and 
progress, there was a pushback to open one’s eyes and see the limitations of science, to 
identify its proper place within human understanding. For science gives the impression of 
objectivity and promotes the idea that there is one way to see the world and one objective 
truth. This sense of objectivity led the European powers to believe that their way was the 
right way—that they were closer to truth than anybody else—and that this way of 
thinking should be exported and promoted around the world. Under the guise of science, 
there is a devaluing of individuality, an obfuscation of one’s interpretive and creative 
nature: people become tools, cogs in a machine. The artists, philosophers and 
intellectuals commonly associated with Modernism retorted by asserting the primacy of 
creativity and the relativity of science. Science was recognized as “one of the possible 
orders of understanding rather than […] the ultimate form of truth statement” (Bell 11). 
For all scientific conclusions depend on an observer, somebody who determines the 
parameters of the experiment and the research questions that shape the conclusions. All in 
all, “the underlying notion of observation was increasingly problematic” (Bell 11). These 
thinkers came to conclude that “science is a reflection of the human mind before it is a 
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reflection of the world” (Bell 11). If science is a reflection of the human mind, then what 
is the human mind and how does it work? Many of these thinkers recognized the 
concurrence between the human mind and the world: the two are inseparable. These 
thinkers saw “the human world as self-created”, dependent on one’s interaction with it 
(Bell 14). Language was seen to be the primary means of this interaction: “rather than 
describing or reflecting the world, language was now seen to form it” (Bell 16). The most 
important and most relevant of these thinkers to relativize science and recognize the 
importance of interpretation and language in human understanding was Martin 
Heidegger. He, in fact, was a relative contemporary of Virginia Woolf. Born seven years 
later, he belonged to a similar historical milieu as Virginia Woolf. Certainly, the two 
engaged similar questions; as such, it is no surprise that there is resonance between 
Woolf’s concerns and Gadamer’s, for Gadamer was a student of Heidegger’s. Heidegger 
emphasized “human involvement in language as resistant to technical or external 
analysis” (Bell 17). In other words, any attempt to describe language already takes place 
in language: language is concurrent with one’s embeddedness in the world. As language 
and the meaning of the world cannot be parsed, the relative status of each individual 
came to be affirmed: “the relative status of the human was a central recognition of 
Modernism itself” (Bell 13).    
As the world for each individual is different because of his or her interaction with 
it, many artists began to explore the dynamics of this interaction, to promote this sense of 
interpretive responsibility and awareness. In the field of painting, for example, Claude 
Monet’s 1874 painting, Impression-Sunrise, is considered by many to be the first Modern 
painting (Fiero, 6: 114). According to Fiero, “the painting says more about how one sees 
150 
 
than about what one sees” (6: 114). This painting emphasizes the primacy of the 
perceiving individual—that perception varies depending on who sees and what that 
person chooses to highlight. As the 19th Century came to a close and the 20th gained 
steam, there was a gradual moving away from realistic representation and a moving 
toward formal innovation and abstraction, an attempt to represent the world as the artist 
sees it. Certainly, Virginia Woolf paid attention to these changes in art, as when she 
declares that human character changed forever in 1910, the year of the first Post-
Impressionist exhibit in England (Schwarz 26-7). In these paintings, one can notice an 
emphasis on individuality, perception, and personal vision: “These painters demonstrated 
that artists could create their own order in a chaotic world. Thus they intentionally 
neglect some details, while they simplify, distort, exaggerate, and stress others to express 
their emotions, solve problems of pictorial space and create effects, In a sense, the artist’s 
temperament and perspective become the subject” (Schwarz 27). 
Modernist novelists adopted a similar project of highlighting perception, of 
showing that each individual belongs to his or her own world. According to Schwarz, 
these authors “realized that each person perceives a different reality and lives in […] a 
‘closed circle’” (19). At the same time, the world of each individual is influenced by and 
influences the worlds of others. Much of Modernist literature focuses on this interaction 
between individuals. To capture the Modernist mode of perception, Woolf creates 
characters that embody this Modern trope. For its part, the characters in Mrs. Dalloway 
represent unique individuals who have been shaped by his or her upbringing and 
circumstance, characters who interpret their place in the world, who are shaped—and 
shape—as each interacts with others. These characters belong to a world that is 
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changing—some believe in God, others do not—a world that is in crisis, one in which the 
stale precepts of the past are inevitably questioned. Like many who lived at the time, 
most of these characters do not purport to have the final answer or to understand 
absolutely. Instead they live in an atmosphere of questioning and wondering, of 
uncertainty. Certainly, in Clarissa we get a sense for her outlook: she wonders about the 
meaning of things and accepts that she will never reach an absolute conclusion, but she 
also does not despair, willing to test and explore, aware that she might find clues as she 
interacts with people and shares in the meaning of the world. This aspect of Clarissa’s 
personality is highlighted when she is out in the street, pondering life and its mystery: 
“She knew nothing; no language, no history; she scarcely read a book now, except 
memoirs in bed; and yet to her it was absolutely absorbing” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 8). It 
is “absolutely absorbing” because of her engagement with people, as the narrative 
immediately stresses: “Her only gift was knowing people almost by instinct” (Woolf, Mrs 
Dalloway 9). 
Undoubtedly, Woolf presents Clarissa as a character who tries to understand. She 
makes an effort, but she is also presented as someone who recognizes the limitations of 
her effort. A part of her is aware that no matter her intent, understanding and meaning 
cannot be forced. Nevertheless, much of the critical reception has chosen to focus on 
Clarissa’s subjectivity. Hussey, for example, argues that “Clarissa is engaged in what 
may be seen as a search for her ownmost identity: her recollections of childhood and an 
unresolved early love affair often prevent her from having a sense of continuity in her 
being” (25). Of course, Clarissa’s identity is important, but my argument is that Woolf 
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stresses those experiences of meaning that lie beyond subjectivity, situations in which 
meaning springs forth, the result of an unconscious interaction with people and language.  
As Clarissa goes through her day, her many experiences, perceptions and 
sensations are filtered through the lens of her past, her relationships, and a potential 
future that she yearns to optimize. Each scent or sight triggers memories and thoughts 
that shape her mood; the very identity of these sensations and perceptions depend on her 
past experiences. In her case, the world turns out to be the result of her interaction with 
the people who know her best. In this context, Gadamer’s words resonate: “It belongs to 
the nature of familiarity with the world that whenever we exchange words with one 
another, we share the world” (“On the Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth” 
115). Somehow, she senses that each relationship, each encounter, is of the utmost 
importance, at the heart of any to attempt to understand or find fulfillment. According to 
Gadamer, dialogue and relationships are, in fact, one’s main source of fulfillment:  
The basic constitution of the game, to be filled with its 
spirit—the spirit of buoyancy, freedom and the joy of 
success—and to fulfill him who is playing, is structurally 
related to the constitution of the dialogue in which 
language is a reality. When one enters into dialogue with 
another person and then is carried along further by the 
dialogue, it is no longer the will of the individual person, 
holding itself back or exposing itself, that is determinative. 
Rather, the law of the subject matter is at issue in the 
dialogue and elicits statement and counterstatement and in 
the end plays them into each other. Hence, when a dialogue 
has succeeded, one is subsequently fulfilled by it (“Man 
and Language” 66).  
 
Indeed, Clarissa has a sense for this nature of dialogue as she tends her relationships—
that they shape who she is, that they are her primary means of finding fulfillment. She 
knows that there is something indefinably productive about relationships: their yield is 
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always more and different than one anticipates—with each encounter, insight, 
reassurance and provocation. And when the relationship is at its most productive, when 
the participants find commonalities and a shared world, then each acquires a sense for 
what the world might be at its most true; each feels more at home, less alienated, the 
world more understandable because it has been corroborated. Certainly, Clarissa 
recognizes the value and productivity of her interactions with others: she knows that each 
meeting represents a tremendous opportunity; that this very person presents a chance to 
approach the world as it truly is; that this moment of unconscious congeniality shapes 
one’s horizon and how one understands at all. Clarissa is reminded of the potential of her 
interpersonal encounters when she recalls how she has failed her husband; she knows she 
has failed him because there have been moments when she has sensed the potential and 
power and possible insight—the intense feeling of communion and completeness—of her 
interactions:  
Only for a moment; but it was enough. It was a sudden 
revelation, a tinge like a blush which one tried to check and 
then, as it spread, one yielded to its expansion, and rushed 
to the farthest verge and there quivered and felt the world 
come closer, swollen with some astonishing significance, 
some pressure of rapture, which split its thin skin and 
gushed and poured with an extraordinary alleviation over 
the cracks and sores! Then, for that moment, she had seen 
an illumination; a match burning in a crocus; an inner 
meaning almost expressed. But the close withdrew; the 
hard softened. It was over—the moment (Woolf, Mrs. 
Dalloway 32).  
 
Each encounter and each relationship are, to a certain extent, indefinable: within each 
there is an unquantifiable emotional and sexual undercurrent. Clarissa recognizes that 
there is something that occurs between two people that is decisive yet uncontrollable: the 
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ways in which two people connect cannot be intellectualized. Clarissa is content with her 
decision to marry Richard, yet she also knows that their connection is imperfect—with 
Richard there is not intense passion nor is there transcendent meaning; however, Clarissa 
is fully aware that such experiences are possible when two people come together. When 
two people enter into a dialogue and confront the world there are moments when the 
passion of the interaction is decisive. Both parties submit to the dialogue and it is the 
subject matter that gains ascendency. Now, the topic of the dialogue could be absolutely 
anything, but the possible subject matter is only available within the world horizon of 
each participant; each particular is only understandable as it relates to the entire context. 
Each participant brings his or her self into the dialogue, a self that is oriented to the 
whole, of everything that might be understood, of everything that might be at all: “We are 
ourselves encompassed by the whole, which we are and which is in us; but not 
encompassed in such a manner that the whole would be present for us as the whole. We 
encounter it rather as the totality and vastness, wherein everything is, only through 
adhering to what has been allotted us, ie., the nómos, whatever it may be” (Gadamer, 
Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and History 91). When people share the 
world in conversation, there is always the possibility that one might glimpse this whole 
and gain an improved sense for one’s place in it; the world and its meaning—one’s very 
perceptions—are confirmed. So, “the world come[s] closer” and is at its most meaningful 
for Clarissa when she is most connected with someone.  
 Clarissa has a sense for the potential of people. She knows that every individual, 
when combined with the right person, might gain a firmer footing and feel more 
complete. She herself has experienced such moments of communion. She has lived such 
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moments and they shape how she experiences her day. She knows that each day carries 
within it tremendous potential—she feels an “exquisite suspense” from one moment to 
the next, aware that one cannot force moments of understanding and unity (Woolf, Mrs. 
Dalloway 30). It is only within the context of time that one might commune with the 
world. Every moment is new: a particular challenge and a particular opportunity. 
Sometimes one feels good, sometimes one feels bad; sometimes one feels inspired and at 
others stumped. But these opportunities only come about as time passes. The number of 
moments that one might seize are limited. With each passing hour, opportunities become 
fewer. At the same time, these opportunities evolve as one grows and changes: the 
manner in which one harnesses a moment depends on past experiences and how one has 
been shaped. With the right experiences and a refined ability to process those 
experiences, every new experience acquires greater meaning and more impact.  
 The action of this narrative takes place within the space of one day. And from the 
very beginning we get a sense for its narrative arc: Clarissa will be hosting a party in the 
evening; she needs to prepare for this party. This event is essential because it is a chance 
for people to come together: for each and every guest, the party represents an opportunity 
for the world to become something else—more understandable, more vibrant. For 
Clarissa too: it is a chance to make a connection that could change her life. By means of 
her party, she might “kindle and illuminate” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 5). In this example, 
Woolf utilizes the metaphor of fire to highlight the manner in which two people interact: 
when people come together, something comes to be that neither can anticipate, an 
interaction of passion, the result new and unexpected.  
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 It is within the context of the looming party that Clarissa lives her day. In many 
ways, this day is special because people will come together who might not otherwise; that 
people will come together at all is of special importance—each encounter is necessarily a 
unique opportunity. In other ways, this day is entirely ordinary: one wakes up at the 
beginning and goes to bed at the end, the sun rises and sets, and the birds still chirp. So 
too, Big Ben booms with the passing of each hour. With each vibration, Woolf highlights 
the thematics of this novel: meaning and truth are only accessible within the context of 
time. Each new moment is different and it is up to each character to face this difference; 
time is incontrovertible and seeps into each and every little crevice; time will end but 
until then all one has is each moment; the past has been and the future will be, each 
impinging on the present. Certainly, this is Clarissa’s feeling as she contemplates her 
present circumstance: “She was not old yet. She had just broken into her fifty-second 
year. Months and months of it were still untouched. June, July, August! Each still 
remained almost whole, and as if to catch the falling drop, Clarissa (crossing to the 
dressing table) plunged into the heart of the moment, transfixed it, there—the moment of 
this June morning on which was the pressure of all the other mornings” (Woolf, Mrs. 
Dalloway 36-7). It is important for Clarissa to digest the moment, to assess and orient 
herself, to determine who she really is, in spite of distractions, in spite of change, to 
ground herself, so that she might become more as a result of the party instead of scattered 
or confused. By “plunging into the very heart of the moment”, Clarissa prepares herself 
for what may come. This is, in fact, something we all might do if we hope to understand: 
“In all human knowing of the world and in all orientation within the world the nature of 
the moment of understanding has to be worked out” (Gadamer, “Reflections on My 
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Philosophical Journey” 28). For each moment is different, a synthesis of the past and 
one’s expectations, and it is worthwhile to confront its nature, to understand it for what it 
is so that one might approach coherence.  
This particular approach to understanding is characteristic of Modernism in and of 
itself. In Modernism one encounters a special emphasis on the subject and the uniqueness 
of the individual. In part, each individual is different because of his or her experiences 
and background. In this novel and in Gadamer’s philosophical approach one can easily 
notice this accent on individuality and personal history. Part of understanding includes 
understanding one’s place in the moment—how it relates to the past and its possible 
impact on the future: “Memory enables us to integrate experience in a series of ongoing 
syntheses which become understandable as we interpret the past and future in a changing 
present” (Kern 45). With the importance of memory in mind—the manner in which it 
informs understanding and the human subject—many Modernist thinkers came to 
recognize the value of confronting and accounting for one’s personal past: “the personal 
past began to attract a variety of prominent thinkers who scrutinized it with 
unprecedented care and insisted that an understanding of it was essential to a healthy and 
authentic life” (Kern 61). 
 This day is new and fresh, an opportunity and a challenge. Its success depends on 
what has happened before and what might happen in the future, but there is still a feeling 
of personal responsibility: within the confines of the possible, one makes choices. And 
certainly there is a feeling that the meaning and value of the day depends on one’s 
approach to it: each day, each moment represents an opportunity to live in a world of 
one’s own creation, as participants in its meaning. Clarissa recognizes this aspect of the 
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world—that it depends on her to create it, that she is responsible: “Heaven only knows 
why one loves it so, how one sees it so, making it up, building it round one, tumbling it, 
creating every moment afresh” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 4). Every moment is new and it 
depends on each and every one of us to interpret these moments. Here, though, 
interpretation is not something that happens after the experience, but is instead part of 
one’s perception of the world: “Pure seeing and pure hearing are dogmatic abstractions 
that artificially reduce phenomena. Perception always includes meaning” (Gadamer, 
Truth and Method 80). Indeed, the meaning of the world depends on the approach to it; 
interaction with the world, ability to describe it, and expectations actually determines 
meaning: “We are simply following an internal necessity of the thing itself if we go 
beyond the idea of the object and the objectivity of understanding toward the idea that 
subject and object belong together” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 457). Of course, this 
creative opportunity and responsibility depends on one’s past experiences and how the 
moment fits into what remains.  And it is the case that Clarissa will be hosting a party 
that evening; her experiences are filtered through the lens of what is to come. 
Furthermore, her old friend, the man she almost married, Peter Walsh, remains foremost 
on her mind. From the very beginning of the novel her sensations and experiences trigger 
memories of Peter; to a certain degree he is the arbiter and fulcrum of Clarissa’s world: 
“For they might be parted for hundreds of years, she and Peter; she never wrote a letter 
and his were dry sticks; but suddenly it would come over her, If he were with me now 
what would he say?” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 7). For Clarissa, it is because of Peter that 




 So, too, Clarissa remains a central figure in Peter’s world: “no one understood 
him, felt with him, as Clarissa did” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 46). For both, underlying 
their relationship is a spring of overwhelming emotion and feeling. Between them there is 
and was an undeniable connection that molded their worlds. Because of the complicated 
reality of love and feeling, they did not marry each other, yet neither can deny that there 
was and is love, that their connection determined who they became: “She had influenced 
him more than any person he had ever known” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 153). For 
Clarissa, too, Peter is decisive: “He made her see herself” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 168). 
This novel culminates with Clarissa’s party and at this party Peter fixates on Clarissa. 
Recently returned to London from India, Peter yearns to reconnect with Clarissa. Despite 
their problems and complications, he knows that she remains a central figure in his life. 
Any subsequent love or happiness that he might have found after their separation still 
hinges on his initial relationship with Clarissa. For Peter, his bond with Clarissa 
represented the apex of emotion and feeling. As a result, any subsequent relationships are 
forever skewed, any emotion or feeling never fully understandable: “He had not found 
life simple, Peter said. His relations with Clarissa had not been simple. It had spoilt his 
life” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 192). So, when Peter talks to his and Clarissa’s mutual 
friend, Sally Seton, they discuss what matters most. Sally states her position plainly: “For 
she had come to feel that it was the only thing worth saying—what one felt. Cleverness 
was silly. One must say simply what one felt” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 191). Peter wishes 
he could say what he feels, for then he might actually understand his emotions. Bereft of 
words, Peter flounders; for, until he is able to articulate his emotions, they remain 
mysterious: “‘But I do not know […] what I feel’” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 191). Indeed, 
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Peter wishes he could verbalize his feelings so that they might be understandable; we all 
need language if we hope to understand: “To come into language does not mean that a 
second being is acquired. Rather, what something presents itself as belongs to its own 
being” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 457). Peter struggles to pin down his emotions, but 
he recognizes that Clarissa still influences any feeling that he might have; he senses that, 
maybe, she can help him rediscover his feelings and their true nature. Maybe Clarissa can 
prompt the language that might calm his emotional turmoil. When, in the end, he finally 
sees Clarissa again at the party, he thinks to himself: “What is this terror? what is this 
ecstasy? […] What is it that fills me with extraordinary excitement?” (Woolf, Mrs. 
Dalloway 194). She is still the potential source of a world that might reach fulfillment 
and this potential is both scary and exciting—terrifying because he has so much to lose; 
thrilling because he has so much to gain. 
 Now, my consideration of this relationship between Clarissa and Peter—and the 
marriage between Clarissa and her husband Richard—is somewhat complicated by 
societal and historical strictures. Certainly, the general concept of love, marriage, and 
friendship between men and women has evolved and changed over time: the ways that 
men and women interact is very different now than it was then. To a certain degree, it is 
unavoidable that I will project my sense of this interaction between men and women as it 
has taken shape in the beginnings of the Twenty-first century, but, at the same time, an 
acute and highly developed historical consciousness belongs to the present moment also. 
I cannot help but affirm that the world was different then than it is now. Certainly, 
traditionally, women have been second-class citizens, often seen as property, and bereft 
of agency. The Modern period was a time of rapid change and this movement 
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comprehends the status of women. It was during this time that the suffrage movement 
began, culminating in Great Britain in 1918 when women won the right to vote. This 
right was one step in the direction towards equality, but undoubtedly there was much left 
to rectify. As one might expect, Virginia Woolf was part of this conversation. In general, 
she focused on “equal opportunity for education and economic advantage” (Fiero, 6: 
110). She also argued for “psychological independence from men” (Fiero, 6: 110). Now, 
in order to win the right to vote and to rally for a more equal status, women had to unite 
as a group and, to a certain extent, affirm their status as different from men. However, 
Woolf took issue with this grouping of women, as if all women were the same or shared 
similar characteristics. Instead, Woolf aimed to transcend this concept of gender 
difference and to promote a notion of women as people, with similar interests, desires and 
needs as men. Her aim was to affirm the “value of human life itself in its natural 
freedom” (Payne, 2). All in all, the point was that people should be allowed to become 
who they might be, that each might become the best version of his or her self. And it is 
this theme that stands out in Mrs. Dalloway. A middle-aged socialite and housewife, 
Clarissa hardly represents radicality, but it is exactly within this atmosphere of tradition 
that Clarissa might transcend traditional gender norms. In her relationships with Peter and 
Richard, there is a general tension between tradition and transcendence. Belonging to 
their time and place, there is no doubt that their relationships were shaped by societal 
expectations. At the same time, they grew up and matured in a time of rapid change. 
While seeking a sense of fulfillment that could only come to fruition as something that 
takes place within society, these characters also interact in a way that undermines these 
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expectations. In their interactions there is this sense that the most important thing is to 
encourage one’s individual freedom so that he or she might reach fulfillment.  
 Woolf indicates in her novelistic characterization that Peter and Clarissa are 
essential to each other and how each understands the world. Clarissa, for her part, is 
acutely aware of the mystery of people and of life; people are inscrutable and so is life, 
each capable of the unexpected: “She would not say of any one in the world now that 
they were this or that” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 8). It is impossible to know people as they 
truly are, she thinks, but we do make judgments and conclusions, even when one knows 
that these opinions might not be entirely accurate; that is, each attempt to know someone 
should be tempered with the recognition that people are unknowable and surprising. 
Clarissa herself wrestles with this tension between revealment and concealment, surface 
and depth. On one end of things, to a certain degree Clarissa can accurately judge people 
just by being in the same room with them: “Her only gift was knowing people almost by 
instinct” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 9). On the other end: “she would not say of Peter, she 
would not say of herself, I am this, I am that” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 8-9). Clarissa is 
fully aware of the paradox of judging others: people contain within them an infinite 
depth, yet they necessarily assert themselves. In one’s interactions with others there is 
something identifiably there. With this in mind, Gadamer’s philosophy resounds: “Being 
is visible not only as the one but also, and just as originally, as the other and as the 
multiplicity of differences, and as the identity and difference that comes into language” 
(“Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language” 44). In many ways, these 
considerations are part and parcel of the historical climate in which Woolf wrote and 
Gadamer philosophized. The world was in crisis and many were seeking an alternative to 
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the mindset that had led Western civilization into war: there was a “widespread belief that 
Western civilization had lost its course” (Matthews and Platt 589). Objective certainty 
was a central component of Western civilization and its unidirectional notion of progress 
and many thinkers decided that it was necessary to dismantle this notion. So, instead of 
certainty, these thinkers preferred uncertainty—as the individual relates to the world and 
as one tries to understand the world: “a questioning mood became the normative way of 
looking at the world, replacing the certainty of previous centuries” (Matthews and Platt 
589). 
 Certainly, Clarissa feels like she is capable of unexpected surprises—and the 
people she meets too. This too is Clarissa’s feeling as she lives her day: each day should 
be approached with radical wonder; anything can happen; she is part of the world yet 
outside of it; each moment is a gift and a burden; she could die at any moment: “She 
sliced like a knife through everything; at the same time was outside, looking on. She had 
a perpetual sense, as she watched the taxi cabs, of being out, out, far out to sea and alone; 
she always had the feeling that it was very, very dangerous to live even one day” (Woolf, 
Mrs. Dalloway 8). Clarissa accepts that life is fleeting, that it is both comprehensible and 
incomprehensible, that it exhilarates as it frustrates. And it is within this context that 
Clarissa lives her life: she will die and everything will end; her access and opportunity 
are limited—all she has is the moment. Willing to look death in the face, Clarissa 
confronts her finitude: “Did it matter then, she asked herself, walking towards Bond 
Street, did it matter that she must inevitably cease completely; all this must go on without 
her; did she resent it; or did it not become consoling to believe that she ended 
absolutely?” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 9). Woolf suggests by this passage that Clarissa 
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recognizes that no one knows what happens when we die, but we all know that it will 
happen and that when it does all of this striving and needing and wanting and wondering 
will cease.  
 And it is this notion of death that tinges much of the novel. Death is always there 
and it is always an option. Clarissa never dies in the narrative nor does she contemplate 
suicide, but death still remains a central motif. In point of fact, it is famously known that 
Woolf initially intended for Clarissa to commit suicide; death is at the center of this 
narrative. Considering the mass carnage of World War I, it is no surprise that death 
would play such a prominent role in this fictional account. The specter of death was 
everywhere, seemingly inevitable. Although many considered Western civilization to be 
on a track of progress, part and parcel of this progress was the potential for mass 
annihilation: “The same science, technology, and medicine that extended and improved 
life produced weapons that made it easier for modern armies to annihilate each other” 
(Winks and Neuberger 289). This potential for annihilation hovered over everyone, 
requiring all to look death in the face. So, at Clarissa’s party, death takes center stage, 
offering a clear juxtaposition between the joviality and mirth of the party and the stark 
finality of death. This story culminates with Clarissa’s party, a time when people can 
come together and celebrate and feel unity, a time when people can forget about their 
worries and frustrations, yet even an event like a party cannot gloss over life’s ultimate 
truth: “Oh! thought Clarissa, in the middle of my party, here’s death” (Woolf, Mrs. 
Dalloway 183). Septimus Warren Smith has committed suicide. He is a topic of 
conversation because Doctor Bradshaw is at the gathering, having treated Septimus just 
that day. Septimus is a stranger to Clarissa, yet his life and death affect her deeply: he is a 
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reminder that life is short and temporary. In contemplating his death, Clarissa 
understands the truth of life: “A thing there was that mattered; a thing, wreathed about 
with chatter, defaced, obscured in her own life, let drop in corruption, lies, chatter. This 
he had preserved. Death was defiance. Death was an attempt to communicate; people 
feeling the impossibility of reaching the centre which, mystically, evaded them; closeness 
drew apart; rapture faded, one was alone. There was an embrace in death” (Woolf, Mrs. 
Dalloway 184). Certainly, for Clarissa (and people in general) in one’s daily life one very 
rarely feels like one has a handle on everything; there are always distractions and 
circumstances that bend meaning; but in death there is no longer this anguish and anxiety 
of wanting to know but never reaching a final conclusion; finally, in death, one 
communes with the world and the circle is complete, consciousness no longer striving for 
unity.  
Septimus’ suicide serves as a point of contrast for Clarissa: she is still alive and 
the world remains vibrant, but she knows that she has an option—she can die if she 
chooses; it is possible. And it is Septimus’ suicide that reminds Clarissa that each 
moment is a gift, that it is up to her to choose how to live: “But what an extraordinary 
night! She felt somehow very like him—the young man who had killed himself. She felt 
glad that he had done it; thrown it away. The clock was striking. The leaden circles 
dissolved in the air. He made her feel the beauty; made her feel the fun” (Woolf, Mrs. 
Dalloway 186). Clarissa reacts to Septimus’ suicide positively because his death helps 
clarify the true nature of life; death itself is like a frame that allows the viewer to see what 
is and what is not; life is limited and mysterious but it is all there is.  
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 This particular day concludes with Clarissa’s party, an event in which people 
might celebrate community, commonality, and solidarity. But this party is not all joy; 
Septimus’ suicide intrudes. Woolf chooses to include Septimus as a central character 
because his plight sheds light on the ravages of war and the vicious character of 
humanity. Of course, not everyone experiences the brutality of war to such a heightened 
degree nor does everyone feel the cutting edge of one’s fellow being, but, undoubtedly, 
Septimus’ outlook and world has been warped by war. Sensitive by nature, he entered the 
war enthusiastic about literature, as someone who acutely felt the benefits of community 
and solidarity. But the war changed him; it was inevitable. Forced to participate in the 
downfall of others, Septimus had no choice but to shut down and snuff out his affective 
capacity, his ability to empathize, all feeling and emotion. In her article, “Trauma and 
Recovery in Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway,” Karen DeMeester echoes this notion: 
“During combat, indifference is a survival tool that protects the psyche from being 
overwhelmed by the horror received through the senses” (658). Furthermore, within this 
environment of heightened stress, Septimus developed a close friendship with his 
commanding officer, Evans. But Evans did not survive the war and Septimus had even 
further reason to despair and retreat into himself: “when Evans was killed, just before the 
Armistice, in Italy, Septimus, far from showing any emotion or recognizing that here was 
the end of a friendship, congratulated himself upon feeling very little and very 
reasonably. The War had taught him. It was sublime” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 86). When 
Septimus returns from the war, he begins to realize that the war has changed him and he 
starts to panic; he fears that he will not lead a normal life, that he is no longer able to 
share or love: “When peace came he was in Milan, billeted in the house of an innkeeper 
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with a courtyard, flowers in tubs, little tables in the open, daughters making hats, and to 
Lucrezia, the younger daughter, he became engaged one evening  when the panic was on 
him—that he could not feel” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 86). 
 As readers, we do not first learn of Septimus at Clarissa’s party. He is introduced 
much earlier, at the beginning of the day, when Clarissa is out buying flowers for her 
party. Clarissa is out in public, among the masses of people who happen to be in London 
that very day. Everyone becomes mesmerized by a car that may or may not include the 
Prime Minister or the Queen of England. Septimus is one of those people being 
mesmerized: he too is captivated. But Septimus is not only enthralled by the car, he is lost 
in reverie because his perceptions and sensations demand an explanation; terrible things 
have happened to Septimus; he has been chosen to suffer; this pain, though, must have 
some benefit—there must be some unique meaning attached to his experiences:  
And there the motor car stood, with drawn blinds, and upon 
them a curious pattern like a tree, Septimus thought, and 
this gradual drawing together of everything to one centre 
before his eyes, as if some horror had come almost to the 
surface and was about to burst into flames, terrified him. 
The world wavered and quivered and threatened to burst 
into flames. It is I who am blocking the way, he thought. 
Was he not being looked at and pointed at; was he not 
weighted there, rooted to the pavement, for a purpose? But 
for what purpose? (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 15).  
 
There must be some special significance linked to Septimus’ tribulations. His perceptions 
are supercharged because he has witnessed extreme cruelty and suffering; he knows what 
people are capable of and this knowledge tinges his perceptions—they are endowed with 
need; his pain must be useful in some way; the world and its appearance must be 
meaningful, harmonious; surely, resolution and unity are possible:  
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But they beckoned; leaves were alive; trees were alive. And 
the leaves being connected by millions of fibres with his 
own body, there on the seat, fanned it up and down; when 
the branch stretched he, too, made that statement. The 
sparrows fluttering, rising, and falling in jagged fountains 
were part of the pattern; the white and blue, barred with 
black branches. Sounds made harmonies with 
premeditation; the spaces between them were as significant 
as the sounds. A child cried. Rightly far away a horn 
sounded. All taken together meant the birth of a new 
religion (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 22-3).  
 
Septimus is particularly equipped to comprehend the scope of existence  because he has 
witnessed the underbelly of human nature (degradation, cruelty) and the truth of the 
world is only available in this context—as something that must be meaningful, 
harmonious and understandable despite—or because of—the way people treat one 
another. At the same time, Septimus’ perceptions are distorted because he has not been 
able to link his pre-war existence with his post-war life. He is stuck in his own head, 
unable to overcome his trauma. As DeMeester contends, “The survivor’s traumatized 
mind apprehends the traumatic event as ever-present, and his memories of the event often 
exist in the present consciousness as encapsulated images and fragments of thought that 
are juxtaposed against other nontraumatic memories but do not relate to them 
sequentially or chronologically” (651). To recover from his trauma, he “must escape the 
prespeech chaos of his traumatized psyche and form his fragments of thought into a 
coherent, communicable narrative” (DeMeester 652). But Septimus is unable to form a 
coherent narrative; he lacks a sympathetic interlocutor, an outlet for his thoughts and 
emotions, somebody who might understand his plight. 
 Woolf includes the character of Septimus in her novel because he represents what 
might happen when the world is turned upside down by war; instead of propping each 
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other up, people chop each other down; when each is obligated to renounce the value and 
dignity of others; when each witnesses and participates in carnage. These experiences 
could not but change Septimus. As a response, in a last-gasp attempt to regain normalcy, 
Septimus chooses to marry Lucrezia. But this marriage to Lucrezia did not rescue 
Septimus. He remained bereft, alone, solitary—on an island. And Lucrezia suffers as a 
result. She too ends up feeling alone, disconnected from Septimus, each unable to 
understand the other. Lucrezia yearns for a connection with Septimus; she longs to be 
able to communicate with him; she wants to understand him and him to understand her. 
But they inhabit different worlds. Septimus is pre-occupied with working out the 
consequences of the War: he feels that he is uniquely qualified to interpret truth and 
meaning. He has approached the limits of human cruelty, of feeling, of life; he has 
walked to the edge and looked over the precipice: “He lay back in his chair, exhausted 
but upheld. He lay resting, waiting, before he again interpreted, with effort, with agony, 
to mankind” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 68). Septimus feels the need to interpret because he 
senses that his background uniquely qualifies him to understand the true nature of things. 
Septimus acknowledges and trumpets the value of interpretation—his very need to 
interpret—because his familiarity with the world has been destabilized. One may not 
recognize the value of interpretation—and one’s need for it—but it is something that 
occurs regardless: “interpretation seems to be a genuine determination of existence rather 
than an activity or intention” (Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation” 71). Septimus thinks 
that his experiences must include a secret meaning, that there must be an explanation for 
his pain, that his primary duty and challenge is to interpret this meaning. But, 
unfortunately, Septimus struggles to articulate the profound insights that he is uniquely 
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equipped to share; precisely because they are so important, because they are so deep, 
Septimus becomes frustrated; these insights are of such importance that any flaw, any gap 
between his need and the realization of this need becomes glaring:  
[H]e, Septimus, was alone, called forth in advance of the 
mass of men to hear the truth, to learn the meaning, which 
now at last, after all the toils of civilization—Greeks, 
Romans, Shakespeare, Darwin, and now himself—was to  
be given whole to… ‘To whom?’ he asked aloud. ‘To the 
Prime Minister,’ the voices which rustled above his head 
replied. The supreme secret must be told to the Cabinet; 
first that trees are alive; next there is no crime; next love, 
universal love, he muttered, gasping, trembling, painfully 
drawing out these profound truths which needed, so deep 
were they, so difficult, an immense effort to speak out, but 
the world was entirely changed by them for ever (Woolf, 
Mrs. Dalloway 67).  
 
Here, Septimus recalls civilization and its accomplishments: people like Shakespeare or 
Darwin, people who themselves interpreted the world, shared their interpretation with 
others, and challenged people to participate in this interpretive effort. To interpret, to 
approach truth, Septimus fully appreciates the value of this effort—but precisely because 
of his need (its immensity, its complexity), Septimus despairs. In the character of 
Septimus one notices an emphasis on interpretation and this emphasis reflects one of 
Modernism’s primary tenets—that each person is different and interpretation should be 
adjusted based on this difference. This variability of personality and experience became a 
central concern of many artists and intellectuals of the time: “They sought to depict a new 
kind of realism, situated in the subjective rather than the objective realm” (Winks and 
Neuberger 310). The character of Septimus is particularly appropriate for a consideration 
of the subjective because of the uniqueness and intensity of his experiences and 
consciousness. The unique subjectivity of Septimus reflects one of Modernism’s 
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principal tropes: “Culture had a new function for the modernists: not to represent, 
explore, analyze, or catalog objective reality, but to turn inward and explore under the 
surface of things, to express the subjective experience unique to each individual, 
including contradictory feelings, drives, energies at the very heart of life” (Winks and 
Neuberger 310). 
 Septimus is obsessed with his need for understanding, but the world that he 
endeavors to interpret is very different than that of Lucrezia. The two struggle to 
communicate, to connect, each on a different wavelength. The reference of the language 
of each is utterly dissimilar. As DeMeester puts it, “Communication between a trauma 
survivor and an untraumatized listener is diminished by a gap in meaning that to an 
extent exists in all attempts to communicate. Though the listener recognizes the words the 
traumatized person uses, she cannot comprehend the reality these words represent; there 
is an irreconcilable gap between the intensity of experience and emotion the veteran 
wishes to convey and the experience and emotion the listener can imagine and feel” 
(654). His concerns are different than hers and vice versa. As a result, Lucrezia also feels 
alone, abandoned even. Unable to communicate with the most important person in her 
life, the world loses its color, becomes indiscernible and murky with shadows. So, when 
Lucrezia comments to her husband that he should see the Milan gardens, she feels that 
the words do not reach Septimus, obsessed as he is with his own predicament:  
There was nobody. Her words faded. So a rocket fades. Its 
sparks, having grazed their way into the night, surrender to 
it, dark descends, pours over the outlines of houses and 
towers; bleak hillsides soften and fall in. But though they 
are gone, the night is full of them; robbed of colour, blank 
of windows, they exist more ponderously, give out what the 
frank daylight fails to transmit—the trouble and suspense 
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of things conglomerated there in the darkness; huddled 
together in the darkness; reft of the relief which dawn 
brings when, washing the walls white and grey, spotting 
each windowpane, lifting the mist from the fields, showing 
the red-brown cows peacefully grazing, all is once more 
decked out to the eye; exists again. I am alone; I am alone! 
(Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 23-4).  
 
Lucrezia is unable to communicate with Septimus because their concerns are entirely 
separate; without this communication, the world lacks meaning, becomes 
incomprehensible, as if the world were bathed in darkness: “The light that causes 
everything to emerge in such a way that it is evident and comprehensible in itself is the 
light of the word” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 478). In the same way that the world is 
indistinguishable when completely dark, Lucrezia’s world is imperceptible because she 
has no one to share it with; instead of reaching their destination and illuminating their 
shared existence, her words are duds, unable to reach self-fulfillment, launched towards 
their target but never reaching it—instead of enlightenment, darkness.  
 Septimus enters the novel when he is out with his wife; later, he visits Doctor 
Bradshaw’s office; then he commits suicide; and finally he resurfaces at Clarissa’s party, 
when she learns of his fatal act. We get a sense for the arc of his day and how he might 
make that final decision—his mindset and all that it implies. For Septimus, the pain of the 
day accumulates precipitously, so much so that he feels compelled to end his life. Now, 
Septimus is included in this novel because he represents one possible direction that a day 
might take. In the character of Septimus one sees a contrast between his dejection and 
Clarissa’s approach to her day. Clarissa is not a perfect person and she too sometimes 
struggles and sometimes despairs, but she has also been lucky, having lived a life in 
which she was nurtured and loved. Clarissa is thankful for her lot in life, but she also 
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knows that she has contributed significantly to her own happiness and success; she has 
made an effort. Clarissa is fully aware that with each day and each moment anything can 
happen, that time itself brims with danger and opportunity. With each instant she might 
understand and feel more or she might fail, cowed by the mystery and challenge of 
existence. However it may be, she knows that every day presents tremendous 
opportunity, within each a series of moments that could change her life: so that she might 
be who she wants to be and the world might be what it should be. But time is running out 
for Clarissa: she has lived more years than remain; her opportunities are becoming less 
and less abundant; her burden, her need, is becoming more and more acute. Now she 
feels a growing sense of urgency to embrace each moment:  
she feared time itself, […] the dwindling of life; how year 
by year her share was sliced; how little the margin that 
remained was capable any  longer of stretching, of 
absorbing, as in the youthful years, the colours, salts, tones 
of existence, so that she filled the room she entered, and 
felt often as she stood hesitating one moment on the 
threshold of her drawing-room, an exquisite suspense, such 
as might stay a diver before plunging while the sea darkens 
and brightens beneath him, and the waves which threaten to 
break, but only gently split their surface, roll and conceal 
and encrust as they just turn over the weeds with pearl 
(Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 30).  
 
Clarissa experiences such an intense feeling of suspense because she knows that her 
opportunities are becoming scarcer; her experiences are shaped by her sense of the future, 
a future that is dwindling, intensifying the importance of the present moment, one that 
may or may not prove decisive.    
 As Clarissa prepares for the party, as she moves about her house and muses, her 
thoughts return to Peter; she cannot help but do so, as he occupies such a central role in 
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her story. She recalls that her outlook in life, her very vocabulary has been shaped by 
Peter: “She owed him words: ‘sentimental,’ ‘civilized’; they started up every day of her 
life as if he guarded her” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 36). She then wonders when Peter 
would be back from India and he appears at her house. His visit affects her deeply: his 
influence in her life is so important, his role in her past so central, that his presence 
challenges Clarissa, reminding her of where she is and what she has become. His 
presence prompts her to evaluate the entirety of her life:  
‘Do you remember the lake?’ she said, in an abrupt voice, 
under the pressure of an emotion which caught her heart, 
made the muscles of her throat stiff, and contracted her lips 
in a spasm as she said ‘lake.’ For she was a child, throwing 
bread to the ducks, between her parents, and at the same 
time a grown woman coming to her parents who stood by 
the lake, holding her life in her arms which, as she neared 
them, grew larger and larger in her arms, until it became a 
whole life, a complete life, which she put down by them 
and said, ‘This is what I have made of it! This!’ And what 
had she made of it? What, indeed? sitting there sewing this 
morning with Peter (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 43).  
 
Here we might return to Gadamer’s notion that we are oriented towards unity, that we are 
a whole and that the whole is in us. Clarissa recalls her parents because they were more 
influential and more present than anyone else when she began her life. Now that she is 
beginning to near her end, she remembers her parents because they are especially 
qualified to assess the continuity of her life, how all of the parts fit together, the extent to 
which she has fulfilled her potential. This sense of continuity constitutes a vital aspect of 
Modernist thought. The Modernists placed an emphasis on subjectivity and the 
uniqueness of the individual; a vital part of this subjectivity and particularity is one’s 
memory; for its part, memory is one’s primary means towards attaining continuity—
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without memory each moment would be discrete and disconnected. Many Modernist 
thinkers contemplated the importance of memory, with Bergson commonly considered to 
be the most important: “For Bergson, memory was all-important as the condition of our 
free will: it is through memory, he argued, that our actions transcend predictable 
mechanical responses to the extent that we bring our accumulated experiences to bear on 
a given situation. Consciousness or ‘duration’, in which the present is swollen with the 
past is the essential feature of our humanity” (Fernihough 69).  
 And, of course, in the same way that Peter mediates Clarissa’s life, Clarissa is 
also the arbiter and reference for Peter. Peter even depends on Clarissa to approve his 
current love-interest. Peter wants Clarissa to acknowledge and endorse his new life, his 
new love, for it is because of Clarissa that Peter has become who he is; it is because of 
her that he has fallen in love once again:  
There they are! he thought. Do what you like with them, 
Clarissa! There they are! And second by second it seemed 
to him that the wife of the Major in the Indian Army (his 
Daisy) and her two small children became more and more 
lovely as Clarissa looked at them; as if he had set light to a 
grey pellet on a plate and there had risen up a lovely tree in 
the brisk sea-salted air of their intimacy (for in some ways 
no one understood him, felt with him, as Clarissa did)—
their exquisite intimacy (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 45-6).  
 
This intimacy between Peter and Clarissa is so decisive that it determines how each feels 
about life and the people in their lives. It is, in fact, because of Clarissa that Peter became 
who he was, that he ended up choosing to marry Daisy at all. 
 This day happens to be Peter’s first day back in London after several years spent 
in India. Back in London to consult with lawyers about divorce and marriage, Peter finds 
himself with several idle hours to pass while waiting for his next appointment. Having 
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visited with Clarissa, he chooses to wander about London, contemplating his life and the 
changes that have taken place in London during his time away. At this moment, Peter 
feels detached, without anchor, as if the usual distractions and concerns have melted 
away, as if his circumstance was completely new, as if he were freed to confront his life 
with a renewed outlook and fresh eyes, the world and its meaning supremely mysterious, 
yet there to be confronted as it truly is: “And just because nobody yet knew he was in 
London, except Clarissa, and the earth, after the voyage, still seemed an island to him, the 
strangeness of standing alone, alive, unknown, at half-past eleven in Trafalgar Square 
overcame him. What is it? Where am I? And why, after all, does one do it?” (Woolf, Mrs. 
Dalloway 52). These are questions without a direct answer, questions that seep into 
anything and everything humans do, part of an undercurrent that sweeps people along, 
always there, belonging to every statement or answer that is given. These questions 
belong to an essential orientation to the world:   
How is understanding possible? […U]nderstanding is not 
just one of the various possible behaviors of the subject but 
the mode of being of Dasein itself. It is in this sense that the 
term ‘hermeneutics’ has been used here. It denotes the 
basic being-in-motion of Dasein that constitutes its finitude, 
and hence embraces the whole of its experience of the 
world. Not caprice, nor even an elaboration of a single 
aspect, but the nature of the thing itself makes the 
movement of understanding comprehensive and universal 
(Gadamer, Truth and Method xxvii). 
 
Gadamer notes that people are oriented to understanding and this orientation is decisive; 
everything one does or thinks depends on one’s understanding of the world, but people 
rarely recognize or confront this orientation; one normally contemplates particulars and 
concrete situations, but rarely questions those factors and elements that contribute to the 
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nature of the situation and one’s understanding of it. Moreover, this novel implies that by 
confronting one’s orientation one might readjust it so that one approaches life with 
clearer vision.   
In Woolf’s novel Peter feels liberated to confront his life with fresh eyes, to ask 
questions that normally remain in the background, to challenge his presuppositions, 
orientation, outlook and horizon, as Gadamer claims is necessary for understanding. Peter 
knows that, in doing so, there is supreme reward. For he knows that his life and its yield 
depends on his participation—its meaning depends on his attitude and approach: “one 
makes up the better part of life” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 54). That life and its meaning 
depends on one’s participation is a common Modernist trope. Life is unique for each and 
every person: there is an “infinite variation in the ways each individual perceives reality” 
(Winks and Neuberger 310). One participates in meaning, and this significance depends 
on one’s past and one’s relationships—all that has determined one’s vocabulary and 
horizon. As a result, Woolf has Peter return to Clarissa so that he might contemplate their 
relationship: it is because of her that he is who he is. Peter accepts that Clarissa is an 
individual, with her own idiosyncracies and unique traits; like everyone else, she is of 
infinite depth and richness. Because she is so particular and special, Peter still wrestles 
with understanding her, defining her, parsing her personality. In Clarissa, Peter notes a 
strange juxtaposition: she is both extremely friendly and open to others, while forever 
withholding her interior, her essence, sedulous of her privacy, unwilling to share 
everything—or, at least, that which is most important. Nevertheless, there is something 
about Clarissa that directly confronts Peter and burrows into his core—perhaps it is her 
private depth: “That was the devilish part of her—this coldness, this woodenness, 
178 
 
something very profound in her, which he had felt again talking to her; an 
impenetrability. Yet heaven knows he loved her. She had some queer power of fiddling 
on one’s nerves, turning one’s nerves to fiddle strings, yes” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 61). 
That Clarissa guards her most profound depths so diligently appeals to Peter; her interior 
and the manner in which she safeguards it represents an alternative for Peter and a 
challenge. 
 Peter cannot and should not dismiss Clarissa. For Peter, Clarissa has a presence 
that is undeniable and exhilarating. She is far from a perfect person, with no special 
talents or skills, yet her very being exudes dignity and humanity. Among people, her 
generosity, humility and acceptance stand out: the world is harsh enough and challenging 
enough already—as an antidote, people should accept each other, embrace each other, 
support each other. Instead of criticizing and analyzing, one might embrace the world for 
all it has to offer: Clarissa had “that extraordinary gift, that woman’s gift, of making a 
world of her own wherever she happened to be. She came into a room; she stood, as he 
had often seen her, in a doorway with lots of people round her. But it was Clarissa one 
remembered. Not that she was striking; not beautiful at all; there was nothing picturesque 
about her; she never said anything specially clever; there she was, however; there she 
was” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 76). For Peter, Clarissa’s presence is enough. In her 
bearing, her appearance, her gestures and looks, Clarissa’s value is undeniable: embedded 
in the world, Clarissa accepts her place and does her best to improve it, all the while 
doing the same for others (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 76).  
 Clarissa remains central to Peter’s narrative, a sequence that remains unfinished 
and continues to unfold. A middle-aged man, Peter finds himself taking stock, assessing 
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everything that has happened in life and everything that might yet happen. Fortunate in 
many ways, Peter has been lucky enough to live a full life, to fall in love, to travel, to 
persevere, to withstand and overcome the vicissitudes of existence. As a young man, 
Peter was passionate, filled with verve and exuberance; he was someone who embraced 
his instincts and impulses. But, in youth, it is hard to fully understand the meaning and 
importance of one’s choices and experiences—one’s context is limited. Grown older, 
Peter accepts that his future may no longer be expansive, but  he also acknowledges that 
his experiences are now more understandable and belong to a wider context—everything 
means more: “The compensation of growing old, Peter Walsh thought, coming out of 
Regent’s Park, and holding his hat in hand, was simply this; that the passions remain as 
strong as ever, but one has gained—at last! The power which adds the supreme flavour to 
existence,—the power of taking hold of experience, of turning it round, slowly, in the 
light” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 79).  The benefits of age and experience emerge in this 
character. With them, he is better prepared to understand the meaning of new 
experiences, their significance understandable within a wider frame of reference; 
furthermore, with experience he knows to discard certain concerns and avoid certain 
distractions, so that the truth of the experience might flower, so that understanding is 
more focused. This aspect of experience is a central concern of Gadamer:   
 The truth of experience always implies an orientation to 
new experience. That is why a person who is called 
experienced has become so not only through experiences 
but is also open to new experiences. The consummation of 
this experience, the perfection that we call ‘being 
experienced,’ does not consist in the fact that someone 
already knows everything and knows better than everyone 
else. Rather, the experienced person proves to be, on the 
contrary, someone who is radically undogmatic; who, 
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because of the many experiences he has had and the 
knowledge he has drawn from them, is particularly well 
equipped to have new experiences and learn from them. 
The dialect of experience has its proper fulfillment not in 
definitive knowledge but in the openness to experience that 
is made possible by experience itself (Gadamer, Truth and 
Method 350).  
 
Peter acknowledges the value of experience; he appreciates that the world is more 
understandable with more context; he embraces the idea that he is more discerning, less 
distracted by the superfluous or the irrelevant. The manner in which the past effects the 
present and its degree of influence were important considerations for the Modernists; the 
background and experiences of each individual shapes meaning and perception. In her 
article, “Consciousness as a Stream”, Fernihough quotes the Modernist novelist Dorothy 
Richardson, who analyzed the personal past and its influence on the present in similar 
terms to that of Bergson: “In actual experience it is more like an agglomeration, a vital 
process of crystallization grouped in and about the human consciousness, confirming and 
enriching individual experience” (69). 
With age, Peter has gained a better sense for life and the meaning of his 
experiences. However, he remains fully aware that life remains mysterious: it is, in fact, 
so compelling because it can never be fully understood. It is incomprehensible, yet there 
are moments of communion and correspondence, moments in which truth asserts itself, 
when its impact cannot be denied: for example, moments of beauty. When Peter 
experiences the beautiful, he is often overwhelmed, feeling, at least in the moment, an 
exhilarating clarity, as if he were given access to the true nature of things. This clarity 
prompts an emotional response: however clear and understandable, however potent, 
Peter’s impressions of things will never fully be understood or communicated. So, when 
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Peter tries to explain to himself why he is prone to uncontrollable bouts of emotion, he 
signals the weight of beauty and understanding, the challenge they present:  
in privacy one may do as one chooses. One might weep if 
no one saw. It had been his undoing—this susceptibility—
in Anglo-Indian society; not weeping at the right time, or 
laughing either. I have that in me, he thought standing by 
the pillar-box, which could now dissolve in tears. Why, 
heaven knows. Beauty of some sort, and the weight of the 
day, which beginning with that visit to Clarissa had 
exhausted him with its heat, its intensity, and the drip, drip, 
of one impression after another down into the cellar where 
they stood, deep, dark, and no one would ever know. Partly 
for that reason, its secrecy, complete and inviolable, he had 
found life like an unknown garden, full of turns and 
corners, surprising, yes; really it took one’s breath away, 
these moments; there coming to him by the pillar-box 
opposite the British museum one of them, a moment, in 
which things came together; this ambulance; and life and 
death (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 152).  
 
For Peter then, life is secretive yet open; in it he encounters something that is identifiably 
there and understandable, yet this identity includes difference and change within itself. 
Gadamer’s philosophical approach can be applied here to Peter’s experience: 
“Hermeneutics has the task of revealing a totality of meanings in all its relations. The 
individuality of the sense intended corresponds to the totality of definitions” (Gadamer, 
Truth and Method 467). 
 Peter had visited Clarissa earlier that day and their meeting had impacted him 
deeply; to see his old friend after several years, to see the woman he had loved, to revisit 
his passion and heartache—all of this affects him to the core. For Peter could not escape 
Clarissa’s influence: despite their sharp edge, his encounters with Clarissa were 
consistently fruitful; although she might challenge him, her particular manner of being 
would always provoke Peter, push him to expand his world:  
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Brief, broken, often painful as their actual meetings had 
been what with his absences and interruptions […] the 
effect of them on his life was immeasurable. There was a 
mystery about it. You were given a sharp, acute, 
uncomfortable grain—the actual meeting; horribly painful 
as often as not; yet in absence, in the most unlikely places, 
it would flower out, open, shed its scent, let you touch, 
taste, look about you, get the whole feel of it and 
understanding, after years of lying lost. Thus she had come 
to him; on board ship, in the Himalayas; suggested by the 
oddest things […]. She had influenced him more than any 
person he had ever known (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 153).  
 
Their relationship is so intense, their encounters so powerful, that Clarissa remains in 
Peter’s mind even when she is not there. There is something about Clarissa that provokes 
Peter; her outlook, her words, and her very bearing demand an explanation; something 
about her may provide an answer; their conversations comprehend their situation, who 
they are; because of their conversations the world is understood more completely. In 
point of fact, this is the nature of dialogue and conversation; by way of the other, one’s 
vision becomes clearer: “Self-understanding always occurs through understanding 
something other than the self, and includes the unity and integrity of the other” 
(Gadamer, Truth and Method 83). 
 This self-reflective, productive element of dialogue is illustrated when Peter 
contemplates attending Clarissa’s party: Peter braces himself for the gathering, fully 
aware that he will undergo, once again, one of these painful yet exhilarating encounters 
with Clarissa. He is also mindful that he will be among scores of people, at a party, an 
environment in which individuals come together to celebrate togetherness and 
community. Peter is not a naturally social person, but he recognizes that parties have their 
value and worth. A light and mirthful event, one in which people have no obligations and 
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feel no pressure, people might alight on topics that would not otherwise be approached; 
furthermore, it is a chance for people to meet who would not meet otherwise: a party’s 
value is often surprising and unexpected; it is common to be inspired by this mixing, this 
jumbling together of personalities and differences. Frequently, one does not even know 
what one knows nor does one even make an effort to overcome mystery until enlightened 
or provoked by the right person: “For this is the truth about our soul, he thought, our self, 
who fish-like inhabits deeps seas and plies among obscurities threading her way between 
the boles of giant weeds, over sun-flickered spaces and on and on into the surface and 
sports on the wind-wrinkled waves; that is, has a positive need to brush, scrape, kindle 
herself, gossiping” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 161). There is something about meeting 
different personalities and individuals that pushes one to go in entirely new and different 
directions; one feels the need to account for the other person and in doing so acquires a 
better sense for who one is; one also feels provoked to assert one’s particular stance, to 
compare and contrast, to test one’s horizon. 
 Peter recognizes the appeal of parties and he intuits that this party will matter, that 
he will have an experience. It is not just the possibility of seeing Clarissa that compels 
Peter, he also anticipates that he will experience beauty; but not just beauty, life in its 
entirety: people, space, eccentricities, sounds, all combining somehow, in harmony 
somehow, related somehow. All of it is significant, yet Peter also knows that this 
significance is incomplete—there, interesting, real, meaningful but forever questionable:  
It was not beauty pure and simple—Bedford place leading 
into Russell Square. It was straightness and emptiness of 
course; the symmetry of a corridor; but it was also windows 
lit up, a piano, a gramophone sounding; a sense of pleasure-
making hidden, but now and again emerging when, through 
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the uncurtained window, the window left open, one saw 
parties sitting over tables, young people slowly circling, 
conversations between men and women, maids idly looking 
out (a strange comment theirs, when work was done), 
stockings drying on top ledges, a parrot, a few plants. 
Absorbing, mysterious, of infinite richness, this life 
(Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 163).  
 
Peter wrestles with these contrasting impressions of life, aims to balance them: life is 
meaningful, harmonious, and symmetrical, yet within this order there is variability and 
difference; the understood itself branches into questions. 
 Like Clarissa, Peter contemplates the depth of life—its meaning and its mystery. 
He knows that there are no final answers but still believes that life is worth exploring and 
interrogating, that it might be more understandable if he participates in its meaning. But 
Peter is less tolerant than Clarissa, more exacting. As an emblem of his personality, Peter 
consistently brandishes his pocket knife and fiddles with it: “What an extraordinary habit 
that was, Clarissa thought; always playing with a knife. Always making one feel, too, 
frivolous; empty-minded; a mere silly chatterbox as he used” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 44). 
As this habit would suggest, for Peter all of life’s intricacies are worth exploring and this 
effort should be precisely executed; one should confront life’s challenges with open eyes 
and controlled movements; one should be unrelenting and focused.  
At times Peter can irritate Clarissa. He demands too much, needs too much. 
Despite his imperfections, Clarissa almost chose to marry Peter; she still wonders, even, 
if maybe she should have married him. As she weighs the positives and negatives of her 
life-decisions, Clarissa generally concludes that she was right to marry Richard instead of 
Peter. With Peter, she might have been happy but she almost might have been cowed by 
the more flinty elements of his personality—his exactingness, his demands. With 
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Richard, however, Clarissa feels that her life has turned out much smoother, easier, less 
dramatic; perhaps she might not experience as many moments of bliss as with Peter, but 
she also may have avoided innumerable moments of despair and frustration. For Richard 
encourages Clarissa to be herself, to do as she pleases, and to think as she chooses; he 
accepts her as she is, someone who prefers privacy, someone who recognizes that some 
things cannot or should not be shared: “And there is a dignity in people; a solitude; even 
between husband and wife a gulf; and that one must respect, thought Clarissa, watching 
him open the door; for one would not part with it oneself, or take it, against his will, from 
one’s husband, without losing one’s independence, one’s self-respect—something, after 
all, priceless” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 120). Although Peter might be essential to 
Clarissa’s world and her horizon, his and Clarissa’s interaction is not entirely positive; he 
might expand Clarissa’s world, but, to a certain extent, he also distorts it. For his part, 
Richard might not inspire Clarissa to the same degree, but he is also more accepting and 
encouraging.  
 Certainly, Richard does respect and understand Clarissa’s need for privacy, but it 
is also true that he, like Peter, does not entirely understand Clarissa’s motivation for 
throwing parties. In the case of Richard, he worries about Clarissa’s health, the toll the 
parties take, and, in Peter’s case, he thinks that she cares more about rank and status, that 
she hosts parties to promote Richard’s station and, by proxy, Clarissa’s. This criticism 
rankles Clarissa and she feels the need to defend herself. She searches herself, attempting 
to understand why, exactly, she feels compelled to throw parties. First, she tells herself: 
“What she liked was simply life” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 121). Then she elaborates: 
“They’re an offering” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 121). Now, Clarissa equates parties with 
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life because these get-togethers represent a chance for people to share and communicate, 
to simply be among one another. When people gather, no one can anticipate the outcome. 
She throws parties as an offering to her friends and acquaintances, a gift to life itself, so 
that all might experience an increase in being. At a party, each attendee has an 
opportunity to renew or develop his or her bond with others, so that the world might be 
more understandable, so that each might feel more at peace:  
But to go deeper, beneath what people said (and these 
judgments, how superficial, how fragmentary they are!) in 
her own mind now, what did it mean to her, this thing she 
called life? Oh, it was very queer. Here was So-and-so in 
South Kensington; some one up in Bayswater; and 
somebody else, say, in Mayfair. And she felt quite 
continuously a sense of their existence; and she felt what a 
waste; and she felt what a pity; and she felt if only they 
could be brought together; so she did it. And it was an 
offering; to combine, to create; but to whom? (Woolf, Mrs. 
Dalloway 122).  
 
Woolf portrays Clarissa as a character with an acute sense for the essential dignity of her 
fellow beings. She recognizes that each has a special value, has something to offer. But 
Clarissa’s friends and acquaintances are all submerged in his or her life, his or her world, 
working, eating, moving forward; and it is not easy to rouse oneself, to take time to 
connect, to visit with one’s friends, to do something different, to break with routine. 
Clarissa feels moved to do her part to battle complacency by giving parties; in doing so 
she might spark her friends to go further, to connect with strangers or long-lost-friends, to 
consider what is or might be, to grow and evolve.  
 Clarissa feels the need to bring people together, to combine, to create; but what 
exactly is she creating? She is building a venue, an arena for people to learn from one 
another. Of course, people do not go to a party with the express intent of learning, but it 
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is an implied aspect of all conversation. At a party, people very often feel liberated, freed 
to discuss topics that might not be considered otherwise, compelled to flit around, test 
and wonder. Frequently people wear special clothing to parties and find themselves in 
unusual situations with unusual people; such events are an escape from the routine and 
the mundane: “Every time she gave a party she had this feeling of being something not 
herself, and that every one was unreal in one way; much more real in another. It was, she 
thought, partly their clothes, partly being taken out of their ordinary ways, partly the 
background, it was possible to say things you couldn’t say anyhow else, things that 
needed an effort; possible to go much deeper” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 171). Liberated 
from one’s daily routine, now in a situation where one might discuss questions that 
normally do not seem relevant, unexpected topics suddenly become important—at a new 
setting, with different people, the world suddenly seems different—and one feels the need 
to confront this difference.  
 Clarissa brings people together because each individual contains within him or 
her an infinite depth, a unique perspective that never becomes depleted. And when people 
share each becomes more. But even as one becomes more, one never entirely gains a firm 
handle on meaning; no matter how much one knows, there is something about the 
moment that destabilizes and unsettles; one’s perception necessarily includes meaning, 
cannot help but find meaning, but this meaning does not blot out mystery; difference will 
never be entirely overcome—the world is always in motion, people always inscrutable: 
“that’s the miracle, that’s the mystery; that old lady, she meant, whom she could see 
going from chest of drawers to dressing-table. She could still see her. And the supreme 
mystery […] was simply this: here was one room; there another. Did religion solve that, 
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or love?” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 127). No matter how much one understands or knows, 
one’s concerns and circumstances determine meaning; something is understood, but the 
thing itself resists mastery, its implications infinite, belonging to the perception itself: “Is 
the given not in fact the result of an interpretation? It is interpretation that performs the 
never fully complete mediation between man and world, and to this extent the fact that 
we understand something as something is the sole actual immediacy and givenness” 
(Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation” 30). One inherits a world and it is based on this 
inheritance that one slowly adapts to its nature; it is up to each person to participate in its 
meaning and to nurture an understanding that recognizes the challenge and opportunity 
that one faces; if one embraces the opportunity then one might live in a world that 
inspires and vibrates with potential, the possibility of unity right there, within one’s 
















TO THE LIGHTHOUSE 
 
The story of the Ramsay family on vacation at their summer home and their 
houseguests, To the Lighthouse explores the sometimes-porous, sometimes-
insurmountable borders that exist between individuals, the difference and affinity that 
represents both a challenge and an opportunity for understanding and growth. For in these 
characters we encounter individuals who are drawn to share their lives in community; 
who, despite their need to share, maintain their uniqueness, aware that their particular 
stake in the world is of special value. Each has his or her or own particular story and 
special way of seeing and understanding; when together, though, each becomes more; in 
sharing the world each might refine his or her viewpoint and discard his or her 
idiosyncrasies, those unexamined assumptions that inhibit understanding; furthermore, in 
sharing one might confirm and reinforce those assumptions—one’s very horizon—that 
promote truth and understanding. The principle characters of this novel are Lilly Briscoe, 
an amateur painter and houseguest of the family, and the matriarch and patriarch of the 
family, Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay, the father and mother of eight children, a philosopher and 
his generous-hearted, socially-attuned wife. Lilly, for her part, is infatuated with this 
family and all that it represents—in particular, she is obsessed with Mrs. Ramsay—her 
beauty, her instincts, her general way of being. In Lilly’s mind, Mrs. Ramsay is a clue in 
her effort to understand, a central piece in the puzzle of meaning. As a central component 
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in her effort to interpret, Lilly paints a portrait of Mrs. Ramsay as she reads to her son 
James: her aim is to represent in pictorial form the balance and unity within the family, a 
harmony that exists because its members directly confront and account for their 
differences. In producing her painting, Lilly’s goal is to impose a form and structure on 
her understanding of this family and the world. In her attempt to paint, Lilly necessarily 
engages her perceptions and her sense of meaning; the painting only means anything as it 
relates to this family and the world, a collection of individuals who are willing to face the 
world with open eyes and participate in its creation. In particular, in Mr. and Mrs. 
Ramsay we encounter two characters who emphasize participation, who recognize the 
value of effort and engagement. A philosopher, Mr. Ramsay directly confronts the nature 
of reality and the meaningfulness of the world—he is someone who attempts to identify 
the mechanisms of each individual’s interaction with the world and the implications 
therein. For her part, Mrs. Ramsay possesses a highly refined social instinct: she stresses 
the importance and value of one’s interpersonal relationships—by way of these 
relationships one might approach a more refined notion of truth and understanding. 
 Undoubtedly, Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay are individuals with their own particular 
characteristics and interests. In the case of Mrs. Ramsay, she privileges those experiences 
where she connects and interacts with others. In this connection, and in this interaction, 
truth and improved understanding become more accessible: “Understanding or its failure 
is like an event that happens to us. Thus we can say that something was a good 
conversation or that it was ill-fated. All this shows that a conversation has a spirit of its 
own, and that the language in which it is conducted bears its own truth within it—i.e., 
that it allows something to ‘emerge’ which henceforth exists” (Gadamer, Truth and 
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Method 385). In this instance, neither member of the interaction knows what it will yield, 
but that it will produce something valuable is the important point. As for Mr. Ramsay, his 
personality prefers isolation, concentration and interrogation. His aim is to understand the 
world for what it is, to abstract those factors and elements that belong to perception and 
meaning. This, of course, is central to his vocation—he is willing to plumb the depths, to 
question and consider; he might not reach a final answer, but in the effort he might 
contribute to improved understanding. Though Mr. Ramsay chooses to shoulder this 
burden, this responsibility belongs to everyone: 
It is the world itself which is communicatively experienced 
and continuously entrusted (Traditur) to us as an infinitely 
open task. It is never the world as it was on its first day but 
as it has come down to us. Always present when we 
experience something, when unfamiliarity is overcome, 
where enlightenment, insight, and appropriation succeed, 
the hermeneutic process takes place in bringing something 
into words and into the common consciousness” (Gadamer, 
“Reflections on My Philosophical Journey” 29).  
 
 Indeed, Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay are central to the meaning of this novel. In the 
character of each and in the way that they mesh, one gleans that each depends on the 
other and the world becomes more understandable as a result of the other. But not all 
critics agree with this stance. For example, A.O. Frank argues that the two occupy a 
“basically binary scheme” (24). She contends that, on one end, lies Mr. Ramsay, aligned 
with professional philosophy, and, on the other, is Mrs. Ramsay, aligned with social 
instinct and creativity. To Frank, this binary is related to “the question of truth” (27). 
Frank goes on to flesh out her position: “The opposing claims come from professional 
philosophy on the one hand, and some at least quasi-artistic type of knowledge on the 
other. Thus it is Woolf who sets up an opposition between philosophy and art, dropping 
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early hints that truth dwells in the latter and not the former, but this refers to one 
particular type of philosophy only” (27). In this case, the kind of philosophy Frank is 
referencing has to do with the type of philosophy that presents the world as an object and 
one reaches the truth of the object by way of method, a circumstance in which the subject 
discounts his or her role in the interpretation, so convinced of his or her sovereign 
subjectivity that he or she believes it can be entirely accounted for and included in one’s 
understanding. But the reader does not know the specifics of Mr. Ramsay’s philosophical 
stance. Sure, Mr. Ramsay may practice a type of philosophical thought that clashes with 
art, the social, and the personal, but that does not mean that he is completely alienated 
from truth or interpersonal fulfillment. Just because he is wrong in some ways, does not 
mean that he is wrong in all ways. That he is willing at all to question and probe the 
transaction between human being and the world is commendable and of value. Mrs. 
Ramsay loves and appreciates Mr. Ramsay for this particular characteristic, and Mr. 
Ramsay has the same feeling about his wife and her particular approach to life. Frank 
goes on to consider the philosophical implications of this binary and how they manifest 
themselves in the novel: “What we can know, how we know it and what are the 
conditions under which we live and know are the concern [of To the Lighthouse]. 
[…T]he question of knowledge is tied in with the question regarding the structure of the 
world or reality” (33). In this instance, I do not disagree with Frank, but I would argue 
that her binary scheme distorts and undermines the manner in which the novel enacts 
these considerations. To my mind, the entire novel hinges on the harmony and 
resonance—the accommodation of identity and difference—that takes place as the couple 
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interacts; the world is more understandable and meaningful as the result of this 
interaction.  
Divided into a tripartite structure, the action of this novel takes place within the 
space of two days, each divided by an interlude of ten years. During the first day, the 
family prepares to visit the lighthouse. This potential journey is important to the 
Ramsays’ son James; only six years old, it represents an excursion into the possible, into 
the unknown, the light house right there, but still in the distance. For James, his very 
perception is filtered through his anticipation—whether or not they will go to the 
lighthouse. But they never reach the lighthouse, the weather prohibitive. Other events 
take place also: Mrs. Ramsay reads to her son James while Lilly paints a picture of the 
scene, and everyone gathers around the dinner table to share a meal. Then the day ends, 
and ten years pass. In this section, titled “Time Passes”, the impersonality, power and 
savagery of time is highlighted; several members of the Ramsay family do not survive: 
Mrs. Ramsay, Prue (giving birth), and Andrew (in the war). Then, in the final section, the 
family and several of the same houseguests return to the vacation home, a place that 
reminds them of their loss, a place where they might heal, a means of resolving the past 
with the present. Furthermore, Mr. Ramsay and two of his children, his son James and his 
daughter Cam, decide to, at last, visit the lighthouse. In its structure, the first section (that 
day in which Lilly begins her painting, everyone shares a meal, and the trip to the 
lighthouse is still a possibility) frames the final section, another day ten years later, one 
that is very different because Mrs. Ramsay is no longer alive, nor James, nor Prue. On 
this day Lilly Briscoe finishes her painting and reaches resolution; Mr. Ramsay and 
James also reach their goal—they successfully land at the lighthouse.  
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 These central characters attain resolution within the framework of time; so too 
their actions and thoughts take place within a world that is historically conditioned. 
Generally considered to be a high watermark of Modernism, To the Lighthouse directly 
addresses and reflects the concerns of its time and place (early twentieth Century 
Europe). Though it plays a mostly peripheral role, World War I is the historical event that 
is most decisive for understanding the context of this novel, as it was a symptom of larger 
historical, and societal conditions. For Hussey, in fact, Woolf’s work is an attempt to 
expose the links between the personal and society at large: “all Woolf’s work is deeply 
concerned with war; that it helps redefine our understanding of the nature of war; and that 
from her earliest to her final work she sought to explore and make clear the connections 
between private and public violence, between the domestic and the civic effects of 
patriarchal society, between male supremacy and the absence of peace, and between 
ethics and aesthetics” (“Living in a War Zone” 3). Overall, it is Woolf’s aim to subvert 
the dominant paradigm of univocal objectivity and progress that led to war in the first 
place. For, in war, there is a deliberate elision of human dignity and value; people are 
seen as tools and instruments; the depth and significance of each individual is discounted. 
In her novels and, in particular, To the Lighthouse, Woolf succeeds in highlighting the 
supreme worth of each individual—the individual’s unique and valuable purchase on the 
world. Furthermore, she suggests that it is through interacting and engaging with others 
that the world becomes more understandable and meaningful; that shared experience is an 
avenue to truth, that truth itself is a matter of engagement with the world and each other. 
So, it is Woolf’s contention that every individual is unique and particular and this 
uniqueness is of special importance; through the combination of different individuals and 
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personalities one might gain insight and the world might be more understandable. 
According to Matthews and Platt, To the Lighthouse emphasizes the “differing senses of 
reality experienced by the characters” (570).   Yes, this novel trumpets the potential and 
value contained within each person, an interpretive opportunity that is in direct 
opposition with the objectivity necessary for science and technology: “Inner domains 
modernism explores could sustain values and desires imperiled by the ‘progress’ of 
modernity and the recent war, obviously restoring, in particular, depth and significance to 
a sense of self much imperiled in a new machine age” (Stevenson 154). In each character, 
one does notice depth and significance, in each a sense of meaning that is variable and in 
movement as they combine and interact.  
 One such character is Lilly Briscoe, someone who is committed to understanding 
and truth. Toward this end, Lilly chooses to paint. Lilly’s vocation as a painter also 
belongs to a larger historical context. At the time, art and painting were in the midst of a 
revolution: “Although there were many trends within this revolution, in painting and 
sculpture it generally meant a shift from an art that reflected the natural world to one 
rooted in the artist’s inner vision, from an art based on representational or naturalistic 
images to one devoted to nonrepresentational or nonobjective forms, and from an art 
focused on content to one dedicated to the process of creation itself” (Matthews and Platt 
542). Certainly, in her painting Lilly aims to represent her inner vision and she does so in 
a way that is nonrepresentational. For its part, Lilly’s painting is an attempt to transfer 
into visual form her understanding of this family, this place, this moment—all as they 
relate to her understanding of the world, her very perceptions. In particular, Lilly fixates 
on Mrs. Ramsay. As Lilly attempts to finish her painting, she is inundated with emotion 
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and feeling; Mrs. Ramsay’s absence a spur, Lilly aims to comprehend her friend—her 
importance, her weight, her value. In many ways this painting is a tribute to Mrs. 
Ramsay. Mrs. Ramsay is so important to Lilly because her very presence and personality 
prompted Lilly to understand more and differently, to see the world with improved 
clarity; Lilly senses something very truthful about Mrs. Ramsay in the way she interacts 
with the world and those around her. For example, as Lilly attempts to complete her 
painting, she recalls a particular scene in which she, Mrs. Ramsay and Charles Tansley 
share an experience on the beach, a scene of unity and connection. Charles Tansley, for 
his part, is a difficult person who has endured a difficult life. So, as Lilly tries to paint, 
she recalls this particular moment on the beach, when she and Charles played together, 
skipping stones on the water, and Mrs. Ramsay watched them and wrote letters. Because 
Lilly and Charles were fond of Mrs. Ramsay, they were able to overcome their 
differences and share a moment that stayed in her memory, an instant when life seemed 
good and honest. To Lilly, it was as if the presence of Mrs. Ramsay had united Charles 
and herself, as if her presence made the world less complicated. To Lilly, this 
recollection, and the role played by Mrs. Ramsay, might be compared to a work of art:  
That woman sitting there writing under the rock resolved 
everything into simplicity; made these angers, irritations 
fall off like old rags; she brought together this and that and 
then this, and so made out of that miserable silliness and 
spite (she and Charles squabbling, sparring, had been silly 
and spiteful) something—this scene on the beach, for 
example, this moment of friendship and liking—which 
survived, after all these years complete, so that she dipped 
into it to re-fashion her memory of him, and there it stayed 
in the mind affecting one almost like a work of art (Woolf, 




Lilly equates this particular scene on the beach, this memory of her and Charles, with a 
work of art—and this comparison is vital. A work of art is something essential, 
something illuminating. It is deep and unfathomable. It is a means of insight. It is 
coherent, complete and entire, yet provocative. This moment and memory is like a work 
of art because in it there is a clue to understanding, insight and meaning. According to 
Gadamer, art is an essential means of self-confrontation, an opportunity to see in new and 
different ways: 
Language signifies memory. Mnemosyne is, however, the 
mother of all the muses and so the patron of art. Art—
whether picture, word, sound, song, or whatever its origin 
was or its present social function may be—means, in the 
final analysis, a way of confronting ourselves in which we 
become mindful of ourselves. In word as in picture, in 
petroglyph as in the song, and still in the refined and 
mediated forms of later literature, the world as a whole—
the whole of our world experience—has become present. 
And even the most silent forms of modern painting, which 
radiate a brooding silence, evoke in us the ‘you are that.’ 
Such an experience of the whole, in which we confront 
ourselves, occurs through the continual new-awakening of 
the echoing of art. In this lies the actual distinguishing 
characteristic of humans (Hans-Georg Gadamer on 
Education, Poetry, and History 90).  
 
Somehow, she and Charles were able to enjoy each other’s company on that day; 
something about that day and their interaction is exhilarating and meaningful, so much so 
that it is compared to a work of art. Despite their differences, despite their antagonism 
and antipathies, Lilly and Charles were able to connect, enjoy—this day, and the 
antipathy overcome, is of special value to Lilly. For once they were able to enjoy each 
other’s company: people can find common ground after all. Mrs. Ramsay played a vital 
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role: her presence and its significance united them. They were able to enjoy the day, 
share, learn, and grow, all because of Mrs. Ramsay.  
 Now, these thoughts occur to Lilly as she herself is painting, as she remembers 
Mrs. Ramsay, as she tries to understand why this woman is so important—how her 
absence is such an important presence. Mrs. Ramsay is gone, but her legacy remains 
strong, hovering over Lilly and the Ramsay family, as ubiquitous as oxygen. Someone 
who had an acute sense for the value of each individual, someone who recognized that 
people have much to offer, Mrs. Ramsay promoted tolerance, generosity, openness: 
people should be accepted as they are—it is worthwhile to share with each other, talk 
with each other—much can be gleaned. It is this stance, this attitude that Lilly 
particularly appreciates as she remembers Mrs. Ramsay and that specific memory of 
them on the beach: life should be enjoyed, appreciated—all one can do is what one can; 
to try, to accept mystery and challenge but still take the necessary step and leap forward. 
When Lilly remembers Mrs. Ramsay and her ability to resolve difference into 
acceptance, she compares this memory to a work of art and this thought leads Lilly into 
an even more general consideration: what is the meaning of life? With Mrs. Ramsay’s 
absence so present, with this recollection of her and Charles in harmony despite their 
antagonisms, with this painting in front of her, Lilly is drawn towards this most general 
of all questions. It is a relevant question as she paints, as she considers the subject matter 
and how to express it visually. It is an applicable query as she tries to pin down Mrs. 
Ramsay, as she strives to understand who this woman was and why she means so much:  
What is the meaning of life? That was all—a simple 
question; one that tended to close in on one with years. The 
great revelation had never come. The great revelation 
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perhaps never did come. Instead there were daily little 
miracles, illuminations, matches struck unexpectedly in the 
dark; here was one. This, that, and the other; herself and 
Charles Tansley and the breaking wave; Mrs. Ramsay 
bringing them together; Mrs. Ramsay saying, ‘Life stand 
still here’; Mrs. Ramsay making of the moment something 
permanent (as in another sphere Lilly herself tried to make 
of the moment something permanent)—this was of the 
nature of a revelation. In the midst of chaos there was 
shape; this eternal passing and flowing (she looked at the 
clouds going and the leaves shaking) was struck into 
stability (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 161).   
 
Simply put, there is no final answer to Lilly’s question, as each variant plays off each 
other, leading to further considerations, more caveats, more explanations, mystery 
surging forth as more is said. Yet there are moments when life seems understandable, 
when there is harmony and balance, when the different components fit the one with the 
other. In this instance, Lilly points toward shared experience as an essential clue: this 
scene on the beach when she felt at harmony with Charles Tansley and Mrs. Ramsay; that 
Mrs. Ramsay was able to resolve Lilly and Charles’ differences, that her presence could 
be so impactful and powerful. To Lilly, there was something about Mrs. Ramsay that 
simplified the world; Mrs. Ramsay was cognizant of the value and meaning and 
opportunity of just such a moment—that a simple day and a simple activity such as 
relaxing on the beach could be so impactful; perhaps the inescapable mystery and eternal 
flux of existence includes understanding within itself, an access point, one that derives 
from shared experience and personal connection: “The nature of the hermeneutical 
experience is not that something is outside and desires admission. Rather, we are 
possessed by something and precisely by means of it we are opened up for the new, the 
different, the true” (Gadamer, “The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem” 9). 
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People are oriented to understanding and this orientation is decisive for all interaction: 
truth emerges as something unexpected; identity and difference blend together.  
 As Lilly attempts to paint her portrait of Mrs. Ramsay and James, she considers 
the Ramsay family and their friends. In many ways, this painting frames the entire novel. 
This novel is about the space between people, how this space is crucial to the nature of 
understanding and meaning: this painting comprehends these considerations also. So, as 
Lilly attempts to finish her painting, she does so with Mrs. Ramsay in mind, with 
meaning in mind. There is something in Lilly that recognizes the importance and value of 
these people and their interconnectedness: each is different, yet each is more because of 
their interactions, their undeniable connection. Lilly acknowledges that this connection is 
a source of understanding and fulfillment. It is her aim to mine this connection and 
present it in her artwork, to present it so that it is seen for what it is. This, according to 
Gadamer, is one of the primary functions of art: “In it we can see without any doubt that 
a picture is not a copy of a copied being, but is in ontological communion with what is 
copied. It is clear from this example that art, as a whole and in a universal sense, 
increases the picturability of being. Word and image are not mere imitative illustrations 
but allow what they present to be for the first time fully what it is” (Truth and Method 
137). Lilly senses that within this family there is a feeling of completeness and it is this 
unity that she aims to represent in pictorial form: “She seemed to be standing up to her 
lips in some substance, to move and float and sink in it, yes, for these waters were 
unfathomably deep. Into them had spilled so many lives. The Ramsays’; the childrens’; 
and all sorts of waifs and strays of things besides. A washer-woman with her basket; a 
rook; a red-hot poker; the purples and grey-greens of flowers: some common feeling held 
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the whole” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 192). This family represents a model of love and 
feeling, of undeniable connection. Each makes an effort and does so in a way that 
acknowledges the provisionality of this effort; although one might misstep, each can rely 
on the knowledge that there below lies a safety net of affection and support; one might be 
uncertain, but not about these feelings: here is verification and corroboration, a sense that 
all uncertainty is shared, the world itself meaningful and uncertain all at once.  
 For it is this feeling of connection, of shared experience, that attracts Lilly. She 
recognizes that love and family and togetherness promote a sense of completeness: “It 
was some such feeling of completeness perhaps which, ten years ago, standing almost 
where she stood now, had made her say that she must be in love with the place” (Woolf, 
To the Lighthouse 192). It is this feeling of coherence and unity that Lilly aims to 
represent in her painting: “And as she dipped into the blue paint, she dipped too in the 
past there” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 172). It is, of course, a nearly impossible task to 
represent this family—and Lilly’s feeling about them—in her painting. But Lilly does 
have an idea of what she is trying to accomplish. She is attempting to represent 
completeness, harmony and balance. Also, too, the primary subject matter of her painting 
is Mrs. Ramsay as she reads to her son James. But Lilly does not attempt to represent 
mother and son realistically, instead she focuses on line and color—how they signify and 
represent balance. When Lilly explains to Mr. Bankes her artistic decisions, we get a 
better sense for her mission: “It was Mrs. Ramsay reading to James, she said. She knew 
his objection—that no one could tell it for a human shape. But she had made no attempt 
at likeness, she said. For what reason had she introduced them then? he asked. Why 
indeed?—except that if there, in that corner, it was bright, here, in this, she felt the need 
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of darkness” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 52). As Lilly engages with her painting she 
engages with balance and harmony: an order and unity that Lilly is drawn to and strives 
towards. For this reason Lilly chooses to paint: to engage her perception of the world and 
its meaningfulness. In transforming her perceptions into a meaningful structure, they 
might become more understandable and truthful: “Thus the concept of transformation 
characterizes the independent and superior mode of being of what we called structure. 
From this viewpoint ‘reality’ is defined as what is untransformed, and art as the raising 
up (Aufhebung) of this reality into its truth” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 112).Yes, by 
means of her painting, Lilly’s perceptions are transformed into a meaningful structure 
and this structure comprehends unity and order: “art is present whenever a work succeeds 
in elevating what it is or represents to a new configuration, a new world of its own in 
miniature, a new order of unity in tension” (Gadamer, “Art and Imitation” 103). In point 
of fact, this emphasis on the meaningfulness of art and its ability to order the world and 
one’s understanding of it constitutes an important attribute of Modernism as it responded 
to the trends of its time. At the time, there was a prevailing “mood of uncertainty 
produced by […] the outbreak of World War I” (Fiero, 6: 30). With this uncertainty in 
mind, art was seen as an especially vital means of ordering and understanding the world: 
“Modernism is viewed as a kind of aesthetic heroism, which in the face of the chaos of 
the modern world (very much a ‘fallen’ world) sees art as the only dependable reality and 
as an ordering principle of a quasi-religious kind. The unity of art is supposedly a 
salvation from the shattered order of modern reality” (Eysteinsson 9). 
Now, Lilly does not finish her painting during the first section of the novel, the 
first day, but it remains in her mind during the ten years that divide the novel. There is 
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something about the painting that is so essential, so important and meaningful, that it 
stays with her as she participates in her day-to-day existence, jostling her, still a matter to 
be resolved:  
There was something (she stood screwing up her little 
Chinese eyes in her small puckered face), something she 
remembered in the relation of those lines cutting across, 
slicing down, and in the mass of the hedge with its green 
cave of blues and browns, which had stayed in her mind; 
which had tied a knot in her mind so that at odds and ends 
of time, involuntarily, as she walked along the Brampton 
road, as she brushed her hair, she found herself painting 
that picture, passing her eye over it, and untying the knot in 
her imagination. But there was all the difference in the 
world between this planning airily away from the canvas, 
and actually taking her brush and making the first mark 
(Woolf, To the Lighthouse 157).  
 
By means of this painting, Lilly might understand herself, how her personal narrative 
might be unified; she might approach coherence and continuity: 
Self-understanding always occurs through understanding 
something other than the self, and includes the unity and 
integrity of the other. Since we meet the artwork in the 
world and encounter a world in the individual artwork, the 
work of art is not some alien universe in which we are 
magically transported for a time. Rather, we learn to 
understand ourselves in and through it, and this means that 
we sublate (aufheben) the discontinuity and atomism of 
isolated experiences in the continuity of our own existence 
(Gadamer, Truth and Method 83). 
 
This painting, though, is a challenge that is rather indefinable, no true way to 
know when the painting has really been completed, when this knot has truly been untied. 
Nevertheless, Lilly is unwilling to ignore the mystery and uncertainty, the challenge of 
the painting; it is there, it remains, and no one but Lilly will finish it. It is her 
responsibility. In completing her painting, Lilly has the feeling that she will approach 
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greater understanding, that she and the world will be closer together. This, according to 
Gadamer, is one of the primary functions of art—to recognize the world for what it is: 
When I recognize someone or something, what I see is 
freed from the contingency of this or that moment of time. 
It is part of the process of recognition that we see things in 
terms of what is permanent and essential in them, 
unencumbered by the contingent circumstances in which 
they were seen before and are seen again. This is what 
constitutes recognition and contributes to the joy we take in 
imitation. For what imitation reveals is precisely the real 
essence of the thing” (“Art and Imitation” 99).  
 
This painting represents a challenge to be confronted, one that is part of Lilly’s very 
marrow, her essence, one that relates to any and all of her activities. But now, when it is 
time to finish, Lilly also recognizes the high stakes, the practical realities. For one might 
have a general sense of what needs to be done, but when it comes time to do the actual 
painting, the practicalities become overwhelming; there are so many possibilities; in the 
doing, though, the limitations become more noticeable too. Lilly cannot instantaneously 
change who she is: she already has a style, a way of being, which determines what 
appears on the canvas. It is Lilly’s task to fully harness the positives of her style and 
personality, to use them to her advantage—instead of obstacles, aids. All Lilly can do is 
make the leap, participate:  
For a moment it stayed trembling in a painful but exciting 
ecstasy in the air. Where to begin?—that was the question 
at what point to make the first mark? One line placed on the 
canvas committed her to innumerable risks, to frequent and 
irrevocable decisions. All that in idea seemed simple 
became in practice immediately complex; as the waves 
shape themselves symmetrically from the cliff top, but to 
the swimmer among them are divided by steep gulfs, and 
foaming crests. Still the risk must be run; the mark made 




Lilly is fully aware that each decision, each brushstroke changes the nature of the entire 
picture, that possibility becomes something else as she paints, that the success of her 
painting requires her to respond and react, to revise and amend as she moves forward. In 
this effort, of course, there is a distinct parallel between the sense of possibility inherent 
in both art and life: there are nothing but decisions and actions and, once done, there is no 
turning back. At this point all one can do is incorporate and account for these decisions 
and move forward, to do so in a way that unifies. In all cases, there is no escaping one’s 
situation and circumstance, yet within each person there is a sense of limitless 
possibility—art is a means of engaging this tension: 
Amidst the variety of art, this same message of the whole 
addresses us over and over again. Indeed, this seems to 
provide a more precise answer concerning the significance 
of art and beauty. This means that in any encounter with 
art, it is not the particular, but rather the totality of the 
experienceable world, man’s ontological place in it, and 
above all his finitude before that which transcends him, that 
is brought to experience (Gadamer, The Relevance of the 
Beautiful 32-3). 
 
In participating in art one is attempting to identify and share in generalities and 
universalities: everyone perceives and this perception is meaningful; by means of 
participation in art one might resolve and unify and share in what one sees. It is an effort 
to discover essence, to achieve balance and unity, to represent the world for what it is: 
“The concept of imitation can be used to describe the play of art only if one keeps in 
mind the cognitive import of imitation. The thing presented is there (Das Dargestellte ist 
da). That is the situation basic to imitation. When a person imitates something, he allows 
what he knows to exist and to exist in the way that he knows it” (Gadamer, Truth and 
Method 113). This is Lilly’s aim, to represent the world in a way that reveals its 
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underlying structure, those shared experiences of perception that undergird the meaning 
of the world:  
She took up once more her old painting position with the 
dim eyes and the absent-minded manner, subduing all her 
impressions as a woman to something much more general; 
becoming once more under the power of that vision which 
she had seen so clearly once and must now grope for 
among hedges and houses and mothers and children—her 
picture. It was a question, she remembered, how to connect 
this mass on the right hand with that on the left. She might 
do it by bringing the line of the branch across so; or break 
the vacancy in the foreground by an object (James perhaps) 
so. But the danger was that by doing that the unity of the 
whole might be broken (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 53).  
 
As Lilly attempts to represent the world as she knows it to be, it is an attempt that does 
not allow for verification. Instead it is the structural whole that is decisive, the one and 
only criteria that matters. As one takes action to balance out the painting—or life—then 
that very act changes the nature of the whole; a response is required to unify—and then 
another—and then another.  
 Overall, it is Lilly’s mission to commune with the world, to represent her 
impression, her perception of the world and its visual meaning. For Lilly appreciates the 
meaning and mystery of what she sees. Perception includes meaning but Lilly also knows 
that this meaning is incomplete, that it depends on her to flesh out its body and identity. 
In doing so she might approach a closer correspondence between her perception of a 
thing and its meaning in her life: “What was the problem then? She must try to get hold 
of something that evaded her. It evaded her when she thought of Mrs. Ramsay; it evaded 
her when she thought of her picture. Phrases came. Visions came. Beautiful pictures. 
Beautiful phrases. But what she wished to get hold of was that very jar on the nerves, the 
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thing itself before it has been made anything” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 193). The thing 
itself, of course, depends on the perceiver; each thing is different based on the person 
who sees it. Lilly, for her part, accepts the provocative thrust of the world as what it is: 
the world means infinitely and variously; its meaning belongs to her interaction with it. It 
is Lilly’s aim to plumb this interaction, to mine her feelings and impressions so that the 
world is represented as she feels it, to represent the world as she has experienced it. This 
accent on perception, in fact, is a predominant characteristic of Modernism. According to 
Eysteinsson, “Modernism is felt to signal a radical ‘inward turn’” (26). This turn to 
subjectivity constituted “a revolt against the traditional relation of the subject to the 
outside world” (Eysteinsson 28). Traditionally, this relation to the outside world accepted 
that the world was the same for everyone and it was up to the individual to discover its 
essence, its eternal truth. The Modernists responded by demonstrating the variability of 
the subject and the moment, with truth itself contingent on this variability. 
 For it is Lilly’s goal to bring her world to appearance, so that she understands it 
for what it is and so that it might be shared. Visually, the world is nothing but a series of 
appearances, but these appearances include an infinite depth and meaningfulness. That is, 
the meaning of each appearance is infinite and variable, yet these appearances are 
communicable and subject to dialogue, the meaning there to be chiseled even as it resists 
total mastery: “The play of art as appearance is played out between us. The one takes the 
creation simply as a creation, just as the other does. Communication takes place when the 
other person takes part in what is imparted to him—and in such a way that he does not, as 
it were, only receive in part what is communicated to him, but shares in this knowledge 
of the whole matter that is fully possessed by both of them” (Gadamer, “The Play of Art” 
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128). These appearances are meaningful, but it is not until one engages with this 
meaningfulness that they acquire a more definite identity and understandability. In 
painting, one engages with these appearances and by doing so one approaches essence, 
the manner in which the meaningfulness of the visual is shared and understood. It is this 
shared visual experience that Lilly mines: “Here she was again, she thought, stepping 
back to look at it, drawn out of gossip, out of living, out of community with people into 
the presence of this formidable enemy of hers—this other thing, this truth, this reality, 
which suddenly laid hands on her, emerged stark at the back of appearances and 
commanded her attention” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 158). For Lilly, painting is an 
avenue to truth, in that she engages with her perception of the world and this perception 
becomes something definite and real, something that demands that she account for 
absolutely everything, something that makes perception itself both more meaningful and 
understandable.  
 Lilly is vital to the meaning of this narrative, but she is not the only character who 
lies at its heart. Mrs. Ramsay is central too. Lilly’s painting concerns Mrs. Ramsay—her 
huge presence in the first section, her gaping absence in the final section. The mother of 
eight children and the wife of a philosopher, Mrs. Ramsay has chosen to nest in the heart 
of life. Beautiful, she is used to people wanting her and needing her and praising her, 
offering her tributes; she is used to people listening to what she says and obeying what 
she says. Her beauty and heartfelt personality gives her access to the intimate concerns of 
her friends and loved ones—she is convincing in her charm and grace, her 
straightforward simplicity. People are drawn to trust her and need her. For her part, Mrs. 
Ramsay is drawn to share with and influence those around her: it is in her nature to help 
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and care. More than just being helpful, Mrs. Ramsay’s transaction with the world is 
truthful and honest—it is her instinct to understand the plight of those around her and to 
acknowledge that it is something universal, a burden that might be eased when shared. 
For example, the reader gets a sense for Mrs. Ramsay’s character when the narrative 
discusses her ability to empathize with “stories of great passion, of love foiled, of 
ambition thwarted” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 29). Although she might not have 
undergone these experiences to the same degree of intensity, she is still able to identify 
with and understand them, at home with people and the vicissitudes of life.  Part of Mrs. 
Ramsay’s character is an awareness of the difficulty and challenge inherent in living: part 
of life is disappointment—it is unavoidable. To grow up, to learn and have experiences 
also means that one’s horizon and expectations are refuted: “Every experience worthy of 
the name thwarts an expectation” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 350). It is her ability to 
comprehend people’s shared plight that endears her to others: “She knew then—she knew 
without having learnt. Her simplicity fathomed what clever people falsified. Her 
singleness of mind made her drop plumb like  a stone, alight exact as a bird, gave her, 
naturally, this swoop and fall of upon truth which delighted, eased, sustained—falsely 
perhaps” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 29). Mrs. Ramsay is so simple and capable of 
understanding the world as it is because she trusts her instincts—that, when shared, the 
world is more understandable.  
 It is Mrs. Ramsay’s nature to share with others; so too it is her nature to act, to do. 
Instead of just talking about the need to help others, she acts. In this action she is at 
home, comfortable, where she belongs. When helping, when sharing, she is most herself: 
“She never talked of it—she went punctually, directly. It was her instinct to go, an 
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instinct like the swallows for the south, the artichokes for the sun, turning her infallibly to 
the human race, making her nest in its heart” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 196). This 
instinct, for its part, is Mrs. Ramsay’s primary tool for understanding. It is an approach to 
life that is foreign to Lilly but one that she appreciates. Lilly has her own personality and 
approach—one that starkly contrasts with Mrs. Ramsay—but Lilly sees that Mrs. Ramsay 
is successful, that her approach allows her to know the world as it is: “did she lock up 
within her some secret which certainly Lilly believed people must have for the world to 
go on at all? Everyone could not be as helter skelter, hand to mouth as she was. But if 
they knew, could they tell one what they knew?” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 57). Lilly 
senses that Mrs. Ramsay has figured things out. Of course, no one ever fully understands 
everything, but Lilly feels that Mrs. Ramsay has come closer to truth, that she 
understands better than most. However, this sort of knowledge is difficult to relay: a 
secret, it is something that is so central, so vital, that one is not aware of it—something 
that shapes who and what somebody understands and who and what somebody is. Sure, 
one can try to communicate the identity of one’s platform, one’s horizon, but the words 
are bound to miss the mark, the width and depth and simultaneity always outpacing one’s 
ability to express it. This concept that one can never truly know oneself or express all that 
one knows resonates with the concerns of Modernism. The Modernists acknowledged 
that this aspect of the self was decisive and decided to explore its contours: “As writers 
lost confidence in their perception and grasp of things outside man’s consciousness—
feeling that they hardly knew themselves, much less anything outside themselves—they 
inevitably turned inward to that consciousness for their subject matter” (Beja 47). In the 
characterization of Mrs. Ramsay and Lilly’s desire to unlock her friend’s interior, one can 
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notice this highlighting of the self, this stress on what and how one understands, whether 
it be one’s limitations or one’s possibilities. 
 Lilly is drawn to Mrs. Ramsay. Mrs. Ramsay’s sense for truth attracts Lilly; when 
Lilly is attempting to finish her painting, she returns again and again to Mrs. Ramsay. She 
recalls several scenes in which she and Mrs. Ramsay are together. In one, Lilly has her 
arms around Mrs. Ramsay’s knees, to get as “close as she could get” (Woolf, To the 
Lighthouse 50). Lilly wishes she could truly understand Mrs. Ramsay: “she imagined 
how in the chambers of the mind and heart of the woman who was, physically, touching 
her, were stood, like the treasures in the tombs of the kings, tablets bearing sacred 
inscriptions, which if one could spell them out, would teach one everything, but they 
would never be offered openly, never made public” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 51). Lilly 
intuits that Mrs. Ramsay holds a key to understanding and that if she could possess it then 
she would understand. But complete understanding cannot be shared nor gained, the 
intricacies too knotted, the view too one-sided. However, one can refine one’s 
understanding and improve. Through dialogue, one can expand one’s horizon, approach 
the world with improved clarity: “when we speak to one another we do not so much 
transmit well-defined facts, as place our own aspirations and knowledge into a broader 
and richer horizon through dialogue with the other” (Gadamer, “On the Contribution of 
Poetry to the Search for Truth” 106). In this context, the emotional component of this 
interaction should not be discounted: caring for someone is a crucial step towards 
understanding. Strong feelings are commonly a fount of inspiration—one is suddenly 
able to see from the other’s point of view and the world is both unified and corroborated: 
“Could loving, as people called it, make her and Mrs. Ramsay one? for it was not 
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knowledge but unity that she desired, not inscriptions on tablets, nothing that could be 
written in any language known to men, but intimacy itself, which is knowledge, she had 
thought, leaning her head on Mrs. Ramsay’s knee” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 51). In the 
relationship between Mrs. Ramsay and Lilly we get a sense for the value and importance 
of closeness, of intimacy. Together, close, ready to share, the two seek something that 
can only be found in the interaction. Neither pursues something specific; instead each 
flowers when in the presence of the other—narrowness and bias, one’s self-doubt—these 
evaporate in this intimacy. Despite individual particularities and differences, each has a 
world and it is this shared experience that shapes the dialogue, allowing it to illuminate 
truth and refute falsehood: “Most astonishing about the essence of language and 
conversation is that I myself am not restricted by what I believe when I speak with others 
about something, that no one of us embraces the whole truth within his beliefs but that 
the whole truth can, however, embrace us both in our individual beliefs” (Gadamer, 
“What is Truth?” 46). It is an interaction that pushes the individual to account for the 
presence of the other; it is a dynamic that is neither conscious nor difficult: the world 
glows, backlit from within, effortlessly illuminated. Stabilized by this platform of 
intimacy and feeling, one might take risks, experiment, always aware that this platform 
will cradle and support. Furthermore, because of this connection, one is pushed to 
explore: the difference of the other a spark that flames into language, into understanding.  
 Indeed, Lilly recognizes the value of sharing, of intimacy and human connection, 
and so does Mrs. Ramsay. It is this feeling of community that Mrs. Ramsay promotes 
above all others. The dinner scene is a good example of this effort. More will be said 
about this scene, but, for the moment, Mrs. Ramsay’s contribution to the success of this 
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dinner is most relevant. She is the heartbeat of this summer home and everyone 
connected to it. Her social instinct, her sense for the value and importance of human 
individuality—and connection—means that she is the social and emotional puppet 
master. In many respects, she is the thread that connects everyone: “Nothing seemed to 
have merged. They all sat separate. And the whole of the effort of merging and flowing 
and creating rested on her” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 83). It is not an easy task, but it is 
her identity to bring people together. This characteristic helps explain why she is so 
valued, why she is viewed as exceptional, supremely wise, at home with truth and 
understanding, a willing participant in the meaning of the world. And it is this reputation 
that enables her to influence her friends and family so noticeably: they trust her instincts, 
her sense for truth, her implicit knowledge that she knows the right path, the right 
decision. And it is Mrs. Ramsay’s influence that persuades Paul Rayley and Minta Doyle 
to marry. Mrs. Ramsay does not openly persuade them to marry, but her very personality 
embodies the argument without saying a word; in Mrs. Ramsay they cannot but notice the 
value of marriage and human connection. For Minta and Paul, Mrs. Ramsay is a model to 
emulate; her very presence suggests that marriage and love are possible and even 
appealing: “They would, she thought, going on again, however long they lived, come 
back to this night; this moon; this wind; this house: and to her too. It flattered her, where 
she was most susceptible of flattery, to think how, wound about their hearts, however 
long they lived she would be woven” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 113). 
 For her part, Mrs. Ramsay is neither a poet nor a philosopher. It is not her life’s 
task to engage with—understand and interpret—the primordial phenomena of the world. 
But she does not completely ignore the value of intellectual and creative engagement. She 
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is not a laser beam of focus and intensity, but she is still drawn to language, to textuality, 
to the rhythm and musicality, the mystery and disclosure of poetry. As when, after dinner, 
she alights in the study, joins her husband, and picks a book of poetry randomly, opens it 
randomly, and reads what is there. There is something about the balance, the rhythm, the 
capacity to evoke, the imaging of the world, that settles Mrs. Ramsay: the world can be 
understandable and ordered—it can be beautiful and complete. Although her life is filled 
with frayed edges and unanswerable questions, it can be corralled and contained; mystery 
can be accounted for, included, part of the very meaning; life can be put into language 
and made understandable. For Mrs. Ramsay reads a sonnet and in this reading acquires a 
feeling of completeness; a sensation that stems from her participation, a unity that is her 
responsibility: “So reading she was ascending, she felt, on to the top, on to the summit. 
How satisfying! How restful! All the odds and ends of the day stuck to this magnet; her 
mind felt swept, felt clean. And then there it was, suddenly entire; she held it in her hand, 
beautiful and reasonable, clear and complete, the essence sucked out of life and held 
rounded here—the sonnet” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 121). The words of the sonnet are 
only understandable as they relate to Mrs. Ramsay’s perceptions; in the reading she is 
reminded of what she sees and understands; but, instead of a series of fragmented 
impressions, in the sonnet she discovers order and balance, a feeling of resolution that is 
transferred to her life and all that it might be. In Gadamer’s philosophical outlook poetry 
is a means of confronting one’s familiarity with the world: 
When we grow up in a language, the world is brought close 
to us and comes to acquire a certain stability. Language 
always furnishes the fundamental articulations that guide 
our understanding of the world. It belongs to the nature of 
familiarity with the world that whenever we exchange 
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words with one another, we share the world. The word of 
the poet does not simply continue this process of 
Einhausung, or ‘making ourselves at home.’ Instead it 
stands over against this process like a mirror held up to it. 
But what appears in the mirror is not the world, nor this or 
that thing in the world, but rather this nearness or 
familiarity in which we stand for a while. This standing and 
this nearness find permanence in the language of literature 
and, most perfectly, in the poem (“On the Contribution of 
Poetry to the Search for Truth” 115).  
 
In engaging with a poem, one has the opportunity to enact order and meaning, as all the 
words belong and relate to a meaningful whole. One gains insight and understanding 
because one relates the unity of the poem to the potential unity of life. The Modernists, 
for their part, were particularly enamored with art and literature’s ability to provide order 
where otherwise there was chaos: “the modernists were convinced that they could impose 
an order on the seeming randomness, and meaninglessness of human of human 
existence” (Matthews and Platt 570). 
 In addition to Lilly and Mrs. Ramsay, Mr. Ramsay is vital to the meaning of this 
novel. A philosopher, he is intensely engaged with meaning, the transaction that occurs 
between the individual and the world. For its part, Mr. Ramsay’s philosophical 
engagement also belongs to a historical moment, a philosophical climate that was rapidly 
changing. This change might be described as “a late nineteenth-century turn in 
philosophy from describing the world to an investigation of its ‘conditions of possibility, 
to ‘formulating an experience of the world, a contact with the world which precedes all 
thought about the world’” (Hussey, “Woolf: After Lives” 20). Though his philosophical 
position is never outlined, it is within this climate that Mr. Ramsay philosophizes. His 
task is to question and probe, to consider all of those factors that contribute to meaning, 
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an amalgamation of factors that elude and morph as they mesh and combine. For his part, 
Mr. Ramsay is defined by the intensity of this effort: to approach life and all of its 
complexities; to discover what is common, what we all share—this is his responsibility 
and it is very difficult, a supreme challenge. But this is his life’s work and he is 
committed. Certainly the weight and challenge of his effort renders him surly and 
frustrated, the answer never entirely clear, the complexity too knotted. In all, though, the 
effort is worthwhile: despite the ever-extending horizon, his work does contribute to 
improved understanding; the texture becomes stronger, the weave tighter; illusion and 
false understanding are sidestepped and truth embraced. In point of fact, to a considerable 
degree, Mr. Ramsay’s concerns resonate with the subject matter of this very project: he 
too considers “Subject and object and the nature of reality” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 
23). In Gadamer’s case, he argues for the indivisibility between the world as it is 
perceived and named and the world as it is: “We are simply following an internal 
necessity of the thing itself if we go beyond the idea of the object and objectivity of 
understanding toward the idea that subject and object belong together” (Truth and 
Method 457). Now, these considerations are foreign to the other characters of this novel, 
but they sense that his work matters. Lilly, for example, acknowledges his contribution: 
that the ephemeral, multi-colored world might be reduced to essence, the extraneous and 
superfluous discarded. As an emblem of his work, Lilly is told to think of a kitchen table 
when she is not there. Lilly marvels that Mr. Ramsay is able to reduce perception to 
something so bare and geometric. She notices that he is exceptional, different: “Naturally, 
if one’s days were passed in this seeing of angular essences, this reducing of lovely 
evenings, with all of their flamingo clouds and blue and silver to a white deal four-legged 
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table (and it was a mark of the finest minds so to do), naturally one could not be judged 
like an ordinary person” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 23).  Undoubtedly, Mr. Ramsay is 
different than most, a man who is willing to approach life’s most difficult questions, a 
man who doggedly hunts for truth and abhors falsehood.  
 But Mr. Ramsay’s outlook and effort includes collateral damage. His instinct for 
the thoughts and feelings of others is stunted. His primary concern is truth, never mind 
the consequences. He is blunt to a fault, even with his children. At the opening of this 
novel, the reader gets a sense for Mr. Ramsay’s heartlessness. At this point, husband and 
wife discuss with their son James if he will be able to go to the lighthouse tomorrow. 
Mrs. Ramsay says that it might be possible—the weather could be mild. Mr. Ramsay says 
that it definitely will not be possible, a storm on the horizon. Both are right in their own 
way. For Mrs. Ramsay, the weather could change, necessarily unpredictable; for Mr. 
Ramsay, meteorology is a science, objectively predictable. To Mr. Ramsay, planning for 
a trip that will surely not happen is silly and foolhardy, a bad example for his son. For 
Mrs. Ramsay, the possibility of the trip should be maintained, James’ very mood 
dependent on the prospect of this trip. Mrs. Ramsay would like to encourage James’ 
sense of hope and possibility: the trip, after all, might happen. But Mr. Ramsay would 
prefer James to confront life as it is, harsh and uncompromising: “What he said was true. 
It was always true. He was incapable of untruth; never tampered with a fact; never altered 
a disagreeable word to suit the pleasure or convenience of any mortal being, least of all 
his own children, who, sprung from his loins, should be aware from childhood that life is 
difficult; facts uncompromising” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 4). Yes, “life is difficult”, 
but, as readers, we get a sense that Mr. Ramsay is too rigid in his principles; sure, parents 
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should prepare their children for the challenges of the world; at the same time, however, 
parents should encourage their children, protect and promote their sense of hope and 
wonder. When the world is presented so bleakly, children might not feel motivated to 
participate, might feel overwhelmed and choose to withdraw. Furthermore, in his 
absolutism we see a lack of consideration for context and audience. To seek truth with 
such intensity is honorable, but to do so in a manner that is rigid or inflexible could also 
obscure truth, too unreceptive to the nuances of the moment and its demands. The 
importance of this adaptability is one of Gadamer’s primary concerns: “Every 
interpretation has to adapt itself to the hermeneutical situation to which it belongs” (“On 
the Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth” 112). 
 Regarding Mr. Ramsay’s character, the novel seems to maintain an attitude of 
ambivalence. On one side, he should be commended for his effort and his willingness to 
confront life’s most difficult and challenging questions; he wants nothing more than to 
understand. On the other, his consideration of these questions seems to discount the 
moment, the context, and the participation of the individual, as if one could arrive at a 
final answer that explains everything. Too often Mr. Ramsay fails to include his own 
participation in the thing being understood; this inclusion is one of Gadamer’s primary 
directives: “In all understanding an application occurs, such that the person who is 
understanding is himself or herself right there in the understood meaning. He or she 
belongs to the subject matter that he or she is understanding” (Gadamer in Conversation 
47). Because he seems to view the world as something that can be objectively 
understood, Mr. Ramsay seems to believe that he can arrive at a final answer. This is his 
ultimate goal and he is willing to strain himself to the utmost in order to reach it. As an 
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emblem of his effort, the novel presents his philosophical thought as if it  were 
sequential—once one problem is solved then on to the next, until there are no more 
problems, the world fully mapped—as if each problem was like a letter of the alphabet—
if one can recite all of the letters then one has conquered the entirety of mystery. In this 
scheme, Mr. Ramsay has reached Q, has gone farther than most everyone else. Now he is 
on to R, but is unable to nail it down. It is his life’s goal, his supreme priority, willing to 
work himself until nothing is left: “Qualities that would have saved a ship’s company 
exposed on a broiling sea with six biscuits and a flask of water—endurance and justice, 
foresight, devotion, skill, came to his help. R is then—what is R?” (Woolf, To the 
Lighthouse 34). Mr. Ramsay is committed, willing to endure discomfort and pain, 
prepared to sacrifice for his goal. But no matter how much he tries, he cannot overcome 
his limitations—life remains mysterious, the world a question. According to Gadamer, 
the world will forever remain questionable, as all understanding is limited and more can 
always be said: “Nothing that is said has its truth simply in itself, but refers instead 
backwards and forward to what is unsaid” (Man and Language 67). But Mr. Ramsay 
should be commended for his effort: despite his shortcomings, he is willing to try, to take 
on the responsibility of understanding, of contemplating something that is bound to 
frustrate, cannot but frustrate.  
 For this effort requires a willingness to go deep, to discard irrelevancies, to 
concentrate one’s thought to the point of essence, to recognize scope, to place oneself and 
others in proper context. To do so, of course, is to acknowledge one’s smallness, the 
world and understanding ultimately unfathomable; to accept one’s place, to account for it 
and to consider the implications—these are his concerns. Overall, his aim is to confront 
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understanding: “It was his power, his gift, suddenly to shed all superfluities, to shrink and 
diminish so that he looked barer and felt sparer, even physically, yet lost none of his 
intensity of mind, and so to stand on this little ledge facing the dark of human ignorance, 
how we know nothing and the sea eats away the ground we stand on—that was his fate, 
his gift” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 44). Mr. Ramsay only wants to think about those 
transactions between the individual and the world that are most essential, transactions 
that are necessarily limited but, at the same time, are most potent because of these 
limitations. This notion that human understanding and human reason are limited are 
characteristic of Modernism. It was a time when many began to refute “the precept that 
human reason governs human behavior” (Fiero, 6: 27). It was also an era when there was 
“a loss of confidence in moral absolutes” (Fiero, 6: 69). The subject was no longer seen 
to be in control of his or her self, subject to contradictory thoughts and feelings, and there 
was no certainty about good or bad either; the limitations of the human subject began to 
acquire greater weight—how to account for them and incorporate them into one’s 
understanding.   
 However ambitious Mr. Ramsay might be, however willing to pursue the most 
difficult challenges, he is able to do so because he has the support of his wife. She is his 
beacon of light should he lose his way. It is because she believes in him that he is able to 
take risks; it is because she loves him that the world is worth exploring: “If he put 
implicit faith in her, nothing should hurt him; however deep he buried himself or climbed 
high, not for a second should he find himself without her” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 38). 
Mrs. Ramsay is willing to sacrifice for her husband, to spend her energy in a way that 
sustains and nourishes him. But their relationship is not a one-way street either. Mr. 
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Ramsay also sustains and nourishes Mrs. Ramsay. During the dinner scene, for example, 
the group discusses fishermen and their wages and Mrs. Ramsay yearns for her husband 
to comment on the topic. To her, he is wise and knowledgeable, capable of illuminating 
the topic in a way that makes it both interesting and important: “One word, she said to 
herself. For if he said a thing, it would make all the difference. He went to the heart of 
things. He cared about fishermen and their wages. He could not sleep for thinking of 
them. It was altogether different when he spoke; one did not feel then, pray heaven you 
don’t see how little I care, because one did care” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 95). The two, 
then, are a team, each giving something to the other, something missing but needed.  
 Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay are very different, but, when combined, create something 
new that is better than the sum of its parts, each depending on the other, each inspiring 
the other. Each compensates for the limitations of the other, as when Mr. Ramsay needs 
reassurance and love or Mrs. Ramsay needs precision and accuracy—upon interacting, 
they produce “successful creation”, their relationship so alive it has a pulse: “Every throb 
of this pulse seemed, as he walked away, to enclose her and her husband, and to give to 
each that solace which two different notes, one high, one low, struck together, seem to 
give to each other as they combine” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 38-9). In the interaction, 
in the other, there is balm and relief, a resonance that soothes. In the marriage the two 
become more; in the particular character of the other, each a feeling of corroboration and 
a challenge. In general, there is a sense of shared perception, of looking at the same thing: 
“So that is marriage, Lilly thought, a man and a woman looking at a girl throwing a ball” 
(Woolf, To the Lighthouse 72). Marriage represents a chance to share, to belong to the 
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same world, to partake in the meaningfulness of perception. No matter their differences, 
this sharing fulfills, sustains, allows each to be more confident in his or her individuality.  
 In marriage the world is shared and in this sharing there is a chance to transcend 
one’s individuality and limitedness; one’s partner sees what one does not see, one’s blind 
spots become more visible. In the interaction, one becomes more, but part of this 
interaction includes friction, an immitigable difference; this difference can never be truly 
overcome: “it was painful to be reminded of the inadequacy of human relationships, that 
the most perfect was flawed” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 40). All human relationships are 
imperfect because of the primacy of individuality—the differences are patent: “To be this 
and not that constitutes the determinacy of all beings” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 442).  
Differences can never entirely be overcome. Each person sees and understands from a 
particular horizon: “The infinite perfectibility of the human experience of the world 
means that, whatever language we use, we never succeed in seeing anything but an ever 
more extended aspect, a ‘view’ of the world” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 444). The 
particularities are ingrained, but one can choose to be generous, one can choose to give. 
Instead of fixating on the differences as something to be overcome, they can be 
celebrated, they can be seen as an opportunity. In the case of the Ramsays, there are 
certainly many differences, yet each chooses to embrace the other without hesitation; 
love is intangible, inexpressible, something that occurs between two people in a way that 
is entirely unique and unrepeatable; every moment, every instance, every interaction has 
its own identity, requiring its own particular approach. So, when Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay 
find themselves together at the end of the day, the two discuss the day, the dinner, and 
two of their houseguests, the newly engaged couple, Paul Rayley and Minta Doyle. This 
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engagement leads the Ramsays to think about their own marriage—its nature, what each 
means the one to the other. At this moment Mr. Ramsay wants his wife to tell him that 
she loves him, something—the book hints—that he requests rather often. But Mrs. 
Ramsay distrusts the verbalization of her feelings, scared that the words will not capture 
her true feelings, preferring to express her feelings with action. But between them there is 
a concord, a sense for the thoughts and feelings for the other without them ever being 
said. This concord is unique to their marriage and to their history: they are able to 
communicate wordlessly, in their own nonverbal language. So, Mrs. Ramsay chooses not 
to express her love with words, yet she successfully relays the message—she loves him 
so much that she does not even need to say it: “And she looked at him smiling. For she 
had triumphed again. She had not said: yet he knew” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 124). 
Their love is unique: a shared feeling that is indecipherable to anyone but the couple, an 
interaction with its own special language, reliant on nobody else, vindicated by the only 
people that matter.     
 In addition to Lilly and the Ramsay couple, the Ramsay children are vital to the 
impact and meaning of this novel. In particular, James and Cam stand out. After all, the 
two, along with their father, finally reach the lighthouse, ten years after their initial effort. 
We first meet James and Cam when they are six and seven years old respectively. Fresh 
and new to life, James hinges all of his hopes and dreams on this trip to the lighthouse. 
To him, somehow, it represents a daring expedition, a chance to explore the unknown and 
reach a far-away goal. This failed trip stays in James’ mind, a symbol for life: one sets a 
goal and one is thwarted. It is no one’s fault, but disappointment and pain are inevitable. 
James imagines a particular scene to illustrate this thought: “Suppose then that as a child 
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sitting helpless in a perambulator, or on some one’s knee, he had seen a wagon crush 
ignorantly and innocently, some one’s foot? Suppose he had seen the foot first, in the 
grass, smooth, and whole; then the wheel; and the same foot, purple, crushed. But the 
wheel was innocent” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 185). One is bound to be disappointed, 
overcome, stymied, and it is no one’s fault. Part of what it means to live is to suffer: 
“What a man has to learn through suffering is not this or that particular thing, but insight 
into the limitations of humanity” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 351). All one can do is 
accept this reality, live with it, move forward, respond and react accordingly.  
 James was disappointed as a child and this disappointment informs his outlook as 
an adolescent. In the end, he does reach the lighthouse, even if he is no longer 
enthusiastic about the prospect. Nevertheless, in this long-delayed trip he is compelled to 
revisit the seeds of his pessimism and gloominess. Back when he was a child, the 
lighthouse represented possibility, mystery; ten years later it is something material, 
practical. James realizes that the lighthouse represents many things: “For nothing was 
simply one thing” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 186). When, in the end, James finally 
alights at the lighthouse, he describes it as “stark” and “bare” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 
203). He compares it to his own life: “It confirmed some obscure feeling of his about his 
own character” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 203). Having finally made it the lighthouse, 
James accepts and confronts life as it is: it brims with adversity and challenges; though 
alone and bereft, one stands tall, endures, and cherishes those moments of joy that are 
even more special because nothing is guaranteed. 
 Aside from James, Cam and Nancy also play an important role in the narrative. 
To a considerable degree, both represent adolescence—the link between adolescence and 
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possibility. Nancy appears most prominently in the first section of the novel, when she is 
out hiking with Paul Rayley and Minta Doyle. During this trip, Paul is on the cusp of 
proposing marriage to Minta. He feels nervous and so does Minta—both are uncertain 
about their future. It is one of the most important decisions that the two will make, a fork 
in the road, two distinct futures. Based on this choice, the future of each will completely 
transform; but nothing is certain, verification impossible—one can only leap. So, there 
comes a point when Minta grasps Nancy’s hand, releases it, takes it again, lets it go, and 
so on: Nancy senses why Minta is so nervous—she will make a decision that will shape 
her entire life. For, it is true, deep profound connection determines meaning, the world a 
potential source of inspiration, fulfillment in the distance but visible. Nancy registers this 
dynamic, that love and marriage could be hers, all of its possibility, all of its potential 
disappointment: “When Minta took her hand and held it, Nancy, reluctantly, saw the 
whole world spread out beneath her” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 73). Nancy instantly 
intuits that the world itself is shaped by one’s decisions and one’s relationships; options 
and choices are inevitable. Each path is bound to be misshapen in some way, flawed and 
limited. Furthermore, these potentialities are rarely one-sided: something might be 
gained, but something is also lost. So, when Minta loses her brooch and cries, Nancy 
feels that Minta is not only lamenting her lost brooch; Minta is emotional because she is 
growing up and decisions are on the horizon, because her elections are likely flawed, 
bound to lose even as she gains: “It might be true that she minded losing her brooch, but 
she wasn’t crying only for that. She was crying for something else. We might all sit down 
and cry, she felt. But she did not know what for” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 77). No 
matter her decision, Minta will suffer dissapointment. All relationships are imperfect—
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here tension, there conflict, the differences insuperable. Or—perhaps better, perhaps 
worse—one is alone, in charge of one’s destiny, but uncertain about its meaning and 
importance, no one there to support or challenge it.  
 Cam, for her part, hardly appears in the first section of the novel, but figures more 
prominently in the final section, when she, James, and their father travel to the 
lighthouse. During this trip her adolescent mindset appears in bold relief: the world 
awaits, almost anything possible. During this trip she daydreams, released from habit, out 
on the water, on an adventure, her sensations new and special: “It was the sense of 
adventure and escape that she wanted […] From her hand […] there spurted up a fountain 
of joy […]. And the drops falling from this sudden and unthinking fountain of joy fell 
here and there on the dark, the slumbrous shapes in her mind; shapes of a world not 
realized but turning in there darkness, catching here and there, a spark of light; Greece, 
Rome, Constantinople” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 189). For Cam, there is an entire 
world that remains to be realized, awaiting her, at its most powerful when she chooses to 
engage with it, only possible if she becomes what she might be. To know the world and 
belong to the world is a primary concern for everyone: how to make it happen? What 
steps should be taken? There is no direct answer, but the possibility of self-fulfillment is 
undeniable.   
 The members of the Ramsay family are the primary characters of this novel, but 
the houseguests are also critical. Much has already been said about Lilly, but it is also 
worth discussing the guests as a group, as members of a community that includes the 
Ramsays. Overall, that so many different and unique personalities have gathered together 
is of special note. Because there is friendship, because there is dialogue, the world of 
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each might expand. In the interaction, one might grow; furthermore, one might notice 
one’s blind spots, those unexamined assumptions that remain unnoticed until revealed by 
the presence of another. For example, the trio of Mr. Carmichael, Charles Tansley, and 
Mrs. Ramsay: each represents an alternative to the other, a reproach and a rebuke, a 
means of contrast. Each so different, when one sees the world through the eyes of the 
other, one’s entire outlook becomes skewed, strange, wobbly: “Her going was a reproach 
to them, gave a different twist to the world, so that they were led to protest, seeing their 
prepossessions disappear, and clutch at them vanishing. Charles Tansley did that too: it 
was part of the reason why one disliked him. He upset the proportions of one’s world” 
(Woolf, To the Lighthouse 196). Both Mr. Carmichael and Charles Tansley are oriented 
towards thinking and contemplation, while Mrs. Ramsay is drawn towards action; when 
they interact, each sees the limitedness of his or her personal outlook and position.  
 At the same time, in community, in sharing, there is a sense of enlargement. 
Because of the differences—and in spite of them—the world becomes more. It is a 
dynamic where the similarities and the differences blend and respond to each other—the 
outcome now more refined because the similarities push one to highlight priorities and 
the differences push one to discard irrelevancies. In sharing the world there is a sense of 
corroboration and refinement, of understanding better and more; that there are differences 
at all is part of the appeal: “That was his way of looking, different from hers. But looking 
together united them” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 97). Mr. Bankes and Mrs. Ramsay are 
united when the two look at the same thing, the thing now more vibrant and so too Mr. 
Bankes and Mrs. Ramsay. And it is this sensation of common experience that stands out 
when the entire house gathers for dinner. The world is filled with infinite possibility, with 
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an infinite variety of people, but these people find themselves in this particular house, 
immersed in this particular dinner, with these particular people; at this moment, the world 
is something concrete and definite. Instead of anything, they are engaged with something. 
To have a place, to be with people who matter, who care—in this there is tremendous 
value, instead of uncertainty, stability and reassurance: “they were all conscious of 
making a party together in a hollow, on an island; had their common cause against that 
fluidity out there” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 97).  In this case, this collection of 
individuals has chosen to share and interact with one another; each responds to the other 
in a way that accounts for the other, allowing for a suspension of subjectivity and an 
orientation to the group as a whole that leads to unexpected insight and meaning. 
According to Gadamer, this is the nature of dialogue—in it there is a loss of subjectivity 
in which the subject matter itself becomes the decisive factor, shaping all who participate:  
“Neither partner alone constitutes the determining factor; rather, it is the unified form of 
movement as a whole that unifies the fluid activity of both. We can formulate this idea as 
a theoretical generalization by saying that the individual self, including his activity and 
his understanding of himself, is taken up into a higher determination that is really the 
decisive factor” (“On the Problem of Self Understanding” 54). The outcome of this 
grouping is unpredictable—the resultant feelings, conversation, glances and looks, are 
necessarily spontaneous and of the moment: no one knows if this dinner will be special, if 
it will lodge itself in the memory of these individuals, if it will, by chance, shift meaning 
into clearer focus. But this feeling of togetherness is the first step, a loss of self that 
allows one to see from a different perspective, swept up by the group.  
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 This sense of potential, that the dinner could be special, memorable and important 
is most acutely felt by Mrs. Ramsay. She possesses a highly attuned awareness of people 
and their concerns: she knows that this dinner—and the shared experience that it 
implies—is both a challenge and an opportunity. She acknowledges that individual 
differences are hard to overcome, that each has his or her particular priorities; community 
also comprehends acrimony, bitterness, and resentment. But she also accepts that the 
challenge is worth confronting. No matter the pain, the reward is worth it. So she links 
people together, so she insists that everyone dine in unity. At the same time, there is no 
guarantee that people will get along, that the conversation will soar, that people will feel 
comfortable. Everyone may be caught up in his or her particular concerns, as when Mrs. 
Ramsay wonders to herself, “But what have I done with my life?” (Woolf, To the 
Lighthouse 82). At this point Mrs. Ramsay feels disconnected from her family, her 
friends, and the world. She feels as if she has done nothing worthwhile, as if nothing 
matters. Each person is separate, apart from the other other, nothing in common, no unity. 
Directly, Mrs. Ramsay experiences the urge to merge these disparate personalities, to 
experience unity—in doing so she might reconnect with her greatest ability and 
accomplishment, her weightiest responsibility: “Nothing seemed to have merged. They 
all sat separate. And the whole of the effort of merging and flowing and creating rested 
on her” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 83). Mrs. Ramsay binds them together, a source of 
commonality, each connected to her in some way. She takes on the responsibility because 
she has the capacity to do so; she knows that the potential reward is worth the sacrifice; 
everyone might feel as if he or she belongs; each might feel at home, the world suddenly 
truer and more understandable. 
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 If they are lucky, the group might amble into a meadow of peace and ease, of 
comfort, where there is no strain, the feelings completely natural, unforced, where each 
feels exalted, uplifted. According to Gadamer, this is the nature of dialogue, of play: “It is 
part of play that the movement is not only without goal or purpose but also without effort. 
It happens, as it were, by itself. The ease of play—which naturally does not mean that 
there is any real absence of effort but refers phenomenologically only to the absence of 
strain—is experienced subjectively as relaxation. The structure of play absorbs the player 
into itself, and thus frees him from the burden of taking the initiative, which constitutes 
the actual strain of existence” (Truth and Method 105). Near the end of the dinner, Mrs. 
Ramsay does feel this way—everyone is together and this togetherness is as it should be:  
Everything seemed right. Just now (but this cannot last, she 
thought, dissociating herself from the moment while they 
were all talking about boots) just now she had reached 
security; she hovered like a hawk suspended; like a flag 
floated in an element of joy which filled every nerve of her 
body fully and sweetly, not noisily, solemnly rather, for it 
arose, she thought, looking at them all eating there, from 
husband and children and friends; all of which rising in this 
profound stillness (she was helping Mr. Bankes to one very 
small piece more, and peered in the depths of the 
earthenware pot) seemed now for no special reason to stay 
there like a smoke, like a fume rising upwards, holding 
them safe together (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 104-5).  
 
To Mrs. Ramsay then, this group brought together is its own special entity, one that is of 
special value precisely because of its uniqueness, because the group is capable of 
overcoming strife, because, despite the differences, each person means something to the 
other. To Mrs. Ramsay, this mood of unity and togetherness is what matters most; people 
do connect, people do depend on each other—these needs are eternal; when people 
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experience this connection, it is a moment that lasts, one that is decisive and defines all 
subsequent experience, all engagement with otherness, all potential growth:  
Nothing need be said; nothing could be said. There it was, 
all round them. It partook, she felt, carefully helping Mr. 
Bankes to a specially tender piece, of eternity; as she had 
already felt about something different once before that 
afternoon; there is a coherence in things, a stability; 
something, she meant, is immune from change and shines 
out (she glanced at the window with its ripple of reflected 
lights) in the face of the flowing, the fleeting, the spectral, 
like a ruby; so that again tonight she had the feeling she had 
had once today, already, of peace, of rest. Of such 
moments, she thought, the thing is made that endures 
(Woolf, To the Lighthouse 105).  
 
It is only because of moments like these that the world means anything at all. It is only 
because people bond with one another and begin to care that the world inspires and 
compels. It is not an act of consciousness; in the moment, one does not know what is 
happening; instead, it is a matter of attunement to the other, to the subject matter; the 
world springs forth as something meaningful, as something irrefutable and undeniable 
while still withholding its innermost meaning.   
 In the first section of the novel, “The Window”, the reader gets a sense for the 
Ramsay family and their houseguests: their concerns, their values, their goals. In 
particular, the reader sees that Mrs. Ramsay is at the heart of this group—she is the 
binding agent that enables and empowers each person to belong and share. But then Mrs. 
Ramsay dies, ten years pass, and the dynamics change considerably. In this final section, 
“The Lighthouse”, Mr. Ramsay and two of his adolescent children, James and Cam, are 
en route to the lighthouse. Also, Lilly returns to the summer home and chooses to finish 
her painting, the very same one she began ten years earlier. In the end, all attain their 
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objectives: the Ramsays reach the lighthouse and Lilly completes her painting. The 
meaningfulness of these goals and their resolution are informed by the first section, when 
Mrs. Ramsay and all of the Ramsay children were still alive, the War still in the distance; 
they are also informed by the passage of time and all that it implies. In the dividing 
section, then, the reader is tasked with directly engaging with time—its identity, its 
elusiveness.  
 For Woolf does not present time as something immediately understandable or 
straightforward; it is, instead, vague and slippery. It is something that envelops, 
unavoidable, unknowable because its dominion has already been asserted before it has 
even been recognized. Time does not care; time does not stop; time is impersonal. 
Certainly, belonging to time and as a part of time, people already understand; the passage 
of time and the development of meaning are unavoidable; the world and human being 
necessarily correspond and it is inevitable that this world discloses itself as each person 
grows and changes. There are, of course, moments in time, when the individual feels that 
the world’s meaningfulness has been revealed, finally understandable—but this epiphany 
is only temporary and so too this feeling of completeness—the passage of time will 
necessarily confound too:  
It seemed now as if, touched by human penitence and all its 
toil, divine goodness had parted the curtain and displayed 
behind it, single, distinct, the hare erect; the wave falling; 
the boat rocking, which, did we deserve them, should be 
ours always. But alas, divine goodness, twitching the cord, 
draws the curtain; it does not please him; he covers his 
treasures in a drench of hail, and so breaks them, so 
confuses them that it seems impossible that their calm 
should ever return or that we should ever compose from 
their fragments a perfect whole or read in the littered pieces 
the clear words of truth. For our penitence deserves a 
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glimpse only; our toil respite only (Woolf, To the 
Lighthouse 127-8).  
 
Effort, engagement, and humility have their rewards: one might approach the world for 
what it is. But this reward is only temporary and brings with it corresponding challenges; 
for once one has finally understood, the world has already swiveled, meaning has already 
shifted; this understanding still serves as a light in darkness, as a foundation for 
understanding, but truth remains elusive—something right there, yet forever one step 
ahead. No matter how much one wants to understand, no matter how precise and accurate 
one might be, one cannot fully account for or overcome one’s hermeneutical situation; 
one’s limitedness and givenness necessarily lead to interpretation: “It is not only that 
historical tradition and the natural order of life constitute the unity of the world in which 
we live as men; the way we experience one another, the way we experience historical 
traditions, the way we experience the natural givenness of our existence and of our world, 
constitute a truly hermeneutic universe, in which we are not imprisoned, as if behind 
insurmountable barriers, but to which we are opened” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 
xxiii). We are opened to the world and this access point demands adjustment and agility 
if we hope to approach truth—a correspondence between the individual, the moment, and 
the world. 
 The passage of time includes difference and even finality—death: Mrs. Ramsay 
perishes during this interlude and so too Prue and Andrew (Andrew because of the war 
and Prue in childbirth). As time passes, events occur and they are mostly a matter of 
providence, out of one’s control—one is bound to be disappointed, to struggle; oftentimes 
there is no recourse, no answer. Despite the impersonality of time and its ravages, a 
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feeling of possibility still remains: one might understand, one might find an answer; 
despite the confusion and the chaos, the world and one’s place in it might be understood, 
the essential relations of things might be uncovered: “The mystic, the visionary, walking 
the beach on a fine night, stirring a puddle, looking at a stone, asking themselves ‘What 
am I,’ ‘What is this?’ had suddenly an answer vouchsafed them: (they could not say what 
it was) so that they were warm in the frost and had comfort in the desert” (Woolf, To the 
Lighthouse 131). There is always a sense that the answer is one turn around the corner, 
that this feeling (despite the impossibility of permanently grasping it) is enough; the 
potential is what comforts, motivating the seeker to continue looking. According to 
Gadamer, one cannot help but understand and it is time that requires an adjustment to 
difference, to change, even if the answer always outpaces the question and questioner: 
“understanding is not just one of the various possible behaviors of the subject but the 
mode of being of Dasein itself. It is in this sense that the term ‘hermeneutics has been 
used here. It denotes the basic being-in motion of Dasein that constitutes its finitude and 
historicity, and hence embraces the whole of its experience of the world. Not caprice, or 
even an elaboration of a single aspect, but the nature of the thing itself makes the 
movement of understanding comprehensive and universal” (Truth and Method xxvii). 
 Yes, the ultimate goal is to attain a correspondence between the way the world 
truly is and the way one sees it. But there is no guarantee; one is bound to be uneasy and 
uncertain; but one keeps searching; the possibility of an answer is only open to those who 
seek:  
As summer neared, as evenings lengthened, there came to 
the wakeful, the hopeful, walking the beach, stirring the 
pool, imaginations of the strangest kind—of flesh turned to 
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atoms which drove before the wind, of stars flashing in 
their hearts, of cliff, sea, cloud, and sky brought purposely 
together to assemble outwardly the scattered parts of the 
vision within. In those mirrors, the minds of men, in those 
pools of uneasy water, in which clouds for ever turn and 
shadows form, dreams persisted, and it was impossible to 
resist the strange intimation which every gull, flower, tree, 
man and woman, and the white earth itself seemed to 
declare (but if questioned at once to withdraw) that good 
triumphs, happiness prevails, order rules; or to resist the 
extraordinary stimulus to range hither and thither in search 
of some absolute good, some crystal of intensity, remote 
from the known pleasures and familiar virtues, something 
alien to the processes of domestic life, single, hard, bright, 
like a diamond in the sand, which would render the 
possessor secure (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 131-2).  
 
Yes, in the world, one notices an order and one wishes to be on par with this order; 
maybe by paying close attention one can truly understand. Maybe in the world there are 
hints that help explain how to organize one’s very being, how to be at all. One wants an 
assurance, a means of easing uncertainty. 
 But there are no final answers. People are limited, flawed; every vision, every 
view, every answer is bound to disappoint and miss the target; these flaws are patent, 
unavoidable; the world is bound to be skewed:  
Did Nature supplement what man advanced? Did she 
complete what he began? With equal complacence she saw 
his misery, his meanness, and his torture. That dream, of 
sharing, completing, of finding in solitude on the beach an 
answer, was then but a reflection in a mirror, and the mirror 
itself was but the surface glassiness which forms in 
quiescence when the nobler powers sleep beneath? 
Impatient, despairing yet loth to go (for beauty offers her 
lures, has her consolations), to pace the beach was 
impossible; contemplation was unendurable; the mirror was 




During this section of the novel, the theme of war appears most prominently, as when the 
narrative describes Andrew’s death, or “the silent apparition of an ashen-colored ship for 
instance, come, gone; there was a purplish stain upon the bland surface of the sea as if 
something had boiled and bled, invisibly, beneath” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 133-4). 
One gets the sense that there is a link between time, understanding, and war. In this 
scheme, war is a result of misdirected understanding, of people who fail to acknowledge 
the necessity and importance of interpretation, of people who see the world as an object 
to be controlled and mastered. If the world is the same for everyone, if it is subject to 
dominance, then the essential value, worth, and contribution of individuals is minimized: 
people become expendable, peripheral to truth and meaning. War is the result of the 
passage of time if people do not adjust to the interpretive demands of difference and 
change; interpretation includes an acknowledgement of the value and contribution of the 

















To sum up, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics and Virginia 
Woolf’s novels highlight and emphasize the interpretive opportunity and responsibility of 
the individual. This commonality lends itself to an analysis of both Woolf’s novels and 
Gadamer’s philophical outlook: by probing Woolf’s novels in light of Gadamer’s 
philosophy, one gains an improved understanding of the reference of the words that 
inhabit her novels, words that have been combined to  create a fictional world in which 
the characters understand better or worse—fail or succeed—based on their willingness to 
privilege and confront those experiences and situations that shape consciousness, those 
experiences that determine how and what one understands. By relating Gadamer’s 
philosophy to Woolf’s novels, one engages with an enactment and practical instantiation 
of Gadamer’s philosophical approach. Gadamer stresses the link between the literary text 
and one’s interpretation of daily existence. In all cases, the literary text is only 
understandable as it relates to one’s world and one’s world becomes more understandable 
as it interacts with the literary text. Through interrogation of this interaction, one 
confronts the concept of interpretation and its implications.  
 Interpretation, for its part, hinges on the indivisibility between language, meaning, 
and world. Language is necessarily interpretive; the meaning of the world and its 
appearance in language constitute a non-distinction. That the world meaningfully appears 
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in language is of special importance; human being is tuned to engage with the appearance 
and the meaning of the world and art belongs to this process. An artwork engages one’s 
perceptions of the world and its meaningfulness; by means of art one might gain insight 
and understand better. In all cases—whenever and wherever the concept of interpretation 
is involved—the dialogical situation is crucial. All language use, all interpretation, 
belongs to a concrete situation and this situation determines the understandability and 
appropriateness of all statements and assertions.  
 Embedded in their cultural and historical worlds, Woolf’s fiction and Gadamer’s 
philosophy arose in response to the encroaching impersonality of scientific objectivity, an 
objectivity that can be directly linked to World War I, inequality, subjugation, and 
exploitation. As a riposte to the contention that the world can be objectively understood, 
Woolf and Gadamer argue that the world is understood uniquely and individually, 
according to the person who understands. Meaning is in constant evolution, dependent on 
the level of participation and engagement of the individual. Furthermore, in the 
interaction with others, with artworks and texts, the world necessarily becomes more 
understandable, its meaning in clearer focus. This emphasis on the contribution and 
participation of the individual in the meaningfulness of the world lends itself to a 
recognition and acknowledgement of the essential dignity, value and worth of the 
individual; all people should be respected and each person has something to gain through 
dialogue and personal connection. 
 Woolf and Gadamer’s response to the subject-object dichotomy endemic to 
scientific method belongs to the larger philosophical, intellectual, and artistic movement 
known as Modernism. To the Modernists, Western civilization had lost its course, on the 
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brink of mass annihilation. Certainly, in the way people treated one another, in the way 
societies were organized and countries interacted, there was a widespread feeling of 
malaise and sickness. If civilization were to proceed in the same direction, unchecked, the 
consequences could be enormously destructive. This potential for mass destruction, this 
devaluing of human life, has its roots in the levelling process that belongs to scientific 
objectivity: if the entirety of the world can be objectively understood, then the 
contribution and the value of the individual is diminished. Furthermore, this objectivity 
elides the potential for community and solidarity. With people as mere instruments, the 
potential of shared experience and the consequent insight is discounted. In response, the 
Modernists stressed the uniqueness of each individual as he or she interacts with the 
world and the potential insight and expansion of one’s world as he or she interacts with 
others. In addition, interpretation itself took on a special role in Modernism, as 
interpretation necessarily implies the unique contribution and experience of the 
individual. To this end, the Modernists stressed the importance and centrality of art, as it 
necessarily engages one’s interpretive faculties, pushing one to think more, differently, 
and creatively.  
Using these concepts as an organizing principle—in particular, the notion that 
subject and object belong together when the world appears in language—I chose to 
interpret Mrs. Dalloway and To the Lighthouse, two novels that highlight the individual’s 
interpretive opportunity and responsibility. Mrs. Dalloway, for its part, is about a June 
day in London, the war recently ended, still reverberating, and the variety of ways that its 
inhabitants experience one moment to the next. In this novel, each character has a unique, 
personal history, with a particular way of understanding and being in the world. It is 
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based on this particularity that each individual confronts the fluidity of the day, each in 
search of resolution and coherence. This notion of particularity, of the uniqueness of the 
subject is reflective of Modernism. According to the Modernist mindset, each individual 
was seen to inhabit his or her particular world, and this particularity shaped how each 
person interpreted and understood the moment in time; it was up to the individual to 
incorporate and account for this uniqueness instead of approaching the moment with a 
one-size-fits-all approach. Certainly, in the characters of Clarissa Dalloway, Peter Walsh, 
and Septimus Warren Smith one notices this emphasis on subjectivity and the interpretive 
thrust belonging to this subjectivity. In particular, Clarissa and Peter persistently 
contemplate their personal situation and circumstance, always trying to understand how 
the present moment fits with their personal past and potential future. Though somewhat 
estranged, Clarissa and Peter’s deep connection and shared past are decisive for how each 
understands the world. In order to understand the present moment, both consistently 
return to the other, as both have a sense that this relationship is still imminently 
influential, still formative of the horizon of each. The two acknowledge that the world is 
both understandable and mysterious and this recognition informs their approach to 
understanding; instead of trying to master the moment and the meaning understood, the 
two place themselves in situations where meaning might spring forth, the result of 
dialogue and a shared world. Peter and Clarissa privilege experiences of meaning and 
dialogue because each has a sense that his or her understanding, his or her ability to 
control what is understood, is limited. This sense that one is not fully in control of one’s 
mind, of one’s consciousness, constitutes a Modernist trope. Before one is even aware of 
it, one’s consciousness has been shaped, and this shaping is decisive for understanding. 
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Furthermore, scientific objectivity itself hinges on the sovereignty of consciousness and 
in these characters one notices a subversion of this sovereignty.  As for Septimus, he 
represents what might happen when the present moment fails to cohere with the past and 
a potential future. Septimus’ mindset and outlook is skewed by the war; a witness and 
participant in bloodshed and carnage, he was forced to disconnect from people, the 
feelings too intense to process. No longer able to connect with people and estranged from 
his past, Septimus now lives in a solipsistic world, lacking corroboration and inspiration, 
inevitably warped.  Eventually, Septimus decides to commit suicide, the only means of 
reaching resolution. In the character of Septimus, then, one notices an extreme example 
of this Modernist trope of subjectivity—how one’s past and experiences can determine 
meaning, the intense need to square the meaning of the world with one’s experience of 
the world. Overall, the goal of each character is to live in a world that belongs to them 
and to which they belong, a need reflective of the loss of grounding and the 
corresponding search for grounding that is characteristic of the modern world. The extent 
of their success in this endeavor depends on their willingness to privilege personal 
relationships and their potential yield. In dialogue and in interaction with others, one 
never knows what the yield will be, but the difference of the other necessarily leads to 
insight and improved understanding. So these characters seek out experiences that will 
contribute to interpretive clarity, aware that the meaning of the world depends on their 
participation. 
 For its part, To the Lighthouse explores the borders that exist between individuals, 
the difference and affinity that represent both a challenge and an opportunity. That is, 
each individual is particular and unique, yet shared experience and meaning belong to 
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this individuality. The characters in this novel mediate the polarities of familiarity and 
strangeness. As the characters interact, their horizons of understanding and meaning 
expand and refine. As with Mrs. Dalloway, one also notices in this novel a heavy accent 
on subjectivity, on the uniqueness, depth, and unfathomability of the individual and the 
manner in which the individual’s world shifts and changes. This emphasis on subjectivity 
constitutes one of Modernism’s salient tropes, a direct rebuke to the impersonal 
objectivity of the modern world. So, the world of each character alters as time passes and 
each engages with others. In particular, one notices a triangular relationship between 
Lilly Briscoe, and Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay. In the novel, Lilly paints a scene in which she 
aims to represent her understanding of this family and how it relates to the meaning of the 
world. To Lilly, this painting represents an opportunity to understand the world for what 
it is, as a painting is a meaningful whole in which all of the parts fit together, components 
that represent one’s perception of the world. That art is capable of ordering one’s world 
and providing insight is of special importance. The Modernists, in fact, considered art to 
be an essential means of order and understanding. With the world—and its objective 
underpinnings—mired in chaos and destruction, art was considered to be an antidote, a 
means of engaging one’s subjective experience, an experience that directly refutes 
impersonal objectivity while necessarily involving one’s sense of meaning and 
understanding. For Lilly, this painting is a way to engage with her particular way of 
understanding and it is also a means of engaging with the unique subjectivity of Mr. and 
Mrs. Ramsay. In the case of Mr. Ramsay, his life’s work consists of interrogating the 
individual’s interaction with the world and he does so with the utmost intensity, 
concentration, and effort. As for Mrs. Ramsay, she privileges those experiences of 
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personal connection, drawn to them, aware that in them the world might appear with 
greater clarity. In all, these characters participate in the meaning of the world, always 
aware of the provisionality of this understanding, yet still willing to seek out experiences 
that will push them to become more, experiences that will yield truth even as the world 
remains shrouded in mystery.  
 Overall, then, one’s interpretive opportunity and responsibility cannot and should 
not be denied. Each individual belongs to the world and, before he or she even realizes it, 
the world and its meaning has already asserted itself. All one can do is accept one’s place 
in the world and respond accordingly. By engaging with others, with artworks and texts, 
one is afforded the opportunity to confront one’s understanding and refine one’s 
understanding. In this confrontation, one might discard falsehood and embrace truth. But 
it is not a matter of conscious effort; it is a matter of attention and engagement; it is a 
matter of letting what is to be. But the nature of the thing itself depends on the present 
moment and situation; to interpret with clarity it is necessary to adapt, to consider all of 
the contributing factors that determine the thing understood, to include one’s very 
participation in the meaning of the world. This need to adapt, this emphasis on 
movement, is reflective of the Modernist mindset. The Modernists recognized that the 
world is different according to the individual, that this subjectivity is primary. Instead of 
blindly accepting that the subject is master of his or her consciousness, the Modernists 
stressed that this subjectivity is limited, that this limitation should be incorporated into 
one’s approach to understanding. This subjectivity—in its inherent limitedness and its 
capacity for change and expansion—directly refutes the impersonality of scientific 
objectivity, an objectivity that elides the essential value and contribution of one’s fellow 
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being. Furthermore, Woolf’s novels themselves are a refutation of this objectivity, as 
their very subject matter destabilizes static notions of world, self, and reality. Many 
critics have chosen to interpret Woolf through a philosophical lens, but they fail to fully 
appreciate Woolf’s radical critique of objectivity, with these interpretations themselves 
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